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Hello, everyone, and welcome to this video.

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So in this video, we are going to see an awesome bug which was reported by a security researcher to

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Facebook for which he was able to get a reward of, in total, thirty one thousand five hundred dollars

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for the SRF that he identified.

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That's a very, very interesting find.

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So I hope you guys learn a lot from this find.

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So we are going to do a complete breakdown of this report.

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And the best part is we are going to identify the same one lability into other application as well.

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So let's quickly start and Facebook is the largest social networking site, and he was able to identify

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one of the subdomain after subdomain enumeration and the subdomain was M hyphen.

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Nixa start the Facebook dot com.

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So whenever the user clicks on that particular subdomain, it redirects him to this end point, which

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is slash servlet, slash misti are web admin.

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You can observe into the below screenshot and it says you are all blocked.

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Please contact your sys admin.

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So what he did, he quickly googled the keyword, which was out where Redmond, which was coming into

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the end points when he saw the error.

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So he observed that it was a business intelligence portal that was built on MicroStrategy.

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So MFT R stands for MicroStrategy Overburdensome.

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All right.

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So we have the clue.

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Number one, that we have identified that there is a software of MicroStrategy which is running on my

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Phoenixes, not the Facebook dot com with domain that the researcher has identified.

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Let's move ahead.

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So Googling Mstislav abridgment.

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We came to know that, OK, so it is a micro strategy software, and we can also confirm that from this

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blog, as you can see.

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So it is one of the business intelligence portal known internally as Nix's.

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That's why the name of the domain was Nexxus.

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All right.

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So we have got some of the clues which point that.

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The subdomain is being hosted on to MicroStrategy software now moving it from the official configuration

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document from MicroStrategy, he identified that there are two to two and points which are publicly

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accessible.

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This is the first endpoint.

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But is your company dot com slash MicroStrategy slash servlet slash Mstislav app?

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And second, when is MicroStrategy slash servlet slash TASC proc?

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Let's see, which was the endpoint that we were able to see, which is Mystere.

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All right.

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So we identified that we are able to see one of the endpoint and also these two endpoints are publicly

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accessible.

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Now, going further into the official configuration document of MicroStrategy, the researcher identified

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that the you are l was slash servlet slash Mr Webb.

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Then you observe that task does not require any authentication.

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So it takes a value from the task only parameter to perform some custom, the regulation and content

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generation.

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So by enumerating some tasks using the intruder, he was able to identify the validation parameter where

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you can see over here you can observe.

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And there was something called as a short Yooralla task, which is the process short you order and does

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not check for valid authentication system if you did not understand what basically is happening here.

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So there is an endpoint, which is this endpoint which has been identified and into this endpoint.

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The task I showed you all and the source you are is Google dot com, which the security researcher gave

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to try if this domain, which is Facebook is trying to interacting with any third party domain or not.

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So for some specific reasons, it did not work.

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And you can see the error.

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The source, you are told, is not valid, which means the Web application is not making any HDB request

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or connection to any third party domain.

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So every time it gives me an error message, which is the soul you are told is not valid with a straight

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score of 500, which is internal error.

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All right.

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Then the security researcher thought of downloading the whole application package, which was more than

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400.

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This is the MicroStrategy software.

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So there were several scripts inside which contains some Java files.

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Now, this is something which you guys also need to understand that whenever you get stuck at a particular

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point of time, the best thing that comes handy is download the whole software package.

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For example, if you're working on a party or engineers, try to identify reading from the code itself,

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because that is the time when you may identify many hidden potential flaws.

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Or so you're the researcher downloaded the whole package and he started looking at each.

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Package one by one using Jadeja, I told Sajadi so grateful is used to read the decompiled files of

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Java.

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Now the main target was short, as we knew that short URL is one of the parameter.

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But whenever we try to load Google dot com into it and just through the error.

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So finally I found that our class from Gylfi, as you can see over here, and you can see a very, very

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interesting thing here where you can see private static, final string allow domain equals to dinny.

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You are a dot com.

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All right, so we know that there is a specific domain which is only allowed, which is tiny, you all

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OK?

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So now we know that only tiny Yodle is going to work in there, as you can see into this code.

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Now, you're the source who is not valid at a task exception, is there?

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If anyone tries to load any are, which is not equal to tiny, all of which does not start with tiny.

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So now we know that we are able to load only tiny you are and not anything else, which is Google dot

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com that we tried in the start.

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So now let's quickly exploit so that it is quickly started.

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The collaborative client copied the Bob collaborator's address, went to Dinny You URL and you can see

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this is the collaborator.

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You all converted it into a tiny.

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You are addressed as the tiny Yeoval addresses are allowed Espoo the software configuration and you

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can see over here.

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So this is that I need you all dot com slash the shortened Yodle which was given as you can see, and

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it's successfully connected to the collaborator client.

