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It's all about certificate authorities and hate.

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T t p s s d p s relies on certificates for it and location that the site is real and the public key

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belongs to that site without a certificate.

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The security of Haiti to use doesn't work is broken.

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The problem is the whole certificate ecosystem is weak and vulnerable to attack.

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The security of HTP S is only as strong as the weakest link and in such a large ecosystem of chains

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of trust a broken link is inevitable vulnerabilities within the ecosystem could enable the creation

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of bogus certificates.

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The Everybody then trusts.

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If someone can issue a fake certificate that your browser trusts you'll have no idea that hey CPS can

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be intercepted and read the hated CPS that you associate with in the U L will still be there.

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The padlock will still appear as normal the traffic will be sent encrypted as normal and the certificate

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will look valid and everything will look fine.

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Whoever issued the fake certificate can decrypt the traffic as they know the private key.

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Let me give you some examples of how this is possible and why typically it can't be fully relied on

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and therefore hate.

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Yes can't really be fully relied on.

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Probably the most concerning is the practices of the certificat authorities and vulnerabilities.

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Jus certificate authority mistakes.

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Or if we have a look here.

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This section on the failing of certificate authorities was recorded in 2015.

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I'll provide a 20:18 update at the end.

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It is very interesting to see what I said in 2015 and the consequences of what happened by 2018.

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See the headline.

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Google issued ultimatum to Symantec over an authorized Hastey TPSAC figures.

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So what's happened here is semantic as issued certificates proclaiming to be from Google.

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Google in fact never requested those certificates and semantic is really the market leader in terms

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of typical authority.

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It's the big daddy if you like of certificate authorities these should be the guys setting the standards

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and if we scroll down a little bit go here initially Symantec said that 23 certificates were issued

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and when it means 23 certificates it means 23 certificates that shouldn't have been issued.

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But then Google has disputed this number saying it is much higher following further examination semantic

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said that there was a further 164 certificates over 76 domains and 2000 458 certificates for domains

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not even registered.

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So that's the degree of the current level of concern over the practices of certificate authorities and

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the mistakes that's typical authorities make and this is semantic supposed to be the market leader and

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this is not an isolated incident.

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If we look here we can see five months ago a separate batch of bogus difficulties that have been issued

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for several of Google's domains including which is pretty much all of Google dot com.

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See all these other Google domains they are issued by an NGO based MCSA holdings an intermediate certificate

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authority that operates under the China Internet Network Information Center.

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So you can understand the smallest Devika or authorities are likely to make mistakes and even the bigger

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certificate authorities are making mistakes and these hypocrites that would be issued or have been issued

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would have been trusted by your browser and everyone else's browser.

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So what happened by 2018.

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Symantec made repeated violations and top of those mentioned including mis issuing thirty thousand eighty

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to be a certificate while Symantec continued to go she ate with both Google and Mozilla over the sanctions

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sematic was unable to meet the security demands and ultimately had to sell the business.

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Did you see it.

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The acquisition included the planned timeline to distrust established by Google and Mozilla Firefox

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and Chrome deprecated trust in the semantics Dipika authority including semantic own brands.

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So one of the largest certificat authorities was ultimately able to securely issue certificates re-emphasizing

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my early point in 2015 that certificates and Hastey CPS cannot be fully relied upon due to the bad practices

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of certificate authorities and vulnerabilities.

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You typical authorities.

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There's also far too many trusted parties.

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Let me show you this.

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This is the tree of trust for scientific authorities and we can zoom in here and see all of the different

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troughs and trust relationships

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so civil authorities exist in about 50 something countries there's over 1400 certificate authorities

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trustable by Microsoft and Mozilla.

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Therefore Firefox you've even got it's typical authorities like the Hong Kong post office.

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This is typical authority you've got.

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You have subsidiary certificate authorities like the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. defense

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contractors who are supposed CIA's which leads onto another key witness.

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Nation states will have influence over certificat authorities if not actually be able to just issue

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certificates themselves and be able to claim to be whoever they want to be.

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Facebook Apple your bank and your browser will trust that certificate as it would be issued by a trusted

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CA or subordinate CIA that's within your browser's certificates that it trusts.

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This means the U.S. U.K. China Russia the 14 eyes they're all like to be able to issue fake certificates

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that your browser will trust and therefore be able to view Haiti CPS encrypted traffic that will look

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absolutely normal to you that they will be able to decrypt it.

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So you'll think that you have end to end encryption but not these guys can issue fake certificates than

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to be it's completely broken.

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Something else of concern is the X5 09 standard for certificates themselves.

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This is pretty poorly designed and it's just too flexible in the writing of the standard.

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Somebody accidentally copied and pasted the wrong thing and they ended up missing out parts of the standard

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that was supposed to be in there.

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So you ended up having a standard and then there's the things that should be in it that weren't in the

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standard.

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There was a complete disaster and you can have vulnerabilities in the process of getting certificates.

