emproof
Safeguard what counts

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM
RUB

The Next Generation of Virtualization-based Obfuscators

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About Us

- Tim Blazytko
  - co-founder of emproof
  - designs software protections for embedded devices
  - trainer
- Moritz Schloegel
  - final-year PhD student at Ruhr-Universität Bochum
  - working with bugs by day (mostly fuzzing)
  - code deobfuscation by night

- VM-based obfuscation
- Attacks on VMs
- **Next-Gen**

Motivation

~~Prevent~~ **Complicate** reverse engineering attempts.

- intellectual property
- malicious payloads
- Digital Rights Management

Virtualization-based Obfuscation

Virtual Machines

```
mov ecx, [esp+4]
xor eax, eax
mov ebx, 1

__secret_ip:
  mov  edx, eax
  add  edx, ebx
  mov  eax, ebx
  mov  ebx, edx
  loop __secret_ip

mov eax, ebx
ret
```

Virtual Machines

```
mov ecx, [esp+4]
xor eax, eax
mov ebx, 1

__secret_ip:
  mov  edx, eax
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  loop __secret_ip

mov eax, ebx
ret
```

Virtual Machines



https://t.me/learningnets

Virtual Machines



made-up instruction set

```
__bytecode:   vld  r1
  vld  r0     vpop r2
  vpop r1     vldi #1
  vld  r2     vld  r3
  vld  r1     vsub r3
  vadd r1     vld  #0
  vld  r2     veq  r3
  vpop r0     vbr0 #-0E
```

https://t.me/learningnets

Virtual Machines

```
mov ecx, [esp+4]
xor eax, eax
mov ebx, 1

__secret_ip:
  push __bytecode
  call vm_entry

mov eax, ebx
ret
```

made-up instruction set

```
__bytecode:
  db 54 68 69 73 20 64 6f
  db 65 73 6e 27 74 20 6c
  db 6f 6f 6b 20 6c 69 6b
  db 65 20 61 6e 79 74 68
  db 69 6e 67 20 74 6f 20
  db 6d 65 2e de ad be ef
```

Virtual Machines

```
mov ecx, [esp+4]
xor eax, eax
mov ebx, 1

__secret_ip:
  push __bytecode
  call vm_entry

mov eax, ebx
ret
```

made-up instruction set

```
__bytecode:
  db 54 68 69 73 20 64 6f
  db 65 73 6e 27 74 20 6c
  db 6f 6f 6b 20 6c 69 6b
  db 65 20 61 6e 79 74 68
     69 6e 67 20 74 6f 20
     65 2e de ad be ef
```

https://t.me/learningnets

Virtual Machines

Core Components	
VM Entry/Exit	Context Switch: native context ⇔ virtual context
VM Dispatcher	Fetch–Decode–Execute loop
Handler Table	Individual VM ISA instruction semantics

- **Entry** Copy native context (registers, flags) to VM context.
- **Exit** Copy VM context back to native context.

- Mapping from native to virtual registers is often 1:1.

Virtual Machines

Core Components	
VM Entry/Exit	Context Switch: native context ⇔ virtual context
VM Dispatcher	Fetch–Decode–Execute loop
Handler Table	Individual VM ISA instruction semantics

1. Fetch and decode instruction
2. Forward virtual instruction pointer
3. Look up handler for opcode in handler table
4. Invoke handler



Virtual Machines

Core Components	
VM Entry/Exit	Context Switch: native context ⇔ virtual context
VM Dispatcher	Fetch–Decode–Execute loop
Handler Table	Individual VM ISA instruction semantics

- Table of function pointers indexed by opcode
- One handler per virtual instruction
- Each handler decodes operands and updates VM context



Virtual Machines



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Virtual Machines



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Virtual Machines

```
__vm_dispatcher:
  mov   bl, [rsi]
  inc   rsi
  movzx rax, bl
  jmp   __handler_table[rax * 8]
```

VM Dispatcher

`rsi` – virtual instruction pointer
`rbp` – VM context

Virtual Machines

```
__vm_dispatcher:
  mov   bl, [rsi]
  inc   rsi
  movzx rax, bl
  jmp   __handler_table[rax * 8]
```

VM Dispatcher

`rsi` – virtual instruction pointer
`rbp` – VM context

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

Handler performing `nor`
(with flag side-effects)

Breaking Virtual Machine Obfuscation I

How to reconstruct the original code?

