WEBVTT - This file was automatically generated by VIMEO

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 Hello everyone. Welcome back. I want to talk about mythology back

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 into this category on SSL strip as

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 the name, suggests that a curve is going to strip off his

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 of connection, using Madam will attack. Now

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 what the reason attacker is trying to do

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 is because whenever we use SSL protocol over any

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 of the existing such as FTP or HTTP to

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 latch again grip.

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 Jump in and using that the backup will

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 not be able to hijack. Essential information, or

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 any other data that is willing to understand. So

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 the title is going to ensure that

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 if he has able to download this

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 is the protocol itself, then you can downgrade it to

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 http and using that we'll be able to sniff

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 sniff it.

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 Now, one of the primary ways would be to

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 use now, spoofing, this is because we need to ensure that

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 all the traffic is being diverted to that account machine only.

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 It was a proxy. So once we use a

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 proxy server, all the traffic would be reordered to

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 the same foxy, 12 server, and we can terminate the salon that

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 instance as well and read the

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 data in plain text.

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 And one of the last would be back open by Faust,

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 hot spots. The user connects and is not aware that

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 to traffic is being routed. And everything is being

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 sent in plain text.

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 Now what the tool that are going to show today is

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 known as petrol cap.

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 I'm going to assign one of the two places where we are

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 going to strip the traffic this scenario. It would be, it

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 is 0.

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 Now, let's look at basic commands.

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 These are the multiple modules that we need to enable

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 before snapping the traffic. So

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 let's start with setting up.

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 This is a strip.

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 So the next would be questionable the

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 network capture as well.

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 Now, let's perform some up

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 spoofing.

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 - we see that are all

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 the traffic is being cut. Listen, if you're using this tool, so,

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 one of the demerits of using this attack

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 include is scenario, is because not every possible, development

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 of the strong gradient, and the same time,

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 if the users are using any cached URLs

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 to that would not be downgraded. The

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 same time if there are strong hsts signatures

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 set up better than close the

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 browser window, too.

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 Direct to any SSL encrypted traffic

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 only and it will check the domain and soon. So

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 this particular type will not be foolproof

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 given to multiple complications on

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 the browser. So that scenario would be when the user is

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 trying to access an HTTP URL. That article is

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 quid to spoof. All the traffic towards himself. Such

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 that he is able to strip out the

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 surroundings, local machine, and the same data is for to

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 the router and again, back to the server. So that way the combination is

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 Big tin through the tackle in self and

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 this is subscribe would control that the

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 connection is terminated method while he reads the data

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 in plain text.

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 That's it for this video. Thank you.
