WEBVTT

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Hi, in this video
lessonn we're going

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to talk about plain
text passwords, which

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are stored in Active Directory.

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And we're not referring
about the passwords stored

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in Active Directory
NTDS, but simply

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passwords that may be stored
in scripts, or user attributes,

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or anything else in Active
Directory in plain text.

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And that is something
that usually

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is left behind certain
administrators,

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in often cases due to lack
of policies, in other cases

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just negligence.

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But it is something that
happens in real life

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and unfortunately
happens too often.

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It is probably the
most common way for me

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to escalate on penetration
testing engagements,

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by finding on a share
exposed passwords.

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And you would be
surprised if I told you

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how many times it is
a password of highly

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privileged account, most
cases domain administrator.

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So the first product
we're going to talk about

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is passwords that
are stored in scripts

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that are located in shares.

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So what would normally
do is I would recommend

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using an offensive
tool, part of power

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exploit, called
Invoke-Share Finder,

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which is a partial
script that you can

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execute in your environment.

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It will scan every
single computer

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and identify all
the shares which

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are exposed to that computer.

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And what is really interesting
about the specific tool

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is that it will also list
shares which tend to be hidden.

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So it will also
show hidden shares.

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What I normally do is there are
multiple approaches for this,

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of course, some automated
tools, some are more manual.

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I would rather prefer
taking the manual approach

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because I want to also look into
other data, not just the one

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that the script identifies,
while browsing through certain

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shares, especially those
shares that contain software

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or installation scripts.

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Common ones usually are
[INAUDIBLE] and net logon

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because administrators tend
to put a lot of logging

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scripts in there.

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And then, they usually
specify an account

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that they want those
scripts to execute with.

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And then, the password
on that account

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is stored into
the logon scripts.

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My current approach is that
to use the findstring command,

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[INAUDIBLE] arguments to it.

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Specify the word that I
want the findstring command

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to be looking for, and
put it in the strings.

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In this case, the word is pass,
which stands for password.

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Of course, this
would be replaced

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with PW and any
other variations,

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maybe something different
in your language

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if it's different than English.

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And then specify the
location of the share

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that you want to scan.

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So if you take
[INAUDIBLE] for example,

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on the second line
of the command,

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we'll see that the command to
have specify is findstring,

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I'm looking for the
word pass, and I'm

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looking at the
share fileserver01,

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into the folder Scripts.

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And I'm specifying any name
for the file that ends with

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the extension .ine.

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Sorry, ini.

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While ini is not really
the only extension

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that we'll be interested
into, here is at least

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the very basic list
of those that you

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may consider quite interesting.

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So that would be .conf,
.config, .cmd, .bat, .vbs, .ps1.

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Maybe .cs, .js, depending
on what kind of [INAUDIBLE]

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in the environment.

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But these are really
the core basic ones.

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And I tend to find them to be
most fruitful providing you

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with some passwords.

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What I see in many
organizations is

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that medium or large
scale organizations

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where they have multiple
users being administrators

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on many servers, there's
usually a problem,

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or one administrator who
creates a few scripts,

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puts them in a folder called the
script programming [INAUDIBLE]

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or something.

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And then at a later stage,
another administrator

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might put software in
that-- actual software

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for installation, that folder.

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Then create the
folder as a share.

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And that share will
stay essentially

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until someone turns it up, which
in most cases really is never.

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So that will not only expose
the software, which is therefore

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installation, but also
the previous scripts that

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may contain these credentials.

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And here's an
example of if we're

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in the command and
look for batch files,

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it will identify that a
batch file in the directory

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called Scripts is identified.

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And it contains slash password.

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And in this case, what you're
going to notice is that

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the password for this service
account is with [INAUDIBLE] is

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rather--

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to some extent lengthy
and hard to guess as such,

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that is service user
for running web stuff--

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Service user running web stuff.

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It contains uppercase,
lowercase, numbers,

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and [INAUDIBLE].

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But because exposing
plain text an attacker

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can essentially just go grab
it out and use it as his.

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So that is the following here.

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The other problem that
is often encountered

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is credentials start in Active
Directory object attributes.

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For example, in this
case on the picture,

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you'll see that the password
is stored in the description

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of the account.

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So in this case, I'm
using a offensive tool

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called Sharp View.

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And I'm passing up a parameter
or an argument, getdomainuser,

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when specifying some
account name to [INAUDIBLE]..

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So it will extract information
regarding the [INAUDIBLE]..