Breaking Virtual Machine Obfuscation I

How to reconstruct the original code?

1. understand VM architecture/context
2. reverse engineer handler semantics
3. write a disassembler for the bytecode
4. reconstruct VM control flow
5. reconstruct high-level code

Writing a VM Disassembler


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

Writing a VM Disassembler


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
mul
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
mul r1
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
mul r1, r5
```


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
mul r1, r5
```

Writing a VM Disassembler


```
0a 01 02 0b 01 05
```

```
add r1, r2
mul r1, r5
```

VM computes `(r1 + r2) * r5`.

Virtual Machine Hardening

Hardening Technique #1 – Obfuscating individual VM components.

- Handlers are *conceptually simple*.

Hardening Technique #1 – Obfuscating individual VM components.

- Handlers are *conceptually simple*.
- Apply traditional code obfuscation transformations:
  - Substitution (`mov rax, rbx` ➡ `push rbx; pop rax`)
  - Opaque Predicates
  - Junk Code
  - …

```
mov eax, dword [rbp]
mov ecx, dword [rbp+4]
cmp r11w, r13w
sub rbp, 4
not eax
clc
cmc
cmp rdx, 0x28b105fa
not ecx
cmp r12b, r9b
```

Hardening Technique #2 – Duplicating VM handlers.

- Handler table is typically indexed using one byte (= 256 entries).

Hardening Technique #2 – Duplicating VM handlers.

- Handler table is typically indexed using one byte (= 256 entries).
- **Idea:** *Duplicate* existing handlers to populate full table.
- Use traditional obfuscation techniques to impede *code similarity* analyses.

Goal: Increase workload of reverse engineer.





Hardening Technique #3 – No central VM dispatcher.

- A *central* VM dispatcher allows attacker to easily observe VM execution.
- **Idea:** Instead of branching to the central dispatcher, *inline* it into each handler.

Goal: No “single point of failure”.

(Themida, VMProtect Demo)





Programming Techniques
R. Morris Editor

Threaded Code

James R. Bell
Digital Equipment Corporation

The concept of "threaded code" is presented as an alternative to machine language code. Hardware and software realizations of it are given. In software it is realized as interpretive code not needing an interpreter. Extensions and optimizations are mentioned.

Key Words and Phrases: interpreter, machine code, time tradeoff, space tradeoff, compiled code, subroutine calls, threaded code

CR Categories: 4.12, 4.13, 6.33

Fig. 2 Flow of control: interpretive code.



Fig. 3. Flow of control: threaded code.



Hardening Technique #4 – No explicit handler table.

- An *explicit* handler table easily reveals all VM handlers.

Hardening Technique #4 – No explicit handler table.

- An *explicit* handler table easily reveals all VM handlers.
- **Idea:** Instead of querying an explicit handler table, *encode* the next handler address in the VM instruction itself.

Goal: Hide location of handlers that have not been executed yet.

(VMProtect Full, SolidShield)

Hardening Technique #4 – No explicit handler table.

- An *explicit* handler table easily reveals all VM handlers.
- Idea

table,
e VM instruction itself.

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(VMProtect Full, SolidShield)

Hardening Technique #4 – No explicit handler table.

- An *explicit* handler table easily reveals all VM handlers.
- Idea



Goal: Hide location of handlers that have not been executed yet.

(VMProtect Full, SolidShield)

SOFTWARE–PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE, VOL. 11, 963–973 (1981)

Interpretation Techniques*

PAUL KLINT

Mathematical Centre, P.O. Box 4079, 1009AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

SUMMARY

The relative merits of implementing high level programming languages by means of interpretation or compilation are discussed. The properties and the applicability of interpretation techniques known as classical interpretation, direct threaded code and indirect threaded code are described and compared.

KEY WORDS Interpretation versus compilation Interpretation techniques Instruction encoding Code generation Direct threaded code Indirect threaded code.

Hardening Technique #5 – Blinding VM bytecode.

- *Global analyses* on the bytecode possible, easy to patch instructions.

Hardening Technique #5 – Blinding VM bytecode.

- *Global analyses* on the bytecode possible, easy to patch instructions.
- **Idea:**
  - *Flow-sensitive* instruction decoding (“decryption” based on key register).
  - Custom decryption routine per handler, diversification.
  - Patching requires re-encryption of subsequent bytecode.

