NETWORK PROTOCOLS

X

11 SECURITY ACADEMY WWW.SecAcademy.com

PHYSICAL LAYER Threats: Denial of Service

THE MOST BASIC element of computer networks, the function of the physical layer is to transmit raw data bits

BLOCKING DEVICES and media in this layer is the equivalent of launching an effective denial of service attack in the entire system





 \bigcirc

PHYSICAL LAYER

Threats: Unauthorised Access

THE SECOND TYPICAL THREAT

in the physical layer can occur if unauthorised persons obtain access to a medium

BECAUSE IN MANY NETWORKS

this means automatic easy access to all, or nearly all data transmitted across this medium, the unauthorised local access attack is a serious threat for the confidentiality and integrity of data

YOU CAN'T CHOOSE A MEDIUM

that will make you more secure in the face of the eavesdropping threat





PHYSICAL LAYER

Threats: Unauthorised Access

Most protocols running in the upper layers in the OSI model cannot validate the identity of the packet source and cannot ensure the security and integrity of the packet

THE ONLY FEASIBLE COUNTERMEASURES IN THIS LAYER ARE:





 \bigcirc

THE DATA LINK LAYER protocol mostly used is the Ethernet protocol. Ethernet frames carry higher-layer protocol packets

THE MAC addresses of the source and destination hosts are contained in an Ethernet frame header

THE MAC addressing rules:

- If the source and destination hosts are in the same network, the packets are transmitted directly
- If the destination host is not in the same network, the source host forwards packets through a router



T SECURITY ACADEMY



HOW DOES THE SOURCE HOST KNOW THE DESTINATION HOST'S MAC ADDRESS?

The source needs to broadcast requests to all networked computers checking if they have the destination MAC address

Under RFC 826 this request should only be answered by the computer with the searched MAC address

	and and			Expression	Clear Apply			
No.	Time	Source Giga-Byt_7d:f1:66	Destination	Protocol Le		as 197,168,1,80		
			GIGA-BYT 70111166			as 192.100.1.00		
-		Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP		as 192,168,1.8		
		Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP		as 192.168.1.8		
		Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP		as 192.168.1.8		
		Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP		as 192,168,1.8		
		Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP	60 who ha	AS 192,168,1.8	7 Tell	192.168.1.1
	173 32.956814	Netgear_e4:b0:91	Broadcast	ARP	60 who ha	as 192.168.1.8	7 Tell	192.168.1.1
	Sender IP add	is: False] ddress: CadmusCo_al: dress: 192.168.1.86	f1:66 (00:24:1d:7d:					
	Target MAC as Target IP add							



ALL THIS, AND THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

ONCE GETTING A

response, the requester does not validate its authenticity What's more, the ARP protocol is stateless ARP specification states MAC addresses can even be broadcast without a need (Gratuitous ARP) NICs being able to receive all packets sent through a medium to which they are connected

MAC addresses being changeable contribute to the greatest data link layer threat: MAC Spoofing and attackers sniffing out data transmitted through a shared medium





TI SECURITY ACADEMY www.SecAcademy.com



The second layer in the OSI model has two types of networking devices operating: hubs and switches

A HUB TRANSMITS RECEIVED packets across all the ports (to all networked hosts)



A SWITCH TRANSMITS PACKETS only to the one port to which the computer that has the target MAC address is connected

Since today all network architectures include switches, simply connecting a computer to a local network may not allow the attacker to sniff out data that is transmitted in the network



IT SECURITY ACADEMY www.SecAcademy.com DATA LINK LAYER Threats: ARP Poisoning









Method #1: flooding a switch with fake MAC addresses and associated fake IP addresses THIS ATTACK:







DATA LINK LAYER Threats: ARP Poisoning

METHOD #2: poisoning the ARP cache in the targeted computer

SINCE IT'S ARP that is responsible for translating MAC addresses into their associated IP addresses, by modifying the ARP cache the attacker can cause packets sent to the IP address of server X to be in fact sent to the computer chosen by the attacker

IF THAT SERVER'S ARP cache becomes poisoned as well, and the attacker's computer will forward received data to its original destinations, the communications between client and server will not be interrupted: however, the attacker has full access to all the data transmitted





DATA LINK LAYER Protection: 802.1x standard

THE 802.1X STANDARD

provides definitions for medium access control techniques both in wired and wireless networks



IT SECURITY ACADEMY www.SecAcademy.com 00

DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard

A CLIENT

(supplicant) must have an authentication code, which could be a certificate issued for the computer (EAP-TLS) or a password (EAP-PSK)



A RADIUS

server verifies computers' identity and allows the switch to open a given port or blocks this

