WEBVTT

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Hey humans.

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My name's Aaron Rosenmund,

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and welcome to this course on Pluralsight about Business Email Compromise.

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I'm here with Tyler Hudak to talk about what you can do about it,

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how you can prevent it, and if you do find it,

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what we do to respond to it.

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Hey, Tyler,

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do you want to talk about your experience with this a little bit

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and really we can start to dive into what it is?

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‑Absolutely, and thank you for having me on so we can talk about this.

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Business email compromises are a huge issue right now,

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and so getting the information out there about how you can find them and

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what you do when you do find them is really important.

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So,

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there are a lot of different variations of different

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types of business email compromises.

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Everybody has seen some aspect of this.

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These are the emails that you get supposedly from your CEO asking

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you to buy a whole bunch of iTunes gift cards,

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or the emails asking you to transfer money into a bank account.

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But the attackers have kind of graduated from trying to hit

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home users to where the real money is, and that's on the corporate side.

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‑So,

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how does this really differentiate from ‑‑‑ and I know we're

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not talking about malware here specifically,

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but it might as well be,

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it's the same tactics of stealing information or being able to steal money.

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The end result ends up being the same.

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But, how do we differentiate from, say,

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the prince from some obscure country wanting to give you money in your

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Gmail and this event that we're trying to talk about,

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what's the real difference there?

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‑So, there are a couple of differences.

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First off, when you're talking about kind of the Nigerian 409 type scams,

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those are typically focused on one person.

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With a business email compromise,

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especially the variation that we're going to talk about that

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corporations are most often going to see,

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there are really two victims in this attack.

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There's the company that gets compromised there.

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We'll talk about how their email gets compromised and how

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there could be information lost through that.

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But there's also the victims who send money to the attackers,

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and because of those two victims that are in there,

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it makes this a little bit of a more unique attack.

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‑Okay, so maybe even a little bit more advanced too,

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like this is probably over a longer period of time

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that these people are doing research,

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these criminal organizations are doing research on an organization

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and maybe there's some dwell time to it too.

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‑Absolutely, absolutely,

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And I think that's a great way to start talking about there are a

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number of different types of phases that the attacker goes

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through in a business email compromise.

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‑You shared a nifty slide with me.

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Why don't I bring that up and we can chat through it.

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Okay, so here's the slide you shared with me.

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This is probably a pretty common slide when we talk about phases,

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but really just kind of a useful device for us to walk through,

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one, how this is kind of a more complex attack than,

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like we said, the Nigerian prince attack,

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but also how there's different points, just like any attack chain,

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and that's, again,

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I'm a big let's move away from the attack chain to

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more of MITRE ATT&CK technique stuff,

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but mainly because there's so many different types of attack chain.

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And when we talked about this before,

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I realized this is kind of a pretty different attack chain as well.

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So, this is a good way to look at that, and maybe where there's some points,

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we can point out later when we get into detections that here's the

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points where we can detect different things.

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So, walk me through these phases real quick, please.

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‑Yeah, exactly.

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So the attackers are going to go through

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essentially about four different phases.

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Like most attacks, like most cybersecurity attacks,

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the first thing they're going to do is recon on the company.

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They're going to look at the target.

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So, let's say you are part of an organization.

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They are going to do analysis on you,

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they're going to do analysis on the organization,

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and, most importantly, they're going to try to figure out who's paying the bills,

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who's sending out the invoices,

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and things like that because those are the people that they want to target.

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‑I see.

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So they're actually going to gain compromise first,

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and then after that's targeted,

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do some research to identify are you a company that sends money,

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how do you do it, what do your templates look like,

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who can I spoof that's going to be able to get the authorization to do so?

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‑Right.

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They want to figure out all that information beforehand

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because they're going to target those people to try to get

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access to their email accounts.

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That's their first goal.

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That that moves us into the second phase,

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which is the attacker gaining a foothold into the organization.

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And the way they typically do that with business email compromises is they will

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send phishing emails to the individuals within that company,

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and normally these phishing emails will contain a link out to a

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website that looks like an Office 365 login page.

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Most business email compromises that I've investigated involve Office 365,

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so we're going to really focus on that, but the thing to make clear,

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though, is it's not an Office 365 problem,

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it's an everyone problem.

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If you have your email system with Gmail,

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if you have it on‑premises through Exchange or

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Lotus Notes or anything like that, you could still be subject to this attack.

