WEBVTT - This file was automatically generated by VIMEO

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In this video, we will discuss message authentication codes

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 or Mac.

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We start by defining the security guarantees that Mac

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 provide and what are they useful for?

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We will see how we construct Mac from log ciphers

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 and from cryptographic hash functions.

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We look at both secure and insecure constructions

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 and discuss an example of variability we

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 have with an N secure Construction.

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We have seen in the previous video how using cryptographic hash

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 function retrieve message integrity.

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for instance at least sends a message and its

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 corresponding digest why to Bob

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and Bob does the Integrity verification by recomputing

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 the digest and comparing it with

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 the digest sent by Alice.

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This way Pope is sure that the message was not

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 modified during its transmission.

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Nevertheless Bob has no guarantee

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 about the origin of the message.

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An adversary can pretend to be Alice and

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 send a pair of message that passed the

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 Integrity verification of Bob.

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If Bob would like to check the origin of

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 the message.

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the digest must be transmitted through secure Channel

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 which guarantees the authenticity

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for example in the previous video. We

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 have seen that Bob obtained the digest of some

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 Ubuntu image from the official

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 Ubuntu website. So he was sure that

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 the digest comes from Ubuntu and not

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 from adversary.

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So if Bob wants to verify the authenticity of

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 the message X.

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Alice must transmit the dangerous through another authenticator

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 channel. For example her website that

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 Bob trusts.

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But you see this is a constraint that we

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 cannot always fulfilling several applications.

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And this is exactly the problem that message authentication

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 codes or Mac proposed to

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 solve.

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They guarantee the authenticity of a message.

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even over an insecure Channel

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Mac requires that the key K was

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 generated and distributed to both

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 Alice and Bob

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using this key K and the message X

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at least computes or code C.

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And Depends it to her message X.

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And she sends the pair xnc to

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 Bob.

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Bob that has the key can be compute the

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 Mac on the message you received.

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And can check that the computed code.

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C Prime matches with the code here received from

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 a party that pretends to be Alice.

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If the verification passes Bob can conclude

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 that the center of the message must be Alice.

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the security guarantees that we need from Mac is

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 that an adversary that does not

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 have access to the key k

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is unable to forge new messages.

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in other words

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an adversary is not able to create new pairs of

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 messages and corresponding valid codes.

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Let's better clarify this unforgibility guarantee

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 of Mac.

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We assume that adversary.

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Has already intercepted several pairs of messages denoted

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 by X1 X2

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 all the way to xn.

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And their respective goals C1 C2

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 all the way to CN.

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So remark here.

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In the notation, we are using the super scripts to

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 distinguish messages, but it doesn't

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 mean that these are like powers of some X interests

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 notation to say that.

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The message X1 was sent first then

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 X2 Etc.

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So we expect the unforgibility guarantee to

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 prevent these adversary from

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 being able to create a pair of new message.

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X and plus 1 and its corresponding

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 code C and plus 1

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that passes the Mac check that Bob's runs.

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We call this attack of creating a

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 new pair of message and code macfoldery.

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In a couple of slides. We'll see how the adversary

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 can succeed to do a Mac forgery on our

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 Mac Construction. That was not insecure.

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Now we'll move to see how we can construct message authentication

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 codes from the cryptographic algorithms

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 that we have already seen.

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We'll start with the idea of using block

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 ciphers and in particular

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 the CDC mode of operation that

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 we have seen in section 2.

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Remember that CBC does a training of

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 the outputs of the encryption function using an

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 xor operation?

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The CDC Mac Construction is

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 as follows.

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We divide the message X into n blocks.

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Each block is of the size of the encryption function.

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 So for example, if we are using as encryption

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 function, then we

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 have blocks of 128 bits.

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We encrypt the blocks following CBC Style.

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And we take the last encrypted block of

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 the CBC encryption of the message as the

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 Mac.

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a couple of remarks here

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first remark

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unlike what we have seen with encryption for CBC Mac

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 Allison ball.

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before exactly the same operations

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that's why we are only using the

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Encryption function that is denoted by E. We don't

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 use at all the decryption function the like

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 we have seen with

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regular encryption encryption flow

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secondary mark

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with Mac

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like with encryption we need key. We

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 just omit to represent the key in

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 the diagram, but keep in mind the key is always there.

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And it is the second input to the encryption function

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 and it is the same for all the blocks.

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Great, we should be done for our first Mac

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 Construction, but unfortunately this construction is

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 unsecure.

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The previous construction is insecure.

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Because an adversary who intercepted messages on

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 the communication channel is able to do a

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 Mac filtering.

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Let's see scenario that leads to search Mac

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 rotary.

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Here, we assume that Alice sent three

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 messages.

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X1 X2 and X3

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 of this format. So X3 is

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 the concatenation of X1 and some Block B.

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if the adversary intercepts all these

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Messages and their corresponding codes then

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 the adversary is able to submit

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 a new pair X4.

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Which is of this format X2 concatenated with

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 B Prime?