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And for those of you who are
more familiar with the Active

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Directory command
getaduser, this

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is the equivalent in the
hacking term, which is created

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with LDAP in the back end.

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It doesn't require the
Active Directory module to be

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installed to use this command.

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You just need the executable
or the partial version of it.

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So in this case
on the screen, we

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can see the description
contains pass,

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and the password
being welcome123.

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Now, this is wrong in many ways.

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The first one is that plain
text password is exposed.

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And of course it's indicated
with the word pass.

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Often discovered passwords also
into the information attribute,

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but also in some
group descriptions.

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So someone creates a
group called ISS Users.

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And then in the description
of that ISS User group,

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you'll put the names and plain
text passwords of the ISS user

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accounts.

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And of course that is
really about as well.

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This information is available
to every domain user,

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and that is the main issue.

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It's not only domain admins
who can go and read it.

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If you have a domain user,
authenticated user in fact,

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which will be a
computer or a user,

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you can go and extract all the
information about all users

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in Active Directory.

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Which will contain these
plain text passwords as well.

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I have provided two links at
the bottom, which might go to,

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so to speak, which
are normally used

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to scan for this issue
in User Attributes,

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to scan both a
description and the info

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for containing pass, PW, and
some different variations

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of those.

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You can add, of
course, custom ones

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if your language is
not English, or if you

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think that users might have
different ones other than pass.

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[INAUDIBLE] makes to you.

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You can really customize
it to your liking.

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And at the end of
this slide, I will

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create a small demonstration.

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We'll just show how we
can execute the script

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to identify these issues
in the environment.

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Now, it's really hard to
prevent these passwords being

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stored in scripts and
Active Directory objects.

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First, because maybe they
exist there for so many years

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that everyone has
forgotten about them.

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We need to go actively
scan our environment,

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and check whether we have any
of these being exposed or not.

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Then, it's very hard to change
the mentality of someone who

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has been a system
administrator for 20 years

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to not do something.

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It's really built into a person.

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We can give him many
trainings and many sessions,

00:08:29.700 --> 00:08:34.600 align:middle line:84%
likelihood of a person being
a person is still very high.

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So really, what
we should be doing

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is scan your environment
as often as you can.

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I'll suggest maybe once a
month would be a good interval

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to look and try to identify
any of these issues.

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Because in reality you
shouldn't have any of them,

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and if any of them
are detected, you

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can create alerts,
such as automated email

00:08:56.340 --> 00:08:59.160 align:middle line:84%
or messaging-- a lot of
the messaging applications.

00:08:59.160 --> 00:09:01.890 align:middle line:84%
Anything that you might
desire to indicate

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that there is some issue
that need to look into.

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So of course, even though
we might not succeed,

00:09:10.990 --> 00:09:14.050 align:middle line:84%
we should anyway go and
try to teach our employees

00:09:14.050 --> 00:09:17.252 align:middle line:84%
to not store plain text
passwords, because some of them

00:09:17.252 --> 00:09:18.460 align:middle line:90%
will actually listen to this.

00:09:18.460 --> 00:09:23.440 align:middle line:84%
And it would at least decrease
the likelihood of this issue

00:09:23.440 --> 00:09:26.250 align:middle line:90%
existing in our Directory.

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So let's move in
the environment,

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and we'll just execute
one of the two scripts

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which I showed earlier.

00:09:31.980 --> 00:09:34.770 align:middle line:84%
Just to show you how easy
it is to execute it, and try

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to identify these plain
text passwords that

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may be stored in the Directory.

00:09:42.330 --> 00:09:44.520 align:middle line:84%
I'm not going to
the environment.

00:09:44.520 --> 00:09:47.590 align:middle line:84%
And I'll show you how we can
execute the PowerShell script

00:09:47.590 --> 00:09:49.800 align:middle line:90%
from the slides really easy.

00:09:49.800 --> 00:09:55.230 align:middle line:84%
So first we'll perform
invoke expression,

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and just use any hacker
threaded commands

00:09:58.440 --> 00:10:03.270 align:middle line:84%
that we can in our
benefit as well.

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This is a very common technique
to get, for example, tools

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such as [INAUDIBLE],, which
you can run them directly

00:10:08.090 --> 00:10:09.170 align:middle line:90%
into the memory.

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And the likelihood of them
triggering [INAUDIBLE]

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is very unlikely.

00:10:13.340 --> 00:10:16.070 align:middle line:84%
Of course EDR products
and next generation anti

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viruses are kind of different.