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‑Yeah, absolutely.

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And Office 365 is fairly ubiquitous.

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I mean, that makes a lot of sense.

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And like we talked about, we set up an environment based on Office 365.

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And again, don't get your hopes up, everybody,

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it's really just super basic to use as an example,

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but it seemed pretty effective.

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That being said, what we're talking about in this phase is really just phishing.

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Like this is common phishing to begin this phase.

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It's something we all know really well, but it's really just the beginning.

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So,

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we're suddenly attacked and we think maybe business email

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compromise could have a connotation of, oh,

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not to bring it up one more time,

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but that prince from obscure location want to give you money,

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that's nearly the beginning and end of the attack.

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You either send them the wire transfer through some conversation,

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or don't, whereas this is really just the beginning of this attack here.

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‑Correct.

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Yeah, with this attack, once they send the phishing email,

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that's the beginning of the attack.

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They're not even close to being done.

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And the thing to keep in mind, too,

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is that the phishing attacks with the links in the email to the phishing

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sites that they're trying to get people to click on,

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those phishing sites, they are putting time and effort into this.

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They look exactly like the Office 365 logon pages,

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plus, attackers are getting smart.

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They're not just throwing a web server on some IP

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address somewhere on the internet,

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they're going to do something like registering a web page on SharePoint.com,

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Microsoft's public SharePoint.com that anybody can go and get a web page on,

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they're going to throw it on there,

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and the reason they're doing that is because that makes it look more

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legitimate and a lot of web filters will only look at the domain,

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SharePoint.com, and think, oh, well, it's Microsoft,

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it's valid, I'm going to let that through.

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‑Yeah, you know, when you bring that up,

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it actually makes me think of a response I did earlier

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this year to a LinkedIn compromise,

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and they sent out a link that went to a OneDrive that had a

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PDF of I'm sharing like a folder with you,

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and when you clicked that, it went to a pre‑compromised legitimate server,

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like in Germany or something, but it was a legitimate website that,

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you know,

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a WordPress plugin that was probably out of date and got compromised

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and they were hosting an Office 365 portal there.

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I didn't connect that this may be what the next steps were after

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that because it was extremely targeted through the CEO of a

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company from on the LinkedIn DMs as well,

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and it was from the initial compromise for that,

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but I can see now that this may have been kind of the,

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that may have been like the lead‑in to the next steps being we're

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now going to fall through the rest of this chain.

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‑Yeah, absolutely.

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And again, the attackers and business email compromisers,

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they're being smart about all of this.

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They're focusing, they're doing targeted phishing attacks,

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it's not going to be a widespread phishing attack to everybody in the

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company because they don't want everybody in the company.

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Somebody who works in IT or who works in human resources

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is not going to have the information that they need in

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order to move to the next phase.

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Now, the one thing I do want to bring up too is,

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you know, a lot of people will think, well,

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I've turned on multi‑factor authentication in Office 365,

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I don't need to worry about that.

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That's not entirely true.

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The attackers, again, are smart.

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They figured out ways to get around multi‑factor authentication.

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One of the ways that they do that is on this phishing site,

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they will have the users log in or pretend to log in,

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and so they get the user's credentials,

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but they will also load a malicious app into Office 365,

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and basically by going to the website, the phishing site,

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the user is prompted with a request to allow this

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application full access to their email, essentially.

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And I believe we're going to talk about this a

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little bit more in depth later on, but if they do that,

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if the attacker is able to get the victim to allow that access

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into their email account through that app,

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then the attacker doesn't need to bypass MFA or credentials.

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They are already in the system.

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It's like they have a back door within Office 365 in that user's account.

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‑Yeah, that's really interesting, and it sparks some other questions,

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but I want to save them for later when we get into it a little bit further,

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but I'll take some notes on that now.

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But, so either way, it doesn't matter whether you have MFA,

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or I don't want to say it doesn't matter,

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but like obviously that helps, but there's also ways around that,

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it's not foolproof.

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‑Exactly.

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We'll talk about defense in depth, what you need to look at as you move forward.

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So, the attacker, they've done their research,

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they've sent out the phishing email, now they've got in.

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Let's presume that they got into the right person's email account.

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‑Sure, phishing always work, so they definitely got somebody's email.

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‑Exactly.

