APPLICATION PROTOCOLS

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PRESENTATION LAYER Threats: Incorrect Data Redndering

The presentation layer's function is to code and decode transmitted data packets. The attacks you may face here relate to attackers potentially manipulating how the data is rendered in web programs

SEVERAL YEARS AGO AN IIS SERVER VULNERABILITY WAS DISCOVERED THAT ENABLED ATTACKERS TO:

USE

HTTP to access a targeted computer's hard disk running an IIS server. The URI address needed to be submitted in hexadecimals

DOWNLOAD

files from an IIS server's hard disk by executing the GET command with the file name expressed in Unicode



PRESENTATION LAYER Threats: Incorrect Data Redndering

FOR BOTH INSTANCES standard character requests were denied by the server. IIS checked if they contain the ../. string that allows a client to move up to a parent folder

BUT IF THE ATTACKER decided to use Unicode to code the / character as %c0%af, the IIS server failed to detect the string, allowing the user to move up to a parent folder of his choosing

THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM was that IIS servers accept and execute commands coded using a code page and Unicode, but only the standard, normal characters were checked against a black list of forbidden requests





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PRESENTATION LAYER Threats: Null Byte Injection

THIS ATTACK THREAT IS NOT EXCLUSIVE TO SERVERS AND IS MORE PREVALENT IN PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

Null Byte Injection as a vulnerability found in most web applications that use high-level languages like PHP, ASP.Net, Perl or Java. These applications still have to communicate with web servers or operating systems, the majority of which are written in C or C++. Both of them have Null represent the end of a string character. In other words, everything that comes after this character will not be rendered





PRESENTATION LAYER

Threats: Null Byte Injection

IF AN APPLICATION IS WRITTEN IN PHP AND USES THE FOLLOWING FUNCTION TO RETRIEVE THE .DAT FILE:

\$file = \$_GET['file'];
require_once("/var/www/images/\$file.dat");

THE ATTACKER IS ABLE TO DOWNLOAD ANY FILE STORED IN THE WEB SERVER JUST BY CHANGING THE STANDARD REQUEST

http://www.server.com/user.php?file=myprofile.dat

into this one: http://www.server.com /user.php?file=../../../etc/passwd%00





PRESENTATION LAYER Threats: Null Byte Injection

IF AN APPLICATION THAT IS WRITTEN IN JAVA USES THIS FUNCTION TO LOAD A FILE:

String fn =
request.getParameter("fn");
if (fn.endsWith(".db"))
{
File f = new File(fn);
//loading content of file f





...



PRESENTATION LAYER Threats: Null Byte Injection

THIS FUNCTION SHOULD ONLY ENABLE YOU TO LOAD FILES WITH A SPECIFIC EXTENSION



BUT if the attacker changes this request: http:// www.server.com/mypage.jsp?fn=report.db



INTO A REQUEST where the correct file name is preceded with Null, he is going to be able to load the content of any file: http:// www.server.com /mypage.jsp?fn=serverlogs.txt%00.db

IT IS WEB APPLICATION DEVELOPERS WHO ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR SECURING THEIR PRODUCTS AGAINST THESE THREATS





APPLICATION LAYER Threats: Confidential Information Disclosure

The DNS constitutes one of the most fundamental Internet services, and consists of two parts:

A DNS SERVER, which responds to client requests

A DNS CLIENT (RESOLVER), which is part of the OS



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APPLICATION LAYER Threats: Confidential Information Disclosure



DNS SERVERS STORE information about hosts (info stored as A record types) and their canonical names (as CNAME records), as well as info about some network services like DNS servers (as NS records) and mail servers (as MX records)







EXERCISE Application Layer Attack



READING registry data: http://serversniff.net



READING

registry data using dig and the dnsrecon and fierce scripts







Threats: Man-in-the-Middle and Denial od Service Attacks

THE DHCP PROTOCOL is widely used in nearly all networks







Threats: Man-in-the-Middle and Denial od Service Attacks

This is how it works:



computer broadcasts a DHCP discover message to locate the servers in a network (DHCPDISCOV ER) The DHCP servers then replies with an offer to assign an IP address to the client making the request (DHCPOFFE R)

Then, the client broadcasts a request to get the IP address (DHCPREQU EST) One of the available DHCP servers confirms the offer and IP assignment (the DHCPACK message) or informs the client the request has been denied (DHCPNAK)



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Threats: Man-in-the-Middle and Denial od Service Attacks

THE CLIENT makes no attempt to verify the identity of the DHCP server

IF YOU RUN your own DHCP server, you can direct traffic through your own router or make client computers use your DNS server