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An example of that was no bite poisoning where you were able to get certificates for domains that you

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didn't own.

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A nation states will definitely be working on discovering new vulnerabilities to subvert the process

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of getting certificates.

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So if they don't have new ways of doing that now they certainly will have potentially new ways in the

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future.

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And if you have a bogus certificate there's even free tools available you can use in order to insert

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that.

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So here we are SSL sniff.

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So this was originally developed because of a weakness that was found in Internet Explorer but this

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tool could be used to insert a different certificate if you were sat in the middle.

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Obviously if you're a nation state you have your own version of this software where you can insert your

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own certificate into the traffic.

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And as you can see it says it is designed to map in the middle SSL connections on a LAN and dynamically

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generates for the domains that are being accessed on the fly.

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The new certificates are constructed in a certificate chain that is signed by any certificate that you

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provide.

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So what are ways to help prevent bogus certificates and therefore your traffic being decrypted.

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Well you can reduce the number of certificates that you actually trust trigger here auctions.

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Tranced certificates these certificates you can see the hundreds of certificates here that you actually

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trust.

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Now you can remove certificates that you feel are just not necessary.

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What you'll find is that probably 95 percent of the places that you go only need a very small number

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of certificates.

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So if reducing the number of certificates is something that interests you I suggest this is something

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you can google and have a look around.

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Have a play around with removing certificates.

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Obviously what's going to happen.

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Is he going to come across sites that have a certificate chain is difficult that you may have deleted

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that's something you really have to play around with.

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It depends what sites you go to as close that and other thing you can do is you can watch for changes

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in the certificates for the sites that you use.

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So you can see here there's an add on for Firefox call certificate patrol.

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Your browser has many certification authorities an intermediate civil authorities quietly.

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Every time you enter and hasty CPS Web site this add on reveals when certificates are updated.

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So you can ensure it was a legitimate change.

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Let me go down here and you may or may not be able to see that but what it will show you is the fingerprint

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of what it used to be for the certificate.

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And what is the fingerprint is for the current certificate.

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Now this may seem on the surface to be a good idea right.

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Problem is not practical.

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Certificates are changed all the time.

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So you're going to get these pop up all the time and you are not going to know whether or not this tific

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is genuine or not genuine.

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I mean you can get clues because perhaps if they change the authority that they use so they move from

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say Symantec to the Hong Kong post office they know that that's that's a clue that something is wrong.

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These things if you install this extension you'll see you get these pop up all the time so it becomes

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pretty you on practical clothes that.

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Now there's another option if you are the server owner or if you have some sort of relationship with

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what you're connecting to you're able to do what's called certificate pinning and what that is is as

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it says here is pinning is a process of so chasing a host with their expected x 5 0 9 certificate or

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public key.

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There's varying methods of saying I will only accept one specific public key.

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So for example you could tie it to a fingerprint or hash.

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So then if somebody actually changes it it won't work.

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If you use online banking apps for example because I was a security architect for a number of the banking

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apps in the UK one of the security methods there is that you pin the certificates because your banking

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app doesn't need to go to lots of sites.

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You can say just only allow this one public certificate or a number of problems because their first

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money in the middle tries to change their certificates.

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It won't work because you Pindi it only those public keys and certificate printing works for more than

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just Haiti DPF it can work for VPN and SSL and TLR and other protocols that you use with those.

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Another method is to be anonymous in the first place.

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So if you're concerned about somebody reading your traffic then if you're anonymous they won't be able

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to tribute that traffic to you even if they can read it.

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If this makes sense.

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So for example if you are using an anonymizing method so perhaps a VPN or Tor or something like that

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if they then issue a fake certificate and are able to read it they may not then be able to associate

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that back to you.

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It all depends on whether or not you care about them reading the data or you care about them associating

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that data to you.

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Being anonymous is another method and you can also use VPN is to get a VPN which only protects you so

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more.

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So here we have a diagram showing a VPN.

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You've got a VPN to this VPN Terminator here.

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And within that VPN tunnel this hasty CPS using SSL NTFS.

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And then after it reaches the VPN Terminator the traffic comes out as Hastey t p s only if you've got

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an attacker that is only able to get in the middle here is going to prevent them from being able to

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change the certificate.

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If they can get to the traffic here and obviously they can change the certificate.

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An example where this might be useful.

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So say you're in China you care about the Chinese government swapping out a fake certificate what you

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can do is you can VPN out of China and then connect to your server again which will need to be out of

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China and then you can more guarantee that your connection is end to end secure.

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Because you know that they've not been able to change is difficult while it's been in China.

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Now if you want to connect to a server that's within the domain of influence of your threat agent and

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even a VPN can be a problem because once you break out of the vpn then they can decrypt traffic so that

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certificate authorities and hayseed CPS and the issues that you have with them your main line of defense

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is to have defense in depth.

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You use multiple controls in order to minimize the risk and a control here being the the VPN and you

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would add additional controls depending on your level of security your privacy need those controls which

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we can to go through as part of the course.
