1 00:00:10,690 --> 00:00:12,790 Welcome back everyone to one of those video effects. 2 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:15,550 But my goal is this under worse engineering course. 3 00:00:15,700 --> 00:00:23,830 In this video how we are going to do a demo of how we can analyze a suspicious of malicious speak app 4 00:00:23,830 --> 00:00:26,320 that contains X like traffic. 5 00:00:26,320 --> 00:00:32,350 So in the pre-history of videos we talked about wireshark we talked about that that captures we talked 6 00:00:32,350 --> 00:00:36,160 about Fritos and how we can narrow down our search reserves. 7 00:00:36,310 --> 00:00:40,650 And we also talked about exploits Gates as a delivery mechanism. 8 00:00:40,900 --> 00:00:47,380 There's that movie are going to combine all these aspects are we going to look at the peak up in Wireshark 9 00:00:47,380 --> 00:00:52,670 and we'll be applying a bunch of fingers to basically analyze and extrapolate them and all them that. 10 00:00:52,960 --> 00:00:59,690 So one of the good resources for downloading peak apps can be dyspepsy card malware traffic analysis 11 00:00:59,800 --> 00:01:00,770 dot net. 12 00:01:00,790 --> 00:01:08,080 This website is an excellent resource for the gaps that are explicitly littered with exposed Gates malware 13 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:10,240 sends spams. 14 00:01:10,600 --> 00:01:15,120 So this website contains a collection of for all fifteen hundred feet samples. 15 00:01:15,250 --> 00:01:22,960 You can download them and you can start analyzing those gaps to understand how malware traffics are 16 00:01:22,960 --> 00:01:26,180 captured and how exploit it can be analyzed. 17 00:01:26,200 --> 00:01:32,770 It contains a lot of different scenarios about ex-drug Gibbs spam's Fantomex etc. so all those peak 18 00:01:32,770 --> 00:01:40,450 apps can be really really helpful for you to analyze and get more hands on experience or where analyzing 19 00:01:40,750 --> 00:01:43,560 malicious code captures. 20 00:01:43,570 --> 00:01:49,360 So I just wanted to bring up that all these download activities and analysis activities should be carried 21 00:01:49,360 --> 00:01:50,970 out and you will wash all the wiring. 22 00:01:51,190 --> 00:01:57,670 So as you can see currently I'm in my Windows environment and I have downloaded one of the peak apps 23 00:01:57,670 --> 00:02:05,290 from the site and here's the pick uploaded in washer so we can begin by looking at all the UDP request 24 00:02:05,290 --> 00:02:08,770 and response. 25 00:02:08,800 --> 00:02:17,170 See here is my filter if I press enter it shows that there is a get request followed by another get 26 00:02:17,170 --> 00:02:23,980 request that has a pretty long and vear you or I Papen something similar to what we saw in our previous 27 00:02:23,980 --> 00:02:24,850 videos. 28 00:02:24,850 --> 00:02:26,620 So this you are a pattern. 29 00:02:26,650 --> 00:02:32,680 It doesn't mean that it's actually bad but it does point to some suspicious activity because a lot of 30 00:02:32,680 --> 00:02:37,950 times X-Rite states have these kind of weird your patterns. 31 00:02:38,620 --> 00:02:43,330 So this was followed by a response which came out to be a text Sagal. 32 00:02:43,480 --> 00:02:47,510 So most probably this might be the landing page. 33 00:02:47,590 --> 00:02:51,410 There is another request that is followed by a text here. 34 00:02:51,490 --> 00:02:58,030 So probably this is another response that came back from the X-Rite it again it can either be a landing 35 00:02:58,030 --> 00:03:05,600 page or probably some subset of response that was delivered back to us in the race under get request 36 00:03:05,600 --> 00:03:10,250 which is followed by a response that has mine type of SHOCKLEE a flash. 37 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:16,140 So it seems like after the exploit Kate was able to enumerate our machine it figured out that located 38 00:03:16,150 --> 00:03:19,280 browser it contains that one it will warn you in effect it'll be flash. 39 00:03:19,420 --> 00:03:25,510 That's why a download in a flash exploded onto the machine and there is another get request. 40 00:03:25,510 --> 00:03:33,880 This seems like to be related to the payload download because immediately after this request we are 41 00:03:33,880 --> 00:03:36,520 seeing some Borst activities as well. 42 00:03:36,520 --> 00:03:44,110 So why post activities interesting here is because once malware are the final payload is trub onto the 43 00:03:44,110 --> 00:03:50,910 system the malware will start performing its command and control by sending signals to it so. 44 00:03:51,070 --> 00:03:54,800 And that's where it tries to pull some data to its command and control. 45 00:03:54,800 --> 00:03:58,990 So that's why these false requests can be really interesting to look at. 46 00:03:59,350 --> 00:04:04,900 So let us start by examining the First get requests so we can go to follow. 47 00:04:04,930 --> 00:04:07,150 They should be the same on DCP stream. 48 00:04:07,630 --> 00:04:17,900 So if you see here it seems like the individual visited this Web site and this was the response. 49 00:04:17,920 --> 00:04:26,560 And if you look at the cold closely it seems like a pretty normal as cheaply as DML could. 50 00:04:26,590 --> 00:04:31,840 So you have to figure out the location from where the infection might have started. 51 00:04:31,900 --> 00:04:38,050 So if you scroll all the way to the down you'll see that there is a checkbox could that is present at 52 00:04:38,050 --> 00:04:39,000 the very end. 53 00:04:39,980 --> 00:04:48,120 This javascript seems to be creating an ice free as you can see it's defining a variable. 