WEBVTT

00:00:00.079 --> 00:00:00.783
And not to mention,

00:00:00.783 --> 00:00:03.260
these aren't just tools that just happen to exist on the system.

00:00:03.261 --> 00:00:06.439
They're tools that are actively used, not just by the OS,

00:00:06.439 --> 00:00:09.565
but also by system admins and normal processes,

00:00:09.566 --> 00:00:11.392
and GPO applications, and stuff like that.

00:00:11.393 --> 00:00:13.092
So if you're looking at it from a traffic perspective,

00:00:13.092 --> 00:00:17.777
how do you separate what is bad from what's good?

00:00:17.778 --> 00:00:20.544
It can be very difficult.

00:00:20.544 --> 00:00:20.832
You're right.

00:00:20.832 --> 00:00:22.552
There's a lot of noise that's occurring on the system.

00:00:22.553 --> 00:00:26.313
So even when you do turn on logging that you're going to have

00:00:26.313 --> 00:00:28.190
all this other stuff being logged as well.

00:00:28.191 --> 00:00:29.553
So at some point,

00:00:29.553 --> 00:00:33.485
it almost becomes like you're looking for a needle in a stack of needles.

00:00:33.486 --> 00:00:34.705
You need to go in there,

00:00:34.705 --> 00:00:38.194
and you need to recognize what these techniques look like,

00:00:38.195 --> 00:00:39.266
even when you turn on logging,

00:00:39.266 --> 00:00:42.243
and you have to look for those specific indicators.

00:00:42.244 --> 00:00:45.660
And there are some indicators that are easier to detect than others,

00:00:45.660 --> 00:00:47.283
like what we saw in the demo.

00:00:47.283 --> 00:00:49.140
We saw the encoded PowerShell command.

00:00:49.140 --> 00:00:53.426
You're probably not going to see that used too often in legitimate code.

00:00:53.426 --> 00:00:58.005
A systems administrator doing it, you may see that happen a couple times,

00:00:58.005 --> 00:01:01.343
but for the most part, you're not going to see that.

00:01:01.343 --> 00:01:03.999
So when you see an encoded PowerShell command,

00:01:03.999 --> 00:01:06.748
that's something that you can focus in on.

00:01:06.748 --> 00:01:12.320
If you see a, with WMI with the event subscriptions,

00:01:12.320 --> 00:01:13.094
in an organization,

00:01:13.094 --> 00:01:15.544
there should be a finite amount of event subscriptions

00:01:15.544 --> 00:01:18.070
that you have installed on your systems.

00:01:18.070 --> 00:01:20.961
So that behavior is known, and you make a baseline out of that.

00:01:20.962 --> 00:01:21.153
Exactly.

00:01:21.153 --> 00:01:25.516
You can make that baseline, and then when you go and you look at your systems,

00:01:25.516 --> 00:01:27.435
if you see something outside that baseline,

00:01:27.435 --> 00:01:29.293
then that's an indicator right there.

00:01:29.293 --> 00:01:32.717
That's something that you can just focus in on right away and look at.

00:01:32.718 --> 00:01:35.251
But that's not something I see a lot of organizations doing.

00:01:35.251 --> 00:01:38.018
That's a pretty mature security operations center that's looking at

00:01:38.018 --> 00:01:40.101
those types of things and doing that right now.

00:01:40.101 --> 00:01:43.827
When you look at the maturity of Socks and the

00:01:43.827 --> 00:01:47.147
defensive teams of an organization,

00:01:47.147 --> 00:01:51.482
they typically start out with not being able to do all this stuff only

00:01:51.482 --> 00:01:54.352
because they don't have the access into the systems and they don't have

00:01:54.352 --> 00:01:56.510
the tools that allow them to see this.

00:01:56.510 --> 00:01:59.031
But as the organization grows and matures,

00:01:59.031 --> 00:02:03.625
they start to threat hunt more and start looking for these anomalies

00:02:03.625 --> 00:02:06.043
and looking for these things that are really weird.

00:02:06.043 --> 00:02:08.357
Before that, they're fighting fires constantly.

00:02:08.357 --> 00:02:11.213
They're dealing with the commodity malware that is getting detected,

00:02:11.213 --> 00:02:15.549
and so that even allows the attackers to hide even more.

