1 00:00:00,360 --> 00:00:05,010 People who are related to the target company are always one of the most important resources to collect 2 00:00:05,010 --> 00:00:05,640 information. 3 00:00:06,150 --> 00:00:07,710 Here's a stunning example. 4 00:00:08,010 --> 00:00:14,910 In September 2017, The Guardian reported that Deloitte suffered a cyber attack that breached the confidentiality 5 00:00:14,910 --> 00:00:22,260 of its clients and 244 thousand staff, allowing the attackers to access usernames, passwords, IP 6 00:00:22,260 --> 00:00:26,490 addresses, architectural diagrams for businesses and health information. 7 00:00:26,970 --> 00:00:33,360 A developer working for Deloitte as an outsourced put the credentials to GitHub so anyone who visits 8 00:00:33,360 --> 00:00:38,640 his GitHub account could see the credentials to access the critical systems of Deloitte. 9 00:00:39,330 --> 00:00:44,550 And you think this single example is enough to show that searching for people who are related to target 10 00:00:44,550 --> 00:00:47,970 company is one of the most important parts of information gathering? 11 00:00:48,540 --> 00:00:54,110 In which social network platforms do they have accounts, what do they share, etc.? 12 00:00:55,850 --> 00:01:01,100 Why you're collecting the information about the target company, you're going to find the people who 13 00:01:01,100 --> 00:01:10,100 work for it, you can find more about those people using Pippo dot com or Poeppel website with the world's 14 00:01:10,100 --> 00:01:16,760 largest people's search engine people is the place to find the person behind the email address, social 15 00:01:16,760 --> 00:01:18,290 user name or phone number. 16 00:01:18,920 --> 00:01:25,880 Pippo is a people search engine that tries to be a little different rather than just go off and hunt 17 00:01:25,880 --> 00:01:27,100 for email addresses. 18 00:01:27,410 --> 00:01:33,890 This tries to search through the deep, invisible, hidden web to return contents that other search 19 00:01:33,890 --> 00:01:35,060 engines are going to miss. 20 00:01:35,600 --> 00:01:42,740 The interface is simple typing the name, email address, social user name or phone number optionally 21 00:01:42,740 --> 00:01:44,270 city, state and or country. 22 00:01:44,570 --> 00:01:47,510 Then let it go to see what it'll find. 23 00:01:51,250 --> 00:01:56,320 If you find usernames are nicknames while collecting data about the target company, you should investigate 24 00:01:56,320 --> 00:02:01,810 if the user name or nickname is used in social networks, instead of trying the social network platforms 25 00:02:01,810 --> 00:02:08,140 one by one, you can use check usernames, dot coms, website check usernames, dotcom searches. 26 00:02:08,140 --> 00:02:14,110 The given user name on 160 social networks go to the social network platforms where the user name or 27 00:02:14,110 --> 00:02:15,090 nickname exists. 28 00:02:15,430 --> 00:02:19,660 Look at the profile of the user to learn more about the person from the target company. 29 00:02:20,260 --> 00:02:24,910 Now, if you somehow got the password of a person from the target company, you can try the password 30 00:02:24,910 --> 00:02:26,350 and social network platforms. 31 00:02:26,800 --> 00:02:32,800 If the person used the same username or password in any social network platform, most people do. 32 00:02:33,070 --> 00:02:39,040 You can compromise that account now to engineer, try the username and password values to compromise 33 00:02:39,040 --> 00:02:44,800 the social network platform accounts only if you allowed to do it, even though the penetration test 34 00:02:44,800 --> 00:02:49,900 agreement between the company and you allow it in most countries, you're not allowed to do this.