Goal: Hinder global analyses of bytecode and patching.

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\textit{operand} && \leftarrow [\mathbf{vIP} + 0] \\
&\textit{context} && \leftarrow \text{semantics}(\textit{context}, \textit{operand}) \\
&\textit{next\_handler} && \leftarrow [\mathbf{vIP} + 4] \\
&\mathbf{vIP} \leftarrow \mathbf{vIP} + 8 \\
&\textbf{jmp } \textit{next\_handler}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\textit{operand} && \leftarrow [\mathbf{vIP} + 0] \\
&\textit{operand} && \leftarrow \text{unmangle}(\textit{operand}, \mathbf{key}) \\
&\mathbf{key} && \leftarrow \text{unmangle}'(\mathbf{key}, \textit{operand}) \\
&\textit{context} && \leftarrow \text{semantics}(\textit{context}, \textit{operand}) \\
&\textit{next\_handler} && \leftarrow [\mathbf{vIP} + 4] \\
&\textit{next\_handler} && \leftarrow \text{unmangle}''(\textit{next\_handler}, \mathbf{key}) \\
&\mathbf{key} && \leftarrow \text{unmangle}'''(\mathbf{key}, \textit{next\_handler}) \\
&\mathbf{vIP} \leftarrow \mathbf{vIP} + 8 \\
&\textbf{jmp } \textit{next\_handler}
\end{aligned}
$$

How to deal with hardened VMs?

- locate **VM entry** and **bytecode**
- **simplify handlers** with program analyses techniques
- write a **control-flow sensitive disassembler**[1] and reconstruct high-level code

[1] https://synthesis.to/2021/10/21/vm_based_obfuscation.html

Automated Attacks on VMs

Instruction Removal

```
mov eax, 0xdead
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
mov ecx, ecx
add eax, 0x1111
add ecx, 0x0
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
mov eax, 0xdead
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
mov ecx, ecx
add eax, 0x1111
add ecx, 0x0
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
×
add eax, 0x1111
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
```

Dead Code Elimination

```
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
×
add eax, 0x1111
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
mov eax, 0x5678
×
add eax, 0x1111
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
mov eax, 0x6789
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
```

Constant Folding

```
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
mov eax, 0x6789
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
mov eax, 0x6789
×
mov edx, eax
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
```

Constant Propagation

```
×
mov edx, 0x6789
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
push eax
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
pop eax
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
×
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
×
not eax
ret
```

Compiler Optimizations

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
not eax
×
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
×
not eax
ret
```

```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
×
×
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
×
×
ret
```



```
×
mov eax, 0x1234
×
×
×
×
×
×
mov edx, 0x6789
×
×
ret
```





SATURN

Software Deobfuscation Framework Based on LLVM

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

Symbolic Execution

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

Handler performing `nor` (with flag side effects)

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
• mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

Handler performing `nor` (with flag side effects)

rcx ← [rbp]

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
• mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

$$\begin{aligned} \texttt{rcx} &\leftarrow [\texttt{rbp}] \\ \texttt{rbx} &\leftarrow [\texttt{rbp} + 4] \end{aligned}$$

Handler performing `nor` (with flag side effects)

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
• not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rcx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp}]
\end{aligned}
$$

Handler performing `nor` (with flag side effects)

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
• not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\, \text{rcx} = \neg\, [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\, \text{rbx} = \neg\, [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

Handler performing `nor` (with flag side effects)

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
• and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

Handler performing **nor** (with flag side effects)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rcx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rbx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \text{rcx} \wedge \text{rbx} \\
&\qquad = (\neg\,[\text{rbp}]) \wedge (\neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4])
\end{aligned}
$$

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
• and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
  pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

Handler performing **nor** (with flag side effects)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rcx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rbx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \text{rcx} \wedge \text{rbx} \\
&= (\neg\,[\text{rbp}]) \wedge (\neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4]) \\
&= [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

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\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rbx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \text{rcx} \wedge \text{rbx} \\
&= (\neg\,[\text{rbp}]) \wedge (\neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4]) \\
&= [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
[\text{rbp} + 4] &\leftarrow \text{rcx} = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

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```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
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  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
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• pushf
  pop   [rbp]
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$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rcx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rbx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \text{rcx} \wedge \text{rbx} \\
&\quad = (\neg\,[\text{rbp}]) \wedge (\neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4]) \\
&\quad = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
[\text{rbp} + 4] &\leftarrow \text{rcx} = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\\
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} - 4 \\
[\text{rsp}] &\leftarrow \text{flags}
\end{aligned}
$$

Symbolic Execution: A Syntactic Approach