00:02:15.549 --> 00:02:18.159
If there is ransomware on a system over here,

00:02:18.159 --> 00:02:23.128
then the attacker can easily be over here on another computer,

00:02:23.128 --> 00:02:25.830
and the defenders are probably not even going to notice it

00:02:25.830 --> 00:02:27.366
because they're fighting all these fires over here,

00:02:27.366 --> 00:02:29.380
they're getting calls from the CIO asking when is

00:02:29.380 --> 00:02:33.946
this going to be taken care of, when will our files get back,

00:02:33.946 --> 00:02:35.278
and then so on.

00:02:35.278 --> 00:02:38.622
And so it's very easy for the attackers using these

00:02:38.622 --> 00:02:42.043
techniques to hide in the noise, not only that's on the system,

00:02:42.043 --> 00:02:43.869
but also happening within the organization.

00:02:43.869 --> 00:02:44.003
Yeah,

00:02:44.003 --> 00:02:46.583
and that's something that I've seen before too is even the

00:02:46.583 --> 00:02:49.702
same attacker will execute a noisy attack and then a

00:02:49.702 --> 00:02:52.868
stealthy attack at the same time, and this is not the actual target.

00:02:52.868 --> 00:02:57.034
This is just to get your guys spun up so they're only looking here,

00:02:57.034 --> 00:02:58.997
like look at my left hand while my right hand--- Exactly.

00:02:58.997 --> 00:03:00.475
That happens a lot.

00:03:00.475 --> 00:03:03.045
That's a great technique for attackers to use.

00:03:03.046 --> 00:03:07.388
And in fact, I've even seen attackers that have compromised systems,

00:03:07.388 --> 00:03:12.455
and they put their backdoors to sleep for like 30 days.

00:03:12.455 --> 00:03:15.080
So they compromise a system,

00:03:15.080 --> 00:03:19.059
and their backdoor doesn't even contact them again for another 30 days.

00:03:19.059 --> 00:03:21.215
So as a defender, if I,

00:03:21.215 --> 00:03:24.718
and if they compromise another system and lose that system,

00:03:24.718 --> 00:03:25.654
as a defender,

00:03:25.654 --> 00:03:28.542
I may not go out and look for all of the other

00:03:28.542 --> 00:03:29.839
systems that have been compromised.

00:03:29.839 --> 00:03:33.292
And then all the attacker has to do is wait for that

00:03:33.292 --> 00:03:35.907
backdoor to wake up in a couple of weeks,

00:03:35.908 --> 00:03:37.658
and then they have access back into the system.

00:03:37.659 --> 00:03:39.778
They have all the time in the world to wait.

00:03:39.778 --> 00:03:40.099
Yeah.

00:03:40.099 --> 00:03:43.354
And that's important awareness too for a security operation team

00:03:43.354 --> 00:03:45.748
and CIOs who are implementing these teams.

00:03:45.749 --> 00:03:49.239
And as your security operations guys are looking at the stuff

00:03:49.239 --> 00:03:52.242
that's known and attackers leverage that information knowing that

00:03:52.242 --> 00:03:53.772
you're using the signature analysis,

00:03:53.773 --> 00:03:56.720
you're doing all you can putting out the normal fires to then go

00:03:56.720 --> 00:04:00.327
ahead and use kind of these more and more prevalent attacks like

00:04:00.327 --> 00:04:03.723
fileless malware and stuff that's hidden in the background that

00:04:03.723 --> 00:04:05.109
isn't as well know.

00:04:05.109 --> 00:04:06.494
And so that kind of speaks to hey,

00:04:06.495 --> 00:04:08.193
not only do we need a security operations team,

00:04:08.193 --> 00:04:09.762
we definitely need threat hunting guys.

00:04:09.762 --> 00:04:12.369
You have to have your IR team who's kind of developing these new techniques,

00:04:12.369 --> 00:04:16.164
and then you can integrate that back into security operations.

00:04:16.164 --> 00:04:18.175
And I've actually seen a lot of organizations now,

00:04:18.175 --> 00:04:24.593
when you look at incident response, there is a general framework that follows.

00:04:24.593 --> 00:04:25.769
You do the investigation,

00:04:25.769 --> 00:04:30.143
and then you do the eradication where you remove the compromise,

00:04:30.143 --> 00:04:33.193
then you do the remediation, and so on, and then finally,

00:04:33.193 --> 00:04:34.548
you do the lessons learned.

