WEBVTT

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Yeah, and so when it uses things like EternalRomance or

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EternalBlue to move around the network,

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it's using that to spread from system to system.

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It also has the ability to do brute forcing of the administrator.

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Right, you had mentioned that. So if you have a very easy administrator

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password, like password or admin or something else like that,

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it'll try to brute force that if it can't get in.

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And then finally,

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we've also seen some TrickBot instances that will go through and they'll

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dump credentials from memory using MimiKatz or something very similar. And

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so that if you're not protected properly,

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as soon as you log into a system,

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those credentials are stored in memory in Windows somewhere, you can grab

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them out, and TrickBot will do that and then use that to move laterally in

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your network and just start infecting other systems.

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Right. And so while we're looking at network‑based detections,

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if you're only looking at internal or external,

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you're not going to see that lateral transmission,

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right?

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So this is stuff that there should be updated threat signatures in

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Suricata and Snort for these kinds of things, but if you're not

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capturing at the right point in your enterprise, then you're not

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going to see it anyway. Yeah,

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and that's one thing that I think a lot of people see in their

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organization where they're really good at looking at the traffic

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that's leaving or coming in from the internet, but they're not

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really good at watching internally.

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They don't have that network visibility inside their network,

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which is a huge disadvantage.

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Sometimes that is even more important than watching what's going in and out of

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the network. Especially if somebody has already gotten into your network, how

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else are you going to find what they're doing?

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You need to have host visibility and network visibility,

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and if you don't have those,

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then it's really difficult to figure out the extent of an attack.

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Yeah, absolutely.

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So,

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even talking about that and how your network is set up, what

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are some mitigations we can have in place?

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There's pretty common stuff,

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probably sys control level things that can help prevent the, not just the

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infection, but the spread of TrickBot. Right. I think one of the best ways

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to do that is to just segment your network.

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Usually you don't have to have workstations talking directly to workstations,

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so make it so that they can't. You can set up ACLs or other configuration

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options in routers and switches and hubs and whatever you have to prevent

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your workstations from talking to workstations.

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You can even do things like preventing, let's say,

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departments from talking to other departments.

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So in other words,

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do computers within HR need to be talking directly to computers in accounting.

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Probably not.

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They probably only need to be talking to where your file server

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is at and where Active Directory is at. So doing that is going

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to help prevent lateral movement.

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It's going to make it more difficult for the attacker

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to get from one system to the other.

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They're going to have to find that intermediate system that everybody has

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access to and attack that, and then you just make sure that you're really

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monitoring that system as well. And a lot of people,

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when they talk about that, they start going down this

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road of like role‑based network access, right?

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And yes, that is absolutely something you can do. That's great.

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There's complicated solutions.

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People are going to try to sell you a bunch of solutions.

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You can also just use VLANs, and you can use ACLs and

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free things to segment your network.

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I want to say it one more time, segment your network.  Absolutely.

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Because if someone clicks the document in HR,

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it doesn't mean that all your engineering devices have to

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be infected as well. Right, exactly.