```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
  not   rcx
  not   rbx
  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
  pushf
• pop   [rbp]
  jmp   __vm_dispatcher
```

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[\text{rbp} + 4] &\leftarrow \text{rcx} = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} - 4 \\
[\text{rsp}] &\leftarrow \text{flags} \\
[\text{rbp}] &\leftarrow [\text{rsp}] = \text{flags} \\
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} + 4
\end{aligned}
$$

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```
__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
  mov   rbx, [rbp + 4]
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  and   rcx, rbx
  mov   [rbp + 4], rcx
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&\qquad = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
[\text{rbp} + 4] &\leftarrow \text{rcx} = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} - 4 \\
[\text{rsp}] &\leftarrow \text{flags} \\
[\text{rbp}] &\leftarrow [\text{rsp}] = \text{flags} \\
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} + 4
\end{aligned}
$$

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__handle_vnor:
  mov   rcx, [rbp]
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\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rcx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp}] \\
\text{rbx} &\leftarrow \neg\,\text{rbx} = \neg\,[\text{rbp} + 4] \\
\text{rcx} &\leftarrow \text{rcx} \wedge \text{rbx} \\
&\quad\vdots \\
&= [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4] \\
[\text{rbp} + 4] &\leftarrow \text{rcx} = [\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4]
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} - 4 \\
[\text{rsp}] &\leftarrow \text{flags} \\
[\text{rbp}] &\leftarrow [\text{rsp}] = \text{flags} \\
\text{rsp} &\leftarrow \text{rsp} + 4
\end{aligned}
$$

$$[\text{rbp} + 4] \leftarrow ([\text{rbp}] \downarrow [\text{rbp} + 4])$$

Handler performing **nor**
(with flag side effects)

Program Synthesis

We use f as a black-box:

$$f(x, y, z) := (((x \oplus y) + ((x \wedge y) \cdot 2)) \vee z) + (((x \oplus y) + ((x \wedge y) \cdot 2)) \wedge z)$$

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

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

$(1, 1, 1) \to 3$

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

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

$(1, 1, 1) \to 3$

$(2, 3, 1) \to 6$

We use f as a black-box:

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

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

$(1, 1, 1) \to 3$
$(2, 3, 1) \to 6$
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We **learn** a function h that has the same I/O behavior.

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$$f(x, y, z) := (((x \oplus y) + ((x \wedge y) \cdot 2)) \vee z) + (((x \oplus y) + ((x \wedge y) \cdot 2)) \wedge z)$$

$$h(x, y, z) := x + y + z$$

$\rightarrow 3$

$(2, 3, 1) \rightarrow 6$

$(0, 7, 2) \rightarrow 9$

We **learn** a function h that has the same I/O behavior.

Synthesis Light: Code Book Attacks

Synthesis Light: Code Book Attacks

VM ISA

- $x + y$
- $x - y$
- $x \wedge y$
- $x \vee y$
- $x \oplus y$

- **predictable** set of handler semantics

Synthesis Light: Code Book Attacks

VM ISA

- $x + y$
- $x - y$
- $x \wedge y$
- $x \vee y$
- $x \oplus y$

Lookup Table

$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	8:	$x + y$
$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	2:	$x - y$
$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	1:	$x \wedge y$
$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	7:	$x \vee y$
$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	6:	$x \oplus y$

- **predictable** set of handler semantics
- **pre-computed lookup tables** of I/O samples

Synthesis Light: Code Book Attacks

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$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	2:	$x - y$
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$(5, 3)$	$\rightarrow$	6:	$x \oplus y$

- **predictable** set of handler semantics
- **pre-computed lookup tables** of I/O samples
- SMT solvers to prove **semantic equivalence**

Attack Surface

Shortcomings of VMs

- **predictable** instruction semantics with **meaningful** mnemonics
  - vulnerable to synthesis-based attacks
  - facilitates writing **disassemblers**

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- **predictable** instruction semantics with **meaningful** mnemonics
  - vulnerable to synthesis-based attacks
  - facilitates writing **disassemblers**
- VM components are **independent** of each other
  - isolated analysis possible
  - obfuscation limited to **local** constructs (e.g., handler level)

VM Attack Landscape



VM Attack Landscape



VM Attack Landscape



Next-Gen VM-based Obfuscators

Design Goals



Design Principles

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Design Principle #1 – Complex and target-specific instruction sets.

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- can be **data-flow** dependent

Design Principles

Design Principle #1 – Complex and target-specific instruction sets.

- handler semantics are based on **instruction sequences from the target program**

No meaningful instruction mnemonics for VM disassemblers

  - introduce diversity
  - provide resilience against syntesis-based attacks

- can be **data-flow** dependent

Design Principle #2 – Intertwining VM components.

Design Principles

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- **interlocking** of handlers & semantics to enforce a **cross-handler** analysis
  - mixed Boolean-Arithmetic encodings across handlers
  - dataflow-dependent or multi-threaded opaque predicates
  - merged handler semantics

Design Principles

Design Principle #2 – Intertwining VM components.

- **interlocking** of handlers & semantics to enforce a **cross-handler** analysis
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- analysis **effort rises** enormously

Design Principle #2 – Intertwining VM components.

- **interlocking** of handlers & semantics to enforce a **cross-handler** analysis
  - mi
  - dataflow-dependent or multi-threaded opaque predicates
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Analysis tools reach their limits

Loki

Loki

- industry shifts towards novel VM designs
- academic prototype of next-gen VM
- “Loki: Hardening Code Obfuscation Against Automated Attacks” by Schloegel et al.
  `https://synthesis.to/papers/arxiv21-loki.pdf`

LOKI: Hardening Code Obfuscation Against Automated Attacks

Moritz Schloegel, Tim Blazytko, Moritz Contag, Cornelius Aschermann
Julius Basler, Thorsten Holz, Ali Abbasi

Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany

Current VM Handlers


