WEBVTT

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(Aaron) You said there's different ways that this is downloaded initially.

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Sure, we get the first kind of stage, which would be EMOTET or Ursnif, right?

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(Tyler) Right, right.

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(Aaron) So if I try it by download or like a phishing campaign,

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is this kind of indicative of different groups

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behind the same malware deployment?

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(Tyler) You know, I think it is.

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Probably what's going on here is you have different groups that are

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probably selling their services to each other.

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So you probably have a group that is, really,

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their specialty is doing the phishing or the drive-by downloads and they're

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using EMOTET and they're kind of selling their services to the TrickBot

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people who are using EMOTET to get on the systems.

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And then once the TrickBot people get on the systems,

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they'll kind of move in the environment get whatever information they want,

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get on the systems that they want,

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and either they're deploying ransomware or they're actually

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selling their access through their backdoors,

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through TrickBot,

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to some other ransomware people who are then deploying the ransomware.

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(Aaron) So it's like a big underground criminal B2B market?

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(Tyler) Oh yeah, yeah.

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It's a huge marketplace where they're all working together.

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(Aaron) Is there anything based on the way that it's deployed,

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whether it's EMOTET or Ursnif, or phishing,

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or drive-by download that points toward specific targeting or specific groups,

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or is it kind of just unknown at this point?

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(Tyler) You know, I don't know if it's unknown.

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I think there are a lot of organizations that have some pretty

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in-depth threat intelligence that could go into it.

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To say for sure though, I think it's always hard to say,

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whether or not you're dealing with multiple groups

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or if there's targeting going on.

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For the most part though with TrickBot,

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I've personally seen it on a number of different organizations.

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There's no one vertical that they seem to be targeting,

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it's all just wherever they can get installed onto,

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they're going to see where they're at and if it's someplace good,

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they may stay on there for a little bit longer and

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grab some more information out.

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If it's someplace smaller,

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then they may move pretty quickly to their last stage of ransomware.

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(Aaron) Right, so the main idea is to get on the systems wherever they can,

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kind of shotgun method, see what information they get,

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sell that information, and then potentially sell that access and move on.

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(Tyler) Right.

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They're probably going to act differently if they get on to,

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let's say, a major bank versus some small mom and pop shop.

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(Aaron) Yeah, that makes sense.

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Absolutely.

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And we were talking a little bit about this at dinner and

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that once these deployments are done,

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at some point it's turned over to a manual process?

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So it's not all automatic.

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At some point there's some sort of trigger for whoever's behind that infection,

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that kind of get on keyboard and start looking around.

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(Tyler) Yeah, well,

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there's a lot of automation within TrickBot and there's lots of

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new capabilities always coming out for TrickBot.

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It seems like almost every week,

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some security researcher finds a new module for

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TrickBot that can do additional things.

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At some point from what we've seen, it definitely turns into a manual process.

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You know, PowerShell Empire, for the most part, is manual.

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You have to be there, somebody's behind the keyboard typing commands.

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In some of the investigations that I've done where

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ransomware has been deployed from TrickBot,

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we've actually seen attackers from TrickBot compromise systems,

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RDP into non-TrickBot compromised systems and copy over

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malware and run it from the keyboard,

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and we know that there's somebody at a keyboard just based

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off of the forensic data that's involved.

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So it definitely at some point is going to turn into a manual process,

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it's not completely automated yet.

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But again, if TrickBot is on there,

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it's eventually going to lead to something else.

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(Aaron) Got it.

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And you talked about new modules being downloaded.

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I know that recently TrickBot has kind of resurged,

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I'm assuming there's a new software development cycle for

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whoever's behind starting TrickBot.

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And there's headlines saying hey, TrickBot steals 250 million new passwords,

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or your email passwords,

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so what was particularly new about that that enabled them to do that?

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(Tyler) I think in that case what ended up happening was

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TrickBot was actually using a secondary program,

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it was downloading another program, I believe called TrickBooster,

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which would go and it would specifically look for things

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like email passwords beyond what some of the capabilities

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that TrickBot already has in it.

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And so those are being exfiltrated to some place on the internet,

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and then the security researchers found this database that

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contained 250 million email credentials which they were

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able to trace back to that.

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(Aaron) Wow, yeah.

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So, with this new capability,

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I guess whoever had either already owned a large network of TrickBot

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infections redeployed that module and got more emails,

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as well as kind of more motivation to go ahead and infect additional systems?

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(Tyler) Right, or who knows,

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the developers behind TrickBot could have sold their services

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to somebody who wanted them to get this,

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and so they created a new program for it.

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So regardless,

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TrickBot was definitely a key part of this in order to get

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all of these different email credentials.

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(Aaron) So you're not really safe just through anonymity or because you

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don't feel like you have anything that anybody wants.

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This is more of anyone who's connected to the internet and

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is using it for business functions is, or not,

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even just private computers are going to be vulnerable to this.

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(Tyler) Yeah.

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Anybody, if you're running Windows,

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TrickBot will be more than happy to infect you no matter who you are.