00:10:17.785 --> 00:10:20.960 align:middle line:84%
So they will probably detect
that something's touching

00:10:20.960 --> 00:10:22.430 align:middle line:90%
[INAUDIBLE] at least.

00:10:22.430 --> 00:10:25.670 align:middle line:84%
But because this
will run into memory,

00:10:25.670 --> 00:10:28.400 align:middle line:84%
if it's a traditional
antivirus product you have,

00:10:28.400 --> 00:10:31.250 align:middle line:84%
it's most likely not going
to detect anything happened.

00:10:31.250 --> 00:10:32.720 align:middle line:84%
Although in this
case, the script

00:10:32.720 --> 00:10:34.730 align:middle line:84%
is not going to
reflect this malicious.

00:10:34.730 --> 00:10:36.530 align:middle line:84%
So to execute the
command, we'll do

00:10:36.530 --> 00:10:40.320 align:middle line:84%
New-Object
net.webclient.downloadstring.

00:10:40.320 --> 00:10:42.860 align:middle line:90%


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This is a command which will
download whatever is located

00:10:45.500 --> 00:10:47.630 align:middle line:90%
into the URL that we provide.

00:10:47.630 --> 00:10:52.610 align:middle line:84%
I had already copied the URL
of the searchuser.ps1 file.

00:10:52.610 --> 00:10:54.830 align:middle line:84%
And I'll just go
forward and download it.

00:10:54.830 --> 00:10:57.640 align:middle line:90%


00:10:57.640 --> 00:11:00.070 align:middle line:84%
So it downloads and
takes you [INAUDIBLE]

00:11:00.070 --> 00:11:03.880 align:middle line:84%
directly out of the blue,
for us, which is ready.

00:11:03.880 --> 00:11:05.740 align:middle line:84%
And it actually
comes back stating

00:11:05.740 --> 00:11:08.980 align:middle line:84%
that it found one
user called Slavi,

00:11:08.980 --> 00:11:11.830 align:middle line:84%
that had description
containing pass,

00:11:11.830 --> 00:11:14.800 align:middle line:90%
that it was set to welcome1.

00:11:14.800 --> 00:11:18.550 align:middle line:84%
It was really that easy to go
and scan those user accounts.

00:11:18.550 --> 00:11:20.170 align:middle line:84%
It could be that
some of your users,

00:11:20.170 --> 00:11:22.850 align:middle line:84%
you might have legitimate
reasons to contain the word

00:11:22.850 --> 00:11:26.758 align:middle line:84%
pass, like in passthrough
or some other wording.

00:11:26.758 --> 00:11:29.050 align:middle line:84%
Where you can actually
whitelist those into the script,

00:11:29.050 --> 00:11:31.210 align:middle line:84%
and then just output the ones
that you're really interested

00:11:31.210 --> 00:11:31.710 align:middle line:90%
in.

00:11:31.710 --> 00:11:34.518 align:middle line:84%
So if something new pops up
that you're not aware of.

00:11:34.518 --> 00:11:37.060 align:middle line:84%
So one of the things we didn't
discuss into the slides, which

00:11:37.060 --> 00:11:40.450 align:middle line:84%
I really wanted to outline
is how bad it actually

00:11:40.450 --> 00:11:43.480 align:middle line:84%
is to use passwords
such as welcome1.

00:11:43.480 --> 00:11:45.997 align:middle line:84%
Because I think
with high confidence

00:11:45.997 --> 00:11:48.580 align:middle line:84%
I can predict what's going to
be the next password the user is

00:11:48.580 --> 00:11:49.600 align:middle line:90%
going to set.

00:11:49.600 --> 00:11:52.240 align:middle line:84%
It's most likely
going to be welcome2.

00:11:52.240 --> 00:11:56.740 align:middle line:84%
So having this pattern,
and it might really

00:11:56.740 --> 00:12:00.730 align:middle line:84%
end up being quite
a disadvantage

00:12:00.730 --> 00:12:02.170 align:middle line:90%
in defending our environment.

00:12:02.170 --> 00:12:04.450 align:middle line:84%
You shouldn't teach
your users into using

00:12:04.450 --> 00:12:07.780 align:middle line:84%
weak passwords such as this one,
which are not just guessable,

00:12:07.780 --> 00:12:10.790 align:middle line:84%
but they're increasing
with the number.

00:12:10.790 --> 00:12:13.890 align:middle line:84%
We'll talk about passwords
a lot at a later module.

00:12:13.890 --> 00:12:16.500 align:middle line:84%
So I'll leave
everything for there.

00:12:16.500 --> 00:12:17.000 align:middle line:90%