```
0a 01 02        add r1, r2
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Current VM Handlers


```
0a 01 02
0b 01 05
a2 03 ??
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```
add r1, r2
mul r1, r5
shl r3, 0xff
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


```
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https://t.me/learningnets

Current VM Handlers




```
0a 01 02 00
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```
add r1, r2
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$f(x, y, c) := x + y$

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Current VM Handlers



`0a 01 02 00`	`add r1, r2`	$f(x, y, c) := x + y$
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`a2 03 ?? ff`	`shl r3, 0xff`	$h(x, y, c) := x << c$

Current VM Handlers



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- handler can be represented as (mathematical) functions

Current VM Handlers



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- handler can be represented as (mathematical) functions
- instruction semantics refer to the handler's actual computation

Can we do better?

Merging Instruction Semantics

$$f(x, y, c) := x + y \qquad g(x, y, c) := x - y << c$$

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$$f(x, y, c) := x + y \qquad g(x, y, c) := x - y << c$$

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$

Merging Instruction Semantics



$f(x, y, c) := x + y$ $g(x, y, c) := x - y << c$

Key-dependent instruction semantics

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$

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

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$



$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$

equal

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} & (k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & (k == 1) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$



$$f(x,y,c,k) := \begin{cases} x+y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\Updownarrow$$

$$f(x,y,c,k) := \quad (k == 0) \cdot x+y \quad + \quad (k == 1) \cdot x - y << c$$



$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{cases} x + y & \text{if } k == 0 \\ x - y << c & \text{if } k == 1 \end{cases}$$



Interlocking of instruction semantics

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} & (k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & (k == 1) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

Polynomial Encodings



Hardening Key Selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{aligned} & (k == 0) \cdot x + y \\ + \; & (k == 1) \cdot x - y << c \end{aligned}$$

Hardening Key Selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & (k^2 == q \mod m) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

Factorization

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y \\ + \ (k^2 == q \mod m) & \cdot & x - y << c \end{array}$$

Hardening Key Selection



Factorization

SMT-hard encodings for instruction selection

$+ \quad (k^2 == q \mod m) \quad \cdot \quad x - y << c$

Quadratic Residues

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & (k^2 == q \mod m) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & pf(k) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & pf(k) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$pf(k) := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{ccc} (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y \\ + & \mathit{pf(k)} & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$\mathit{pf(k)} := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1$$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & pf(k) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$pf(k) := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1$$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lcl} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & \mathit{pf(k)} & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$\mathit{pf(k)} := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1 \quad pf(0\text{xabcd}) = 0$

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y \\ + \quad pf(k) & \cdot & x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$pf(k) := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1 \quad pf(0\text{xabcd}) = 0$

✓ ✗

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & \mathit{pf(k)} & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$\mathit{pf(k)} := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1 \quad pf(0\text{xabcd}) = 0 \quad pf(0\text{x1000}) = 0\text{x20ab58bbaa53a22ad7}$

✓ ✗ ?

Point Functions

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} & (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot \quad x + y \\ + & pf(k) & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$pf(k) := ((0\text{xff} \wedge k) \oplus 0\text{xcd}) \cdot 0\text{x28cbfbeb9a020a33}$$

$pf(0\text{x1336}) = 1$ ✓

$pf(0\text{xabcd}) = 0$ ✗

$pf(0\text{x1000}) = 0\text{x20ab58bbaa53a22ad7}$

$pf(0\text{xdead}) = 0\text{xf4c7e7859c0c3d320}$??

Partial point functions for key selection

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{ccc} (n \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y \\ + & \textit{pf(k)} & \cdot \quad x - y << c \end{array}$$

Point functions subvert I/O sampling

$pf(\text{0x1336}) = 1$ $pf(\text{0xabcd}) = 0$ $pf(\text{0x1000}) = \text{0x20ab58bbaa53a22ad7}$ $pf(\text{0xdead}) = \text{0xf4c7e7859c0c3d320}$

✓ ✗ ??

SMT-hard Key Encodings and Point Functions



$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{lll} (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y \\ + \quad pf(k) & \cdot & x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{ccc} (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y + (x + x) \\ + & & \\ pf(k) & \cdot & x - y << c \end{array}$$

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{ccc} (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y + (x + x) \\ + & & \\ pf(k) & \cdot & x - y \cdot (x + y) \end{array}$$

Semantically complex arithmetic operations

How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

