



# NETWORK PROTOCOLS



# PHYSICAL LAYER


## Threats: Denial of Service



**THE MOST BASIC** element of computer networks, the function of the physical layer is to transmit raw data bits



**BLOCKING DEVICES** and media in this layer is the equivalent of launching an effective denial of service attack in the entire system



# PHYSICAL LAYER

## Threats: Unauthorised Access

### THE SECOND TYPICAL THREAT


in the physical layer can occur if unauthorised persons obtain access to a medium

### BECAUSE IN MANY NETWORKS

this means automatic easy access to all, or nearly all data transmitted across this medium, the unauthorised local access attack is a serious threat for the confidentiality and integrity of data

### YOU CAN'T CHOOSE A MEDIUM

that will make you more secure in the face of the eavesdropping threat



# PHYSICAL LAYER

## Threats: Unauthorised Access

Most protocols running in the upper layers in the OSI model cannot validate the identity of the packet source and cannot ensure the security and integrity of the packet

**THE ONLY FEASIBLE COUNTERMEASURES IN THIS LAYER ARE:**




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Limiting physical access  
to network devices and  
media



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Monitoring company  
premises and their  
vicinity



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Duplicating the most  
critical connections

# DATA LINK LAYER


## Threats: MAC Spoofing

**THE DATA LINK LAYER** protocol mostly used is the Ethernet protocol. Ethernet frames carry higher-layer protocol packets

**THE MAC** addresses of the source and destination hosts are contained in an Ethernet frame header

**THE MAC** addressing rules:

- If the source and destination hosts are in the same network, the packets are transmitted directly
- If the destination host is not in the same network, the source host forwards packets through a router




# DATA LINK LAYER

## Threats: MAC Spoofing

HOW DOES THE SOURCE HOST KNOW THE DESTINATION HOST'S MAC ADDRESS?

The source needs to broadcast requests to all networked computers checking if they have the destination MAC address

Under RFC 826 this request should only be answered by the computer with the searched MAC address



# DATA LINK LAYER


## Threats: MAC Spoofing

ALL THIS, AND THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

### ONCE GETTING A

response, the requester does not validate its authenticity

What's more, the ARP protocol is stateless  
ARP specification states MAC addresses can even be broadcast without a need (Gratuitous ARP)



MAC addresses being changeable contribute to the greatest data link layer threat: MAC Spoofing and attackers sniffing out data transmitted through a shared medium



# DATA LINK **LAYER**

## Threats: MAC Spoofing



The second layer in the OSI model has two types of networking devices operating: hubs and switches

**A HUB TRANSMITS RECEIVED** packets across all the ports (to all networked hosts)

**A SWITCH TRANSMITS PACKETS** only to the one port to which the computer that has the target MAC address is connected




Since today all network architectures include switches, simply connecting a computer to a local network may not allow the attacker to sniff out data that is transmitted in the network



# DATA LINK LAYER

Threats: ARP Poisoning



# DATA LINK LAYER

## Threats: ARP Poisoning

Method #1: flooding a switch with fake MAC addresses and associated fake IP addresses

### THIS ATTACK:



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Is easy to detect



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May or may not be effective depending on the switch

# DATA LINK **LAYER**

## Threats: ARP Poisoning

**METHOD #2:** poisoning the ARP cache in the targeted computer

**SINCE IT'S ARP** that is responsible for translating MAC addresses into their associated IP addresses, by modifying the ARP cache the attacker can cause packets sent to the IP address of server X to be in fact sent to the computer chosen by the attacker


**IF THAT SERVER'S ARP** cache becomes poisoned as well, and the attacker's computer will forward received data to its original destinations, the communications between client and server will not be interrupted: however, the attacker has full access to all the data transmitted



# DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard

**THE 802.1X STANDARD** provides definitions for medium access control techniques both in wired and wireless networks



# DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard

## A CLIENT

(supplicant) must have an authentication code, which could be a certificate issued for the computer (EAP-TLS) or a password (EAP-PSK)



## GLOBAL TRENDS




## A RADIUS

server verifies computers' identity and allows the switch to open a given port or blocks this

## AN AUTHENTICATOR

(a switch in wireless networks) is supposed to be a RADIUS server's proxy. It only opens a port if a computer trying to connect can prove its identity




# DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard


**THIS SOLUTION IS FUNDAMENTALLY** flawed: once a computer is granted access, all other computers connected to the port will be able to listen on the data transmitted over this port

**WHAT'S MORE, ALL PACKETS SENT** through this port will be accepted provided the MAC address of the source matches the MAC address of the authenticated computer



# DATA LINK LAYER

Protection: 802.1x standard



# DATA LINK **LAYER**

Protection: 802.1x standard

## **THE BEST PROTECTION**

in this layer is still turning off  
all unneeded port switches

## **DIVIDING A NETWORK**

into VLANs will only help to  
reduce attack territory






# EXERCISE

## Data Link Layer Attack



A MITM ATTACK  
using Cain & Abel




# NETWORK LAYER

## IPv4


### THE PROTOCOLS OF THE THIRD

OSI model layer are responsible for addressing data packets and diagnosing network problems



# NETWORK LAYER


IPv4



# NETWORK LAYER

## IPv4

IP PACKETS  
are called datagrams




# NETWORK LAYER

## Threats: IP Spoofing and Routing Tables Modification

**SINCE DATAGRAM HEADERS** (like the data they hold) lack both encryption or signatures, the attacker may use a simple method to obtain this information and modify it

**THE BIGGEST THREAT** in the third OSI model layer is IP Spoofing, the ability of attackers to change the source IP address

This is used mainly to obscure the attacker's real IP address



# NETWORK LAYER

## Threats: IP Spoofing and Routing Tables Modification

### THE IP PROTOCOL


enables routing, or sending datagrams across networks

### THE IPV6 SPECIFICATION

stipulates that every computer should be set to listen on for broadcasts about new routing paths and change its routing table accordingly

### THIS CAN ALLOW THE ATTACKER

to block all computers in a local network by broadcasting false paths




# NETWORK LAYER

## TCP Tunnelling over ICMP

A **THIRD MALICIOUS** threat in the third layer of the OSI model involves the non-convention use of ICMP

**THE PROTOCOL WAS** never meant to be used for packet transmission, and because of this, it is not blocked in most systems

**ICMP MAY BE TURNED** however into a vehicle for transmitting data, including TCP tunnelling



# NETWORK LAYER

## TCP Tunnelling over ICMP

To protect the system from threats specific to layer three, consider:





# EXERCISE


## Network Layer Attack



**IP SPOOFING**  
using nmap



**DOS ATTACKS**  
using routing broadcasts



**THANKS**