DOS attacks are equally straightforward to launch: it's enough to connect a DHCP server to a network and configure it to assign clients the IP addresses of other networks







Threats: Man-in-the-Middle and Denial od Service Attacks

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Threats: Eavesdropping on and Modifying Transmitted Packets

HTTP TRANSMITS all data packets in the plaintext format. The reason for this is that most Internet resources are publically available, and thus there is no need to encrypt them

HTTP also runs the risk of on-the-fly modification of data. The attacker can:

- Modify data sent to web servers
- Modify files downloaded from web servers. Even if the program you want to download is itself trusted and the website is also secure, attackers can still append malware to it

HTTPS aims to provide the confidentiality and ensure the authenticity of transmitted packets, but what about Man-in-the-Middle attacks? IT SECURITY ACADEMY www.SecAcademy.com





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Threats: Eavesdropping on and Modifying Transmitted Packets

IF THE CLIENT DOESN'T CONNECT to a web server directly and uses the attacker's computer for that purpose, while the web application only uses https to give data a layer of protection, the attacker will obtain full access to confidential data...

... Provided the user ignores a web browser warning about the invalid certificate

IF THAT'S THE CASE, the user will send to the attacker a password encrypted using a certificate that the attacker has, and the attacker will decrypt it and then encrypt it again using the web server's certificate and send it back to the https address entered by the user



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#	R	Protocol	Host	URL ^	O Statistics 15 Inspectors # AutoResponder III Request Builder C Filters C Log - Tendine		
944	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m			
945	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m	2BWJrz2r2d3cErwGP6sql2zyvki3AOGgW5COgim8eW2LX%		
4 6	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m	2BOILAIRd0A6WAR60 IIA3L6WINVXUAR6022012L11g0jH1835D2		
€47	200	HTTPS	www.mba	1	GdiAk%2P%2BjdLukD%2P%2Pju72OMPUSDeS%2Pilq%		
948	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/1140.c	2D52HgAATAKAJ%		
3 49	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m	EVENTD (ALID ATION # 25-53/Aud # 28-50-A-1 #6#		
€ 50	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/ie7.css	2Bi0Dud was CBD2=Eab Cur21E) E 178 2EOF778E18i V8 sustances		
€51	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/commc	2DjoDwLyveCRD3prSbGw715vED7%2rGi2765kBiuTacusiomer-		
52	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/loc	123430780passworu=1ajneriasio123		
53	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/sei	16: 31 64(646		
54	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m	Transformer Headers Teichlew ImageView Hecklew WebView Auth Caching Privac		
55	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/po	Table Day 1 Wilheles		
3 56	200	HTTP	CONNECT	www.m	Entry size 5 223 bytes. Transform		
57	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/bg	Chunked Transfer-Encoding		
58	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/he	HTTP Corpression		
\$ 59	304	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/ye	No Compression		
60	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/gifs/mi	O GZIP Encoding		
●61	200	HTTPS	www.mba	/logon.a	O DEPLATE Encoding		
				Y	O 82P2 Encoding		
(-		2	In these closes, many these pairs and another an encoder whether and the state		
Captu	ung	Y All Processes	1/61 N	tps://www.sbark	.com.pl/logon.aspx		

Threats: Eavesdropping on Transmitted Packets and Password Cracking

ALL DATA TRANSMITTED

using the FTP protocol, including credentials, are in the plaintext format





Threats: Eavesdropping on Transmitted Packets and Password Cracking

THE POP3, IMAP AND SMTP

protocols as well as their secure versions (SMTPS, POP3S and IMAPS) cannot provide adequate security against cracking passwords

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et poczta.interia.pl verified rad user file containing 6 users	
red password file containing 46 Passwords.	
num number of authentication attempts will be 2/6 reing target possts interio of with POP2	=
cind (didd) D052(d.ii)(did.b) With COLS	
g username: wkowalski7654321	





Threats: Key Exchange and Man-in-the-Middle-Attack

Host Identification



You are connecting to the host "torni" for the first time. The host has provided you its identification, a host public key.

The fingerprint of the host public key is: "xuvin-zitil-ducid-gevil-vysok-buviz-nynun-pinat-tylev-gusez-dyxix"

You can save the host key to the local database by clicking Yes. You can continue without saving the host key by clicking No. You can also cancel the connection by clicking Cancel.

Do you want to save the new host key to the local database?



Cancel

No



X



Threats: Key Exchange and Man-in-the-Middle-Attack





THANKS