```
mov edx, eax
mov ecx, 0x20
add edx, ecx
imul edx, 0x10
```

```
edx.1 := eax
ecx.1 := 0x20
edx.2 := edx.1 + ecx.1
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10
```

How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

```
mov edx, eax
mov ecx, 0x20
add edx, ecx
imul edx, 0x10
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edx.1 := eax
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Recursively replace uses by their definitions

How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

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Recursively replace uses by their definitions

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```
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Recursively replace uses by their definitions

```
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How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

```
mov edx, eax
mov ecx, 0x20
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imul edx, 0x10
```

```
edx.1 := eax
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edx.2 := edx.1 + ecx.1
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10
```

Recursively replace uses by their definitions

```
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10
```

How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

```
mov edx, eax
mov ecx, 0x20
add edx, ecx
imul edx, 0x10
```

```
edx.1 := eax
ecx.1 := 0x20
edx.2 := edx.1 + ecx.1
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10
```

Recursively replace uses by their definitions

```
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10 = (edx.1 + ecx.1) * 0x10
```

How to Build Semantically Complex Operations

```
mov edx, eax                    edx.1 := eax
mov ecx, 0x20                   ecx.1 := 0x20
add edx, ecx                    edx.2 := edx.1 + ecx.1
imul edx, 0x10                  edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10
```

$$f(x, y, c) := (x + y) * c$$

Recursively replace uses by their definitions