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Perfect.

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So we have a HDB request on our collaborator, which means it is an external SRF, so that when it is

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present over here, we have identified this.

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Let's quickly see whose IP address is this.

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And you can see this IP address belongs to Facebook, which can be confirmed from the WHO is recorded,

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as you can see here from the website, which is who is dot com slash?

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Who is the IP address?

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Perfect.

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Let's move ahead.

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Now it's the time to test the internal SRF.

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So we are going to create any sort of invalid internal IP address example, a wrong IP address and inserted

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into the source.

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You are URL parameter and observe.

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There is no response from the server, but you can see there is no response.

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But we are going to create a renewal of the internal IP address this time and inserted into the source

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you are parameter and observe it.

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Ask for http basic authentication, which means the server is running htp basic ot on board ADT, which

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can be confirmed over here, which means that we are able to enumerate the internal infrastructure behind

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the firewall environment and we are able to see what's running in the back end.

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But for some reasons, Facebook said thanks for writing in various features of our site, intentionally

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make requests to external users supplied, played host and board.

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So long story short, Facebook did not accept it and said we have the protections already in place,

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so we don't consider this behavior as a security risk.

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So now it's time to dig more deeper.

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So what the security researcher did was he tried to increase the impact of the security of this SSRI

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by identifying Exercice.

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So what he did, he quickly made up of Xerces, hosted on his target website and loaded that target

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website using Dinny.

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You are all over here and you can see a successful exercice over here which can be used to trick users

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and steal credentials.

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Perfect second way using a phishing attack with the help of SRF.

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So we know the Target website is able to successfully load tiny you all we can create and host of phishing

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based on our Facebook login that can steal victims Facebook login credentials, which can look like

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a legitimate login portal, as you can see here.

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And the word express that could not end is the attackers control domain.

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But the attacker will take this domain shorten and using Dinny you are ill and loaded into the source.

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You are a barometer of Facebook which will successfully show a page, which is this which is controlled

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by the attacker.

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So when any victim comes here, login for this credentialled, the attacker is able to get those credentials,

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which you can see.

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These are the credentials which the user will input and you can see where the attacker is able to successfully

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steal the credentials of the user.

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Now, this is something which shows our impact.

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So the attacker is able to steal the credentials and perform identity theft as well as the attacker

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is able to steal cookies using exercice or do a lot of things onto a user's computer.

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Next, the researcher was able to fingerprint the internal network of our services, so what he did

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was he was able to scan the internal network and send in more than 10000 requests to find an open put

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on the server or any application running onto that port.

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So what the security researcher did was he made a couple of tiny jewels and started identifying each

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board number to see which one is open.

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And he identified after scanning a successful application which was running on board, then three zero

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three.

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And the name of the application was lightweight, which can be seen from this screenshot here.

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So before I for further investigate on this, Facebook security team resolved that one liability and

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finally was awarded with a bounty of one thousand dollars.

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Perfect.

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So I hope you guys understood how the security researcher digs in more, deeper and deeper to identify

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the potential impact of the vulnerability.

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So first thing was to identify that only tiny you will go with the second thing, escalate the necessary

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to exercise and a phishing based scenario in which the attacker is able to steal the valid cookies and

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section of the user as well as the credentials.

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All right, so moving ahead, the security researcher has come to mind one more vulnerability, which

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is sensitivity to exposure to increase the bond amount from Facebook.

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So is this the end of the story has just begun.

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So the security researchers started more fiddling with the software package and he identified one of

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the other parameter was also one level, as you can see, all year.

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So he identified that third string is again over one parameter.

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So he identified one more SSRI.

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As you can see, he got a successful request onto his book collaborator Clanked.

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So this way, the researcher was able to identify one more SRF into Facebook.

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Now, if you move ahead now, this is another one that the researcher has identified, which is sensitive

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data exposure.

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And because of the sensitive data exposure, the remaining amount of Bondie is added because of the

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sensitive data exposure.

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For which he was given a bounty of thirty thousand dollars in total.

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That's huge.

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So now the is also reported that refundability to MicroStrategy because it was into the demo portal

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itself, as you can see over here.

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So the researcher was able to identify DEUCY information using the A.W. Esmeralda Epper from the MicroStrategy

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demo portal, as you can see into that screenshot over here.

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And they reported this to MicroStrategy as well.

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And they were generous enough to fix it and they gave a bounty of $ 500.

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So in total, thirty one thousand five hundred, in which one thousand dollars was for the SRF, three

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thousand for sensitive data leakage and five hundred dollars again for the same as SRF.

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On to the demo folder of MicroStrategy.

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So I hope you guys understand this report.

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I'm going to put the link into the description so you can just go over there and read the whole report

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again.

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In the next video, we are going to replicate the scenario and we are going to identify the same bug

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in the live Web website.

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Thank you.