00:04:34.548 --> 00:04:35.586
In that process,

00:04:35.586 --> 00:04:39.914
a lot of organizations have started to include threat hunting in there.

00:04:39.915 --> 00:04:43.193
So the incident does not get closed out until that threat hunt occurs.

00:04:43.193 --> 00:04:46.078
And what you do in that threat hunt in that case is you start looking

00:04:46.078 --> 00:04:49.592
on all your systems then for this adversary to see if maybe they

00:04:49.592 --> 00:04:51.674
pivoted to something that you didn't see.

00:04:51.674 --> 00:04:55.432
Because in an investigation, you're pretty laser focused.

00:04:55.433 --> 00:04:56.408
You're looking at this one system,

00:04:56.408 --> 00:04:58.477
and if you see that system pivoted to something else,

00:04:58.477 --> 00:04:59.831
then you start looking at that system.

00:04:59.831 --> 00:05:01.984
And maybe you're looking at networking traffic and you see these five

00:05:01.984 --> 00:05:04.077
systems over here that have gotten compromised,

00:05:04.077 --> 00:05:06.296
so you're laser focused on those,

00:05:06.296 --> 00:05:10.168
but so you're not looking at anything else in your organization.

00:05:10.169 --> 00:05:12.310
So there could be something that slips through the cracks,

00:05:12.310 --> 00:05:14.275
and that's where this threat hunting comes in,

00:05:14.275 --> 00:05:17.819
and that's where understanding how these techniques work really helps

00:05:17.819 --> 00:05:22.808
to know for that threat hunter to go out and look for this as they're

00:05:22.809 --> 00:05:24.615
looking through their organization.

00:05:24.615 --> 00:05:25.426
Yeah, absolutely.

00:05:25.426 --> 00:05:26.643
So thanks, NIST,

00:05:26.643 --> 00:05:29.787
for providing great framework we could have used for instant response,

00:05:29.787 --> 00:05:33.062
but absolutely, adding in the hey, this is kind of our initial indicator,

00:05:33.062 --> 00:05:35.156
and then through analysis, we found,

00:05:35.156 --> 00:05:37.615
and hopefully we find as this becomes more aware,

00:05:37.615 --> 00:05:41.470
maybe we found some fileless malware techniques used because we were able

00:05:41.470 --> 00:05:44.541
to pull memory in time or get the page file in time,

00:05:44.542 --> 00:05:46.355
and then that's our kind of root cause,

00:05:46.356 --> 00:05:49.088
and then we take our final indicator compromise and the loop

00:05:49.088 --> 00:05:51.927
that back into threat hunt and look for anything that happened

00:05:51.927 --> 00:05:53.181
in the rest of the organization,

00:05:53.181 --> 00:05:55.897
and then probably add that back into the beginning of the detection.

00:05:55.897 --> 00:05:56.803
Like when we add that rule,

00:05:56.803 --> 00:05:58.694
something that helps us identify that whether it's a

00:05:58.694 --> 00:06:00.670
behavioral analysis technique or something like that so that

00:06:00.670 --> 00:06:02.961
we can identify that quicker next time.

00:06:02.961 --> 00:06:08.692
And sometimes our tools can help us with doing that.

00:06:08.692 --> 00:06:11.260
Antivirus, not as much.

00:06:11.260 --> 00:06:14.090
Antivirus typically relies on signatures.

00:06:14.091 --> 00:06:16.165
But EDR, the endpoint detection and response tools,

00:06:16.165 --> 00:06:17.480
that are kind of coming out,

00:06:17.480 --> 00:06:22.318
and I've seen a lot of organizations deploy these either in

00:06:22.318 --> 00:06:26.279
addition to antivirus or in place of antivirus,

00:06:26.280 --> 00:06:29.932
and these tools tend to work a little bit differently.

00:06:29.933 --> 00:06:32.517
They tend to look for anomalies as opposed to static

00:06:32.517 --> 00:06:35.594
signatures that a lot of the antivirus still do,

00:06:35.594 --> 00:06:41.198
and so they'll look for things that are indicative of these fileless attacks.

00:06:41.198 --> 00:06:46.897
So for example, you should really never see Word execute PowerShell.