54 00:04:48,150 --> 00:04:55,640 Q I see that I-frame and then it is creating an element with the same variable name. 55 00:04:55,640 --> 00:05:05,900 So it's basically trying to construct an I-frame that this word high and zero pixel border and the I-frame 56 00:05:05,960 --> 00:05:09,930 is pointing to this particular issue repeat request. 57 00:05:10,010 --> 00:05:16,020 And this seems to be exactly like the request which we just saw in our kneecaps. 58 00:05:16,250 --> 00:05:20,970 So probably this is where the infection actually is beginning from now. 59 00:05:20,970 --> 00:05:26,030 And one thing which I want to bring here is that because this javascript is present all the way at the 60 00:05:26,120 --> 00:05:32,750 end of the SDM code of this website it's highly likely that this Web site might be compromised by the 61 00:05:32,840 --> 00:05:38,110 attackers and they have injected this code into this website. 62 00:05:38,240 --> 00:05:45,420 A lot of times popular content management systems like Wordpress or Drupal except for they they have 63 00:05:45,890 --> 00:05:52,250 a bunch of one notabilities are probably one of their plug ins will have some little video that they 64 00:05:52,770 --> 00:05:55,680 might use can compromise your website. 65 00:05:55,710 --> 00:06:01,110 And once they compromise it they can inject these kinds of scripts into them so that any traffic that 66 00:06:01,110 --> 00:06:07,120 comes to your website will basically get infected by it exploit its. 67 00:06:07,220 --> 00:06:11,630 So let us go back to our big question response here. 68 00:06:11,790 --> 00:06:19,410 So that's the first one that they sledged to this site and get get requests that is right click on a 69 00:06:19,410 --> 00:06:21,530 go to follow the stream. 70 00:06:21,930 --> 00:06:28,850 If you follow the should it be stream it shows that this was the get request and it's the same one which 71 00:06:28,870 --> 00:06:35,470 we saw in the Jetsons scrape in the main website in the previous request. 72 00:06:35,610 --> 00:06:43,380 So the zero holes we got a response and it seems like this web page is also containing in I-frame and 73 00:06:43,440 --> 00:06:47,430 javascript which is pointing to under malicious you are. 74 00:06:47,790 --> 00:06:54,060 If you scroll down further you'll see that there are certain strips which are basically trying to enumerate 75 00:06:54,090 --> 00:06:58,650 browser or trying to look at User-Agent. 76 00:06:59,460 --> 00:07:06,720 So all these groups are pretty legitimate and attackers used these groups to figure out your browser 77 00:07:06,720 --> 00:07:12,500 or figure out the words in Orfield browsers figure out the plugins that are there in your browser. 78 00:07:12,720 --> 00:07:22,950 If he continues trawling down you will see that there is a post the request and the response is very 79 00:07:22,950 --> 00:07:24,690 off the script of script. 80 00:07:24,750 --> 00:07:32,930 So this seems like the name page of the exploited as you can see this is heavily office get hired and 81 00:07:32,940 --> 00:07:36,490 literally nothing can be read in plain text here. 82 00:07:36,660 --> 00:07:43,290 So this is why X-Rite gaps are really really hard to track or really really difficult to understand 83 00:07:43,620 --> 00:07:48,410 because of their heavy obfuscation and my deeper levels of steps in world. 84 00:07:48,420 --> 00:07:52,430 It's not easy to track them when you have a very long Piqua file. 85 00:07:53,680 --> 00:08:00,300 So going back to our request response bill so we looked at this request. 86 00:08:00,360 --> 00:08:07,190 Now let's check this one and seems like it's a response is a flash floods are going good will follow. 87 00:08:07,290 --> 00:08:14,700 It should be the street and as we guessed this is a shockwave flash file and the magic byte is CW as 88 00:08:14,730 --> 00:08:17,060 it means it's a compressed Flash file. 89 00:08:19,170 --> 00:08:25,200 So what do we do here that say if you want to analyze this flash why what they can do here is we can 90 00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:26,150 go to trial. 91 00:08:26,190 --> 00:08:36,680 You can go to export objects and select DP ones we selected the we can select request that shows that 92 00:08:36,770 --> 00:08:39,320 it's an application shockwave. 93 00:08:39,620 --> 00:08:50,070 You can click on see and we can see that probably let's say on our next stop Lekan make as magicians 94 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:51,970 start and establish s 95 00:08:56,060 --> 00:08:57,720 you're going save the flash flood. 96 00:08:57,930 --> 00:09:03,130 Similarly if let's say you want to save the GMAT pages that we just analyze. 97 00:09:03,240 --> 00:09:09,720 You can just select them and you can click on Save just like we just did with chalk the Flash file. 98 00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:16,560 So if you want to analyze the started landing pages or the browser and munitions capes you can similarly 99 00:09:16,560 --> 00:09:22,570 save them here and you can play with them in their day off the station those. 100 00:09:22,640 --> 00:09:28,200 So let's see those days and go back to our request response. 101 00:09:28,330 --> 00:09:32,450 So we know that this was a flash exploit. 102 00:09:32,470 --> 00:09:36,840 Now there is another get request and. 103 00:09:36,870 --> 00:09:40,150 Seems like there was no response associated with this. 104 00:09:40,170 --> 00:09:43,700 We can just close it off. 105 00:09:43,740 --> 00:09:50,610 So this is how we can analyze the data to figure out whether it contains any tracings off exploitive 106 00:09:50,700 --> 00:09:52,410 activity or not. 107 00:09:52,830 --> 00:10:00,870 So this was a great deal more about how we can analyze exploit gates and donated radios will begin analyzing 108 00:10:00,870 --> 00:10:06,870 the suspicious flashlights and the mandate that gets downloaded from the X-book is actual watching.