WEBVTT

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When it comes to protecting our data in the cloud,

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we need to monitor for compliance.

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This is why we have to take a look at cloud data event management as well.

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What we see is that, in many cases, cloud

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deployments are kind of forgotten about.

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In fact,

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many organizations have no idea how many different cloud

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deployments they're using until maybe they install something

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like a CASB and it opens their eyes to see how much data they

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have in various places on the cloud.

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We need to monitor for compliance,

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compliance with contracts and service‑level agreements.

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The first step is always to ensure there's a contract there that stipulates and

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mandates what type of data protection must be provided as an agreement between

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both the cloud consumer and cloud service provider.

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Then we monitor for compliance.

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We review the logs. Who accessed the data? And this is

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something that should be done on a regular basis.

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Are people accessing the data at strange times? Are people accessing

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the data who don't have a business need to know? And this is something

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that we have to look for to try to discover if there is some misuse of

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our data or inappropriate access.

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We should carefully review access controls.

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Maybe a person worked in one area and needed access to this data, but

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they've moved. They don't need that anymore, and that should be removed

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under principles of, say, need to know. We should make sure we have

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encryption and the encryption is being applied.

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We've seen cases where an organization believed that all of their

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network traffic was encrypted, but when they started to look at it,

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it obviously wasn't being encrypted.

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The other thing we should review is to make sure that old

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equipment is being destroyed, and no one is going to be able to

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pick up our data off of a piece of equipment that a cloud

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service provider has discarded.

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When we do log review, one of the problems is that there's just too much of it.

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We have enormous amounts of log data and certainly not enough

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time to be able to look at it all manually.

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There is a cost associated with storing logs, as well as the performance

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impact on our networks and systems from creating all of these logs. But we

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need a team of people that has the skills and, of course, tools necessary to

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be able to take a look at a log and find the things that are important to

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doing analysis of those logs. A lot of the different events we are going to

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look for, we're going to examine according to what IP address maybe did they

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come from?

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Where in the world were they located at the time? And, of course, to try

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to identify who it was. Was it an authorized entity or was it a suspicious

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entity trying to get access to our systems?

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The idea of geolocation and identifying where a person is

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is also used within an organization.

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Maybe a person's access is different if they're in the office than, for

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example, if they're not working in the office that day,

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they're working from home or at a remote location. There can come

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times that we need to do an investigation. And an investigation in

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the cloud becomes a little more challenging because we have to have

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the cooperation of the cloud provider to provide us the logs and

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information we need.

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So there should always be within a service‑level agreement an establishment of

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a communication path or liaison who we can reach out to that is our primary

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point of contact if we need some information. That liaison will then ensure

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that the information we get is complete and hasn't been altered in some way

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before it was provided to us.

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So this should be done through, obviously, a formal

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agreement because an investigation could, of course, end

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up being a legal matter as well.

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And this also should review what happens if law enforcement needs access to

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our data? There can be times that maybe law enforcement shows up at a cloud

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service provider and they want access to our data.

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We want to make sure that they only get access to the

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data that they are authorized to obtain.

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But obviously, we want to be compliant with any type of

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court mandate, warrant, and so on.

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And the idea of law enforcement is an important thing here because, in

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some cases, even a cloud provider may be required not to disclose the

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fact that some type of warrant has been issued.

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We want to cover this. We want to deal with what happens if the

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cloud provider finds out that one of our employees was maybe

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doing something that is improper,

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even possibly illegal based on those cloud‑based services as well.

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We want to be compliant with the needs of regulators who when

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they're trying to enforce things like privacy laws,

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want us to be able to prove that unauthorized people aren't looking

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at our data, for example. We also have to look at this area of

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criticality and therefore data availability.

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Will the data be available when it's required in a timely manner, for

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example? And that includes not just production data,

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but sometimes archived data.

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Even going back in logs, how long do we keep our logs?

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Do we keep them for 7 days,

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30 days or years? As well as if a request comes in, how quickly

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can that data be then provided back to us?

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It also should be in some type of acceptable format.

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We put the data in a format that we'll be able to read or use as well.

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One of the things that has been a tremendous advantage for many

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companies ever since the days of managed security service providers

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was the use of a security operation center.

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Now, many companies have their own,

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but especially many small companies, it just wouldn't pay for them

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to try to develop the skills or the personnel necessary to do

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proper investigations and monitoring.

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So, those were often provided through a managed security

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service provider as a third‑party service.

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But now we also see, of course, many of the cloud providers

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provide this type of a service as well.

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The advantage is that, let's say,

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a cloud provider hosts information for 100 different companies, and they are

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setting up through their security operations center monitoring of all of their

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hardware, networks, and that allows, of course,

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a central point of monitoring for those 100 companies.

