WEBVTT

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I did have one question.

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You were looking at all that road traffic.

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I was. When you were looking at the JA3 signatures,

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I noticed that port 8082 wasn't in there.

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Oh, yeah.

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Does that mean that ‑‑‑ is it possible then that the 8082 traffic

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was encrypted and Bro just didn't identify it, or is there a way

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that we can go ahead and look at that? So when we looked at those

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connections that did show up, but it didn't show up in the SSL connections,

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so it likely just wasn't encrypted traffic.

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So let's go check that out in Wireshark.

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Okay, yeah. Just to make sure that we understand here,

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let's look at some encrypted traffic.

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Let's see that encrypted traffic.

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The 449 traffic is what we're looking at right now. Yes, the 449

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traffic. Okay. And  follow that TCP stream. And there's internet

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widgets, so we know we're looking in the right place,

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right? Right.

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So even though we're looking at some encrypted traffic, there's

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still going to be some plain text in there.

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That's probably the SSL certificate, right?

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Correct.

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Yeah,

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and that's that TLS exchange and then like cipher suite

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stuff. And this one is not very long,

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It looks like the connection got reset is what it looks like to me.

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But if we instead look at port 8082 just so we have the

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difference, and let's see what we get from that.

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I actually forget I did look at this ahead of time. There's multiple sessions.

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Oh yeah, there's a lot with TrickBot .So this looks fun.

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Let's take a look at this.

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Awesome.

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So that looks pretty similar to something you were

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talking about earlier, doesn't it? Yeah,

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definitely.

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There a couple of things that are going on here. Looking at the

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very top, this is obviously a web connection, an HTTP

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connection, and we can tell that from the HTTP headers upfront.

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We have to post the user agent, the host, and all that fun stuff.

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But if you look at the URL it's being posted to, it's slash Leo seven.

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That's actually the group or campaign ID of TrickBot,

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and you can actually monitor that.

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Leo7 will eventually turn to leo8 when their configuration changes.

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Or you could go backwards in time to leo6 and see what it was at some

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point. And probably somebody has done some analysis on that , so you

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could google Trickbot and leo6 and see what it is. After that is the

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client's ID, and you can see the beginning of that client ID is WIN

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dash all these letters. That looks like your generated Windows device

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network.

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Yeah,

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that is the the name of my Windows system followed by some other

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data that it generates and then the slash, and then you'll see a

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number after that. And the numbers mean various things to

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TrickBot. A 90 is typically a post,

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but not necessarily always. It's probably dependent

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upon the plug‑in that's being used.

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Yeah, that makes sense.

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And something good to remember too about that is it's

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people coding it at at nearly random, right?

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They can make it whatever they want it to be. Right, oh, exactly. So

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there's no specific standard that has to be followed.

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Yeah, exactly.

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The User‑Agent is also kind of interesting.

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You usually don't see a User‑Agent of test.

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Nope, that's odd. Yeah, that'd be a great indicator.

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And you were talking about least frequency analysis.

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We could use Bro or any other network monitor to look at all of our HTTP

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traffic and just look at all of the different user agents and then kind of

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sort them like you were doing and look at the ones that are not like the

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others or are not on there very often.

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Maybe we'll do that after we take a look at the rest of this.

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Okay. And then here we've got the post form‑data name is proclist,

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and right underneath that, these are all the processes that were

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running at the time that the malware ran.

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And remember too, this isn't just keeping this information.

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It's sending it back to the attacker. Right, yeah.

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So the attacker has this information outbound,

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and we have got system information,

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lots of information about the system that it compromised, all the

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IP address information, as we're seeing there.

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If we scroll down more, we'll even start seeing some

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things related to the domains.

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All that information would have been sent out to the attacker.

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Yeah.  So you can imagine how valuable that is to an attacker to know that, hey,

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they're on this domain called Really Popular Bank, so now they

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know that they've compromised some bank as opposed to just some

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guy like me sitting in his home lab.

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Yeah, absolutely.

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And this can probably help with when they're making the transition from hey,

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is something, one of our automated TrickBot agents has found

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something interesting, so now let's engage.

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Oh yeah, absolutely.

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I mean,

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you can imagine the excitement the attacker would see if you the domain was

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something like Microsoft or Google or something like that.

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To compromise something like that as opposed to Joe's

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Fish Shack or something like that.

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You don't know Joe's Fish Shack.

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I also thought this was interesting.

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The Cowboy served.

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Yeah, the server response, the server named Cowboy.

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That is kind of interesting.

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Again,

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it's another indicator that you can look at. You can do the frequency

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analysis. And maybe that is a common one, but I kind of doubt it.

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Yeah,

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I doubt it too, Here, let's, before we get out of this, now I'm

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curious to see about that user agent. So let's see if ‑‑‑ hopefully

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we have some good information on that, right?

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So what I normally do, because I never ever remember the column headers,

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is I usually rip through that into more, and then I can figure out

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what I want to bro‑cut into. Okay. Then from here,

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we'll look at ‑‑‑ where's the user agent? Do you see it? There it is.

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Yep, user_agent. Yes. Why don't we say it's easy.

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Cool. And let's sort. It doesn't have to be numeric, so it's fine.

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Let's try that. Gets just one test. So that would definitely be

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something that I'd want to look at. And remember,

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we're only, at this point,

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this was what? Like maybe 20 minutes of network capture all for one system.

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If we were looking across an entire network,

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we would definitely see a ton of different user agents and one called test.

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Regardless,

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should kind of pop out because even if you weren't familiar with user agents,

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look at the way that the others are formatted. That's exactly

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what I was going to say, is kind of a junior security analyst

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looking at ‑‑‑ there's tons of stuff that does this. There's like

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RockNSM and Security Onion, whatever that puts this in a nice,

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pretty format, and Elasticsearch, right?

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And you can just be like oh, let me just scroll through user agents.

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That's weird.