00:06:46.897 --> 00:06:49.632
So as your looking at the processors,

00:06:49.632 --> 00:06:55.523
if you see PowerShell being executed and parent process of that is Word,

00:06:55.523 --> 00:06:59.482
or WMI, the WMI processes, or Excel, or Adobe,

00:06:59.482 --> 00:07:00.592
or something like that,

00:07:00.592 --> 00:07:04.041
then that is a huge red flag that we're going to lock in on.

00:07:04.041 --> 00:07:08.590
And that's kind of what EDR does is it looks for these anomalies.

00:07:08.591 --> 00:07:12.461
And unfortunately, yeah, you do fall into cases,

00:07:12.461 --> 00:07:15.697
there are all those edge cases where an administrator or a

00:07:15.697 --> 00:07:19.036
programmer did write something legitimate where PowerShell

00:07:19.036 --> 00:07:22.125
is being executed out of Word, but those are edge cases.

00:07:22.125 --> 00:07:25.188
Those should be very far and few in between.

00:07:25.188 --> 00:07:27.229
And you probably want to validate those things--- Yeah,

00:07:27.229 --> 00:07:29.220
you want to validate them anyway.

00:07:29.221 --> 00:07:29.550
Yeah.

00:07:29.550 --> 00:07:33.396
So when we're talking about should PowerShell be coming out of Word or not,

00:07:33.397 --> 00:07:35.299
and that's the kind of stuff that EDR is looking for,

00:07:35.299 --> 00:07:36.445
that's more behavior analysis.

00:07:36.446 --> 00:07:37.031
It is.

00:07:37.031 --> 00:07:37.616
It is.

00:07:37.616 --> 00:07:39.212
But that sounds really scary, but basically,

00:07:39.212 --> 00:07:42.625
we're just saying is like yeah, if you see PowerShell executing from Word,

00:07:42.625 --> 00:07:43.489
that's bad.

00:07:43.489 --> 00:07:43.936
Exactly.

00:07:43.936 --> 00:07:47.975
It's looking for what's the normal activity on your system

00:07:47.975 --> 00:07:52.256
versus what is the malicious or the anomalies?

00:07:52.256 --> 00:07:53.103
When I teach malware analysis,

00:07:53.103 --> 00:07:56.487
one of the things that I always teach is you need to know what your

00:07:56.487 --> 00:07:59.312
normal system activity is so that you can kind of whitelist that

00:07:59.312 --> 00:08:01.919
and know what the malware is doing when you're executing malware

00:08:01.919 --> 00:08:04.193
and watching what it's doing.

00:08:04.194 --> 00:08:06.576
Same thing goes for your systems.

00:08:06.577 --> 00:08:10.169
Get some clean images, your gold images,

00:08:10.170 --> 00:08:11.616
install your EDR software on it,

00:08:11.616 --> 00:08:15.659
and let it sit there for a week or so and see what gets alerted.

00:08:15.659 --> 00:08:19.478
Those are probably, unless you have malware in your gold image,

00:08:19.478 --> 00:08:22.012
which you have a whole host of problems beyond that then,

00:08:22.012 --> 00:08:27.247
then you can go in there, and you can investigate what is this?

00:08:27.248 --> 00:08:30.842
If it truly is benign, then you know to whitelist it going forward,

00:08:30.842 --> 00:08:31.961
and if nothing else,

00:08:31.961 --> 00:08:35.898
that's going to make the lives of your Sock analyst so much easier

00:08:35.898 --> 00:08:40.411
because they don't have an extra two dozen alerts a day to go through

00:08:40.411 --> 00:08:43.470
because you know that those are benign, and you can just ignore them.

00:08:43.470 --> 00:08:44.453
Yeah, absolutely.

00:08:44.453 --> 00:08:47.255
And with, security doesn't always make the company money,

00:08:47.255 --> 00:08:49.162
but it does save them money.

00:08:49.163 --> 00:08:54.111
And so with a limited team, you have to be able to limit what alerts you look at.

00:08:54.111 --> 00:08:55.077
So it's part of the process.

00:08:55.078 --> 00:08:56.839
Yeah, you have to limit the alerts that you look at.

00:08:56.839 --> 00:08:57.666
You have to be,

00:08:57.666 --> 00:09:01.290
you have to have to have that laser focus in order to

00:09:01.290 --> 00:09:03.841
find the bad stuff in your environment,

00:09:03.841 --> 00:09:07.136
and being able to know what's good versus bad,

00:09:07.136 --> 00:09:13.136
really will help us do that.