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And it means that the people working in the SOC are getting a lot more

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experience than they would if they worked for any one of those individual

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companies. They obtain the skills they need. They have the experience.

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They're able, in many cases, to be able to detect something, which is

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abnormal faster than somebody else.

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There's also an advantage.

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Let's say of those 100 companies, one of them had a problem.

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Now the staff that is working on resolving that problem learns and can

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go to the other 99 companies and make sure they're not vulnerable or

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exposed to that same type of attack as well.

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There's a lot of advantages through these types of

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centralized monitoring systems.

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When we need to do an investigation in the cloud, obviously

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this depends on our type of deployment model.

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In the case of Software as a Service,

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everything rests really with a cloud service provider with the exception

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of things like access control. I, as a cloud consumer, determine who has

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access of my employees to the data, but all of the data logs and

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everything are really held by the cloud service provider. In the case of

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Platform as a Service, this can be a split responsibility.

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I still manage access control, but it could well be that I have certain logs

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that I manage, but there could be ones that are managed also by the cloud

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service provider as well, say, a database journal.

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If Infrastructure as a Service, really the primary

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responsibility is going to be that of the cloud consumer.

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The only things that the cloud service provider could be involved in was,

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say, physical access or the security of hardware and so on.

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One of the things that's important when we do an investigation

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is to be able to identify who was involved.

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And it's important here that we have the ability through logging,

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for example, to track all activity and be able to associate that

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activity with an identifier, whether or not that's a user ID or

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an IP address and so on.

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But these logs are important.

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They're necessary in order to do an investigation and hopefully

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get the right results from that investigation.

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So therefore, we should very strictly control who has access to those

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logs. We'll often see that logs will be written off to a separate system

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where even a system administrator is not going to be able to get in and,

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say, delete any entries in those logs.

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When we create the log,

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we then calculate what is the hash of that log so that over time

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we can prove that log has not been altered.

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It's still the original genuine log that was created at the time of

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the incident. Storing everything on a separate system can be good, For

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one, it may be a little less expensive,

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but also it can prevent unauthorized access, as well as, as we did

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with databases with remote journaling, one of the big advantages was

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that if the primary hardware was damaged,

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we still have all the log entries on that separate system so

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we can investigate and know what happened or if, in the case

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of a database, rebuild lost data.

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Doing research of, say, forensics in support of

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investigation is often called data discovery.

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When we do this, we have to be careful that we do not violate a person's rights.

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Everybody has certain reasonable expectations of privacy, for example.

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And if we allow a person to use their bring your own device

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laptop, both for personal and for business use,

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I have to be careful that if I'm doing an investigation,

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I'm not looking into their personal data.

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There is a requirement here to comply with regulations.

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People should know whether or not activity is being logged,

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and, of course, they should know whether or not we are

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monitoring their traffic as well.

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An important thing in supporting an investigation is the

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establishment of an unbroken record of everything that has

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happened with any type of evidence during the investigation, and

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this is called a chain of custody.

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It's an unbroken record of who had access to that.

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What did they do with it?

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And, of course, when was this?

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How did they protect it and so on? The problem is that in the cloud

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this becomes more difficult because it's not one person who's the

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evidence custodian who can demonstrate they have had control of

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that evidence at all times.

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No,

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originally it came from somebody at the cloud provider out to the cloud

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consumer. And so there's already a bit of a break there in the evidence

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chain. When our evidence is provided by a third party,

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it's never going to be as trustworthy as something that

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we then actually gathered ourselves.

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How do we know that that third party didn't alter it,

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for example? How trustworthy are they? And as well, did they have

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the skill to make sure that all of the relevant evidence was

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obtained and provided? So for all of this,

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we should have clearly defined procedures.

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How do we protect our information and our investigations so that we hopefully

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will have genuine correct information so that the correct analysis can be

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done? One thing that should be brought in here is the idea of non‑disclosure

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agreements. A non‑disclosure agreement means that if a person has access to

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certain sensitive information, they will not share that with anyone else.

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They will not disclose that to someone else.

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And that, of course, goes everything from business partners to

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competitors to, of course, even a partner or spouse.

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The idea of the NDA is that a cloud provider's staff can have access to our

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sensitive data, and they have to know that it's not permissible for them to

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discuss our data with anyone else at any time.

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In summary, this is the most important domain of the CCSP.

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We've looked at the importance of securing data in the cloud,

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and, of course, this included looking at the areas of data

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classification and from that ownership,

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the appropriate controls such as access control and masking, and, of

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course, having a log so we have a record of what actually was done.

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This in the end was all about securing data throughout the data

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lifecycle so that it was protected at all times, in all forms, and,

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of course, in all places.