```
edx.3 := edx.2 * 0x10 = (edx.1 + ecx.1) * 0x10
```

Semantically Complex Operations



$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{ccccc} & & (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & x + y + (x + x) \\ & + & pf(k) & \cdot & x - y \cdot (x + y) \end{array}$$

Thwarting Symbolic Execution

$$f(x,y,c,k) := \begin{array}{ccc} (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)) + (x \ll 1) \\ + \quad pf(k) & \cdot & x - y \cdot (x + y) \end{array}$$

$$f(x, y, c, k) := \begin{array}{rcl} (n_1 \mod k == 0) & \cdot & ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)) + (x \ll 1) \\ + \quad pf(k) & \cdot & (x + \neg y + 1) \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)) \end{array}$$

$f(x, y,$ Syntactically complex expressions $x \ll 1)$
$2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

47) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

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$\ldots$

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Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

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Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

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2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

47) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$\boxed{x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))}$$

final expression

Traditional Approach

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

47) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

final expression

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
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...

847,000) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

final expression

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

Lookup table w/ *all* identities

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

final expression

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
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$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

~~*final expression*~~

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewriting rules:

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847,000) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

~~*final expression*~~

Recursive Approach

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

1)	$x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2)	$x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$
	...
847,000)	$x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

Recursive Approach

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

$$\begin{aligned} 1) \quad & x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y) \\ 2) \quad & x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y) \\ & \dots \\ 847{,}000) \quad & x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x \end{aligned}$$

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Recursive Approach

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

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$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Recursive Approach

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

847,000) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Recursive Approach

$$x - y \cdot ((x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

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Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

...

847,000) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

Recursive Approach

$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$

$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$

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Recursive Approach

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

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	...
847,000)	$x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

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$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - ((\neg x \vee y) - \neg x)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Mixed Boolean Arithmetic Expressions

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

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...

847,000) $x \wedge y \rightarrow (\neg x \vee y) - \neg x$

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - ((\neg x \vee y) - \neg x)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

final expression

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

Rewriting rules:

1) $x + y \rightarrow (x \oplus y) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y)$
2) $x \oplus y \rightarrow (x \vee y) - (x \wedge y)$

Recursive Rewriting

$$x - y \cdot (((x \vee y) - ((\neg x \vee y) - \neg x)) + 2 \cdot (x \wedge y))$$

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

Polynomial MBAs

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

Invertible function on 1 byte:

$$h: \quad a \mapsto 39a + 23$$
$$h^{-1}: \quad a \mapsto 151a + 111$$

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

Invertible function on 1 byte:

$$h: \quad a \mapsto 39a + 23$$
$$h^{-1}: \quad a \mapsto 151a + 111$$

$$\implies expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr)) \mod 2^8$$

$x - y \cdot (x + y)$

Rewrite as:

$$expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr))$$

Invertible function on 1 byte:

$$h: \quad a \mapsto 39a + 23$$
$$h^{-1}: \quad a \mapsto 151a + 111$$

$$\implies expr \equiv h^{-1}(h(expr)) \mod 2^8$$

$$x - y \cdot (x + y)$$

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Polynomial MBAs

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$$x - y \cdot (h^{-1}(h(x + y)))$$

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$$x - y \cdot (151 \cdot (39 \cdot (x + y) + 23) + 111)$$

Rewrite as:

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Binary Permutation Polynomial Inversion and Application to Obfuscation Techniques

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Syntactically Complex Operations



Taking it all together

Loki: Academic Next-Gen VM Prototype

Design Principle #1 – Complex and target-specific instruction sets.

Design Principle #2 – Intertwining VM components.

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- **MBAs** to thwart **symbolic execution**

Impact on Deobfuscation

Verging on the Limits

Challenges in Code Deobfuscation

Design Principle #1 – Complex and target-specific instruction sets.

- synthesis-based attacks are no longer feasible
- no **meaningful** instruction **mnemonics** for disassemblers

`vadd` vs. `vneg_vadd_vmul_vxor_vpush`

Design Principle #2 – Intertwining VM components.

- shift towards **global analysis**; larger analysis scope required
- analysis **effort rises enormously**: limitations of binary analysis techniques & tools

What needs to be done?

Better Analysis Tools

- better support for **interprocedural** & **multi-threaded** analysis
- improve **tooling for large instruction sequences** (performance and memory footprint)
- advances in **binary lifting**

Yes, these are hard problems.

Selection of Analysis Windows

- **identification** of relevant **sources** and **sinks**
- strategies to **isolate** and **simplify** (partial) **data flows**
- automated **exploration** of **control** and **data flows** (CFG/DFG construction)

Advances in MBA Deobfuscation

- simplification of large **polynomial** MBAs
- improvements on **synthesis-based approaches** to reach higher semantic depths
- strategies to synthesize **constants**

$$(x \oplus 0xf5692443e29a24c2) \cdot 0x3886553866f35c17$$

Conclusion

Takeaways

1. current VMs can be broken in a (semi-)automated fashion
2. industry shifts to novel VM designs
3. code deobfuscation research has to catch up

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1. current VMs can be broken in a (semi-)automated fashion
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Next-gen VMs will shape the landscape of modern obfuscation in the next years.

Summary

- virtualization-based obfuscation
- attacks on VMs (instruction removal, symbolic execution, program synthesis)
- next-gen VMs and their impact on deobfuscation

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