AN AUTHENTICATOR

(a switch in wireless networks) is supposed to be a RADIUS server's proxy. It only opens a port if a computer trying to connect can prove its identity



DATA LINK LAYER Protection: 802.1x standard

THIS SOLUTION IS FUNDAMENTALLY flawed: once a computer is granted access, all other computers connected to the port will be able to listen on the data transmitted over this port

WHAT'S MORE, ALL PACKETS SENT through this port will be accepted provided the MAC address of the source matches the MAC address of the authenticated computer





DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard



DATA LINK LAYER Protection: 802.1x standard

THE BEST PROTECTION

in this layer is still turning off all unneeded port switches

DIVIDING A NETWORK

into VLANs will only help to reduce attack territory





EXERCISE Data Link Layer Attack







NETWORK LAYER

THE PROTOCOLS OF THE THIRD

OSI model layer are responsible for addressing data packets and diagnosing network problems





 \bigcirc



NETWORK LAYER

IP PACKETS are called datagrams





 \mathbf{O}

NETWORK LAYER Threats: IP Spoofing and Routing Tables Modification

SINCE DATAGRAM HEADERS

(like the data they hold) lack both encryption or signatures, the attacker may use a simple method to obtain this information and modify it

THE BIGGEST THREAT

in the third OSI model layer is IP Spoofing, the ability of attackers to change the source IP address

This is used mainly to obscure the attacker's real IP address





NETWORK LAYER Threats: IP Spoofing and Routing Tables Modification

THE IP PROTOCOL

enables routing, or sending datagrams across networks

THE IPV6 SPECIFICATION

stipulates that every computer should be set to listen on for broadcasts about new routing paths and change its routing table accordingly

THIS CAN ALLOW THE ATTACKER

to block all computers in a local network by broadcasting false paths





 \mathbf{O}

NETWORK LAYER TCP Tunnelling over ICMP

A THIRD MALICIOUS threat in the third layer of the OSI model involves the non-convention use of ICMP

THE PROTOCOL WAS never meant to be used for packet transmission, and because of this, it is not blocked in most systems

ICMP MAY BE TURNED however into a vehicle for transmitting data, including TCP tunnelling