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And its corresponding code to

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 Bob.

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By only manipulating the messages that he intercepted

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 he is able to do such forgery.

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Let's see how we can do that. Okay. So

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 let's we go back to how we Define

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 our CBC Mac Construction. So remember

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 this is a schema of

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 the construction.

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And we will write the equations particularly for

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 the third message. So the

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 third message X3 is of this format X1

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 xorbed sort X1

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 concatenate with B.

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Then the code C3.

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is actually

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the encryption of the last

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 output

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which is actually C1 here.

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Exhort with a B that is here.

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all this was encrypted under the encryption

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 function e with a key k

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So this is how we computed the C3 here.

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So if the adversary defines now B Prime as B

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 xor C1 xor

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 C2

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Let's look now at the message authentication

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 code of X4.

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So X4 remember is of this format X2 concatenated

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 with B Prime and

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similar to what we have done for the C3

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 here this x2exort with

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 P Prime.

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leads that we have here C2 and

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 here B Prime that is

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exalt then encrypted.

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So the C4 is the encryption

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 of C2 xor

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 with d Prime.

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and

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remember this equality. This Excel is

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 equal to C1 exalt with

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 B.

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And a C1 exhort with me that's exactly the C3

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 that we have seen here.

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So actually C4 is equal to C3.

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So the adversary didn't need to

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 compute C4. He has it already and

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 that's how he can create new valid

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 pair X4 and C4 without

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 knowing the key.

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To fix the variability that we have seen.

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We can encrypt the last encrypted block.

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of the CBC encryption with a new key

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 key Prime

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having this last encryption with the new key

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 prevents an adversary from being able

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 to create new messages that satisfies some

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 relationship with previous messages that he

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 intercepted.

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You can take the time to return to the previous attack and

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 verify yourself. That is no longer applicable.

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I think it's a good exercise to strengthen your

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 understanding.

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And also make Mac from cryptographic hash

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 functions.

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This is a construction called hmac that

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 was published as the internet standard

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 RFC 2104. We

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 assume that we are given some cryptographic

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 hash function h.

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Which internally processes messages by blocks

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 of b-bytes?

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and produces in digest of L bytes

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the construction relies on

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 two bit strings named iPad and

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 opad

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each is of length B bytes.

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iPad consists of B bytes equal to

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 the value

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36 in hexadecimal

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opad consists of b-bytes equal to 5c

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 in hexadecimal

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Computing the mark of message X under

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 a key K is as follows

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if the key is shorter than b we

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 need to pad it with zeros to

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 have exactly B bytes.

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Once the padded key is of length

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 B bytes. We accelerate with

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 iPad, which remember is of length also B

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 bytes.

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Then the output is

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 concatenated with the message X.

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And the whole thing is hashed

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 with the hash function

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 each.

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Then the result is concatenated

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 with the xor of

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 opat with the padded key.

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to construct a new block

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This block is hashed a second time.

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And we finally truncate the result to its.

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T left most bytes

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and this is how we obtain the hmac of

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 X under the key k

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This construction was proven to be secure and

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 is today the standard of Mac

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 from cryptographic hash functions.

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The following table summarizes some of

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 the main hash Mac algorithms using the

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 Shell 256 hash functions family.

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Each algorithm is specified by three lengths B

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 L and T.

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B corresponds to the input length to the

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hash function

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L corresponds to the output length of the hash function

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while T is the size of the truncated final

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 output.

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the hashmaksha256

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algorithm operates on 512 bit blocks

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 of data.

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while the

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hashmaksha, 384 and

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 hashmaksha 512 algorithms

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 operate on blocks of

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 length 1024 bits

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as we have seen in the previous video.

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Shot 256 gives the digest of

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 length 256 while Shah

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 300 84 gives.

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digest of length 304

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and the same for 512

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and the truncation in this algorithms divides

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 the length of the output by two. So

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 as you see for the first algorithm the truncated

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 length is 128 or for

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 the second one is 192. And

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 for the last one 256

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So you can notice here the convention of the naming of

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 each hmac algorithm. So the

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 first part here corresponding to the hash function.

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And then the second part corresponds to

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 the truncation.

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length

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So this is how we name each of these hash

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 Mac algorithms.

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We have seen in this video message authentication codes

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 or Mac and how they provide us

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 with a way to ensure the Integrity of the message and

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 the origin Authentication.

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We discussed how we construct Mac from other symmetric

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 key cryptographic algorithms such as

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 block ciphers using CBC mode of operation and

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 cryptographic hash functions.

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With this video we reach the end of our third section of

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 the course and also the end of our journey

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 through symmetric key cryptography.

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In this introductive course, we present to

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 you the main cryptographic Primitives. However, there

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 are other useful symmetric key to Primitives

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 for instance cryptographic to

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 the random machine readers or key derivation

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 functions.

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We hope you enjoyed this journey through the universe of

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 symmetric key cryptography.

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In the next video, we'll switch to another exciting branch

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 of cryptography the famous

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 public key cryptography.

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So see you in the next section.