						_	_	
Microsoft Network Monitor 3.4								
File Edit View Frames Cap	pture Filter Experts Too	ols Help						
📄 New Capture 📑 Open Captur	e 🔚 Save As 🛛 🚿 Capture	e Settings 🌔 Start	II Pause 🖬	Stop	87 Layout +	a Parser Profile	s + 🖸 Optio	ans 😢 How Do I
🔵 Capture 1 🎻 Start Page 🖏 I	Parsers							
Display Filter								×
🛣 Apply 🐇 Remove 🛛 🖓 Hist	tory 💌 🏹 Load Filter 💌						😪 Save Fil	iter 📿 Clear Text
ICMP								-
Frame Summary - ICMP								*
							es 🕅 Aliases	
Eind * 1 * Autoscrol								
🗟 Find 🔻 🕹 🏠 🕞 Autoscrol			Destination	Desta and Manage	Description	Color Rul	en 60 vinner	Columns •
Prame Number Time Date Local Adju 732 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321	10.0.0.1	Destination 209.85.148.101	Protocol Name	ICMP:Echo Request N	tessage, From 10.	0.0.1 To 209.85	5, 149, 101
Frame Number Time Date Local Adju	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321		209.85.148.101	ICMP		tessage, From 10.	0.0.1 To 209.85	5, 149, 101
Prame Number Time Date Local Adju 732 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321	10.0.0.1	209.85.148.101	ICMP	ICMP:Echo Request N	tessage, From 10.	0.0.1 To 209.85	5, 149, 101
Prame Number Time Date Local Adju 732 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201 737 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101	209.85.148.101	ICMP ICMP	ICMP:Echo Request N	tessage, From 10.	0.0.1 To 209.85	5, 149, 101
Frame Number Time Date Local Adju. 732 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201 737 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201 €	sted Time Offset Process Na 12 7-2873321 12 7.3057696	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1 M Hex De	ICMP ICMP tails	ICMP:Echo Request N	lessage, From 10. sage, From 209.8	0.0.1 To 209.85	5.148.101 0.0.0.1
Frame Number Time Date Local Ady. 732 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201 737 12:14:02 AM 3/7/201 ↓ Frame Details □ Icmp: Echo Request M ↓ Type: Echo Request M	sted Time Offset Process Na 12 7-2873321 12 7.3057696	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1	ICMP ICMP tails	ICMP:Echo Request N ICMP:Echo Reply Mes	(bx08) 62 92 00	0.0.1 To 209.85 5.148.101 To 10 Frame Off: 92 (18 wn x 8	5.146.101 0.0.0.1 (0xSC) Sel I
Frame Number Time Date Local Adju, 732 1214402 AM 37/200 737 1214402 AM 37/200 *	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.287321 2 7.3057696 ###ege, From 10.0.0. Message, 8(0x8)	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1 Hex De [2] De 0028 0032	tails code As III V 77 6E 76 9E 91 77	ICMP:Echo Reguest N ICMP:Echo Regly Mes Width + Prot Off: 8 8 E 4 0 0 8 E 7 6 E 0 0 0 0	(0x08) 62 92 00 AA AA 03	0.0.1To 209.85 5.148.101To 10 Frame Off: 92 (1B wn x 8 00 wn	(0x5C) Sel I
Frome Number Time Date Local Adju. 732 12:14:002 AM 3/7201 737 12:14:02 AM 3/7201 ★ Frame Details ★	sted Time Offset Process Na 2 7.287321 2 7.3057696 ###ege, From 10.0.0. Message, 8(0x8)	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1	tails code As III V 77 6E 78 9E 91 77 00 00 08	ICMP:Echo Request N ICMP:Echo Reply Mes Nidth = Prot Off: 8 8 E 4 0 0 8 E 7 6 E 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 5 0 0	(0x08) 62 92 00 AA AA 03 00 24 3E	0.0.1To 209.85 5.148.101To 10 Frame Off: 92 (18 wn x8 00 wn 2C	5.146.101 0.0.0.1 (0xSC) Sel I
Prome Number Time Date Local Adju. 732 21:4002 AM 3/7/201 737 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 738 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 737 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 738 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 739 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 737 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 737 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 738 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 739 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 730 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 730 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 730 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 730 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 731 12:1402 AM 3/7/201 731 12:1402 AM 3/	ated Tme Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321 2 7.3057696 ###age, From 10.0.0. Message, 8(0x8) x76BB)	10.0.0.1 209.85.148.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1 Hex De [2] De 0028 0032	tails code As III V 77 6E 76 9E 91 77	ICMP:Echo Request N ICMP:Echo Reply Mes Nidth = Prot Off: 8 8 E 4 0 0 8 E 7 6 E 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 5 0 0	(0x08) 62 92 00 AA AA 03	0.0.170 209.85 5.148.10170 10 Frame Off: 92 (18 wn x8 00 wn 2 C)	(0.5C) Sel I
Preservation Time Case Local Add 2017 727 121402 AM 37720 727 121402 AM 37720 181402 AM 37720 * * Example Labor Frame Details Code 10 (0x0) -Checksums: 30907 (0 -Checksums: 30907 (0 -Di 1 (0x1) -Bergue cellumber 1 & 0x1)	ated Tme Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321 2 7.3057696 ###age, From 10.0.0. Message, 8(0x8) x76BB)	10.0.0.1 209.85.140.101 m	209.85.146.101 10.0.0.1 Hex Do 148.1 A E 0020 0032 0032 0032 0032 0032 0032 00	tails code As III V 77 6E 78 9E 91 77 00 00 08	ICMP:Echo Request N ICMP:Echo Regiv Mes Width - Prot Off: 8 8 E 4 0 0 E 7 6 E 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 1 8 C F1	(0x08) 62 92 00 AA AA 03 00 24 32 A 0 00	0.0.170 209.85 5.148.10170 10 Frame Off: 92 (18 wn x8 00 wn 2 C)	(0x5C) Sel I
Prome Number Time Case Lock Adv. 727 12:14:02:443 377(20) 727 12:14:02:443 377(20) * * Frame Details Tome: Echo Request Code: 0 0(90) -Checksums: 30:907 (0) -Checksums: 30:907 (0) -ID: 1 10(x1)	ated Tme Offset Process Na 2 7.2873321 2 7.3057096 swaage, From 10.0.0. Message, 8(0x8) x7888) (0x5)	10.0.0.1 209.85.140.101 m	209.85.148.101 10.0.0.1 Hex Do 148.1 E 0022 0032 0032 0032 0036	tails code As III V 77 6E 76 9E 91 77 00 00 08 00 00 80 01 55 94	ICMP:Echo Request N ICMP:Echo Regiv Mes Width - Prot Off: 8 8 E 4 0 0 E 7 6 E 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 1 8 C F1	(0x08) 62 92 00 AA AA 03 00 24 32 A 0 00	0.0.170 209.85 5.148.10170 10 Frame Off: 92 (18 wn x8 00 wn 2 C)	(0.5C) Sel I



 \bigcirc

NETWORK LAYER TCP Tunnelling over ICMP

To protect the system from threats specific to layer three, consider:



EXERCISE Network Layer Attack









 $\Diamond \Diamond$

THANKS