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So once they get in there, they're going to go through this analysis phase,

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essentially, and they're going to start looking through the emails,

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they're going to be looking through that victim's contacts and looking

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for anything that is related to statements of work,

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billing requests, invoices, who they're sending them to,

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when they send them, what their signatures look like,

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they're gathering all of this information because what they're

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going to do is they are going to take that and they're going to

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basically modify just the small pieces that they need in order

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to move to the next phase,

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which is sending the emails out to the victim

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companies to try to get them to pay.

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Now, we always need to talk about dwell time,

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how long are the attackers doing this or are they constantly

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logging in to the email system in order to do this,

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and that's not always the case.

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We'll show some examples of where that does happen,

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but attackers,

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so they don't have to sit in somebody's email inbox the

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entire time or constantly download emails,

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they'll do something like they'll put an inbox forwarding rule in place so

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that if an email comes in that has specific keywords,

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like wire or invoice or bill or something like that,

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it gets forwarded out to an external email address.

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So all they have to do is wait for those emails to come in,

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and then they can start their attack going.

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‑I see.

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So this doesn't have to be an active log on over a period of a month and they

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keep logging in as that user over and over trying to check the user's emails

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the same way they would check their own emails.

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Instead,

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they can set up the forwarders and kind of allow the recon to come to them,

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so to speak.

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Really, when we're looking at a normal kind of malware attack chain,

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this is all post‑exploitation.

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So, phishing attempt, they logged into Office 365,

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we're now post‑exploitation,

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but not in the sense that they're like on your box or on‑premises

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somewhere or have access to your back end of Azure instead,

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which they might with that login, but not necessarily.

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It may just be a standard permissioned Office 365 environment.

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Instead, they're now post‑exploitation inside your,

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I guess perimeter of emails and documents,

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which is interesting.

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‑Exactly.

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And like I said, what they're doing is they're gathering more information.

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They want to see how you send out your invoices because what they're

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going to do when they move into the next phase,

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which is the actual attack, I guess,

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or the final phase of the attack to be more specific,

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they are going to take those documents that you send out,

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they're going to modify them,

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they're going to put their own account numbers in there,

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and then they're going to create, typically they create a typosquatted domain.

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So, for example, so let's say Pluralsight.com as an example.

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If a business email compromise happened against Pluralsight.com,

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which it hasn't, but we're just using that as an example, they might create a

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domain that's Pluralsght.com instead of Pluralsight.com.

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And they'll actually do this about a month ahead of time, so

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this kind of tells you how long it takes them to kind of

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prepare for something like this.

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They will create this typosquatted domain,

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and then they will start sending emails to the victims that they've gathered,

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your clients, through this this fake domain asking for the victims to change

00:13:03.540 --> 00:13:07.300
the account numbers for the payments and, oh,

00:13:07.300 --> 00:13:12.210
hey, you have a payment due, and so on. ‑I see, yeah,

00:13:12.220 --> 00:13:14.820
and there's that times a million different things you could do

00:13:14.820 --> 00:13:16.270
for like a subscription model and be like,

00:13:16.270 --> 00:13:16.480
oh,

00:13:16.480 --> 00:13:20.290
your subscription has changed, your card is bad or

00:13:20.290 --> 00:13:21.990
something, you need to change it to this.

00:13:21.990 --> 00:13:24.470
I mean, yeah, that's really kind of prolific.

00:13:24.740 --> 00:13:27.830
And I was going to say, if you changed that in Pluralsight, like I

00:13:27.830 --> 00:13:29.850
type it that way half the time and don't notice,

00:13:29.850 --> 00:13:33.410
I certainly wouldn't notice it 100% of the time being sent to me. ‑Right.

00:13:33.420 --> 00:13:37.620
But, the thing to remember here, we're just using Pluralsight as an example.

00:13:37.630 --> 00:13:43.250
Imagine if this is a financial company that's being targeted and they do

00:13:43.260 --> 00:13:46.740
financial transactions in the millions of dollars.

00:13:46.750 --> 00:13:51.250
Imagine what an attacker can do by sending an email out to one

00:13:51.250 --> 00:13:54.270
of their clients or partners and saying,

00:13:54.280 --> 00:13:59.140
hey, this bill is due or this bill is past due, please remit payment.

00:13:59.150 --> 00:14:03.600
Our banking information has changed as per the attached document.

00:14:03.600 --> 00:14:05.460
And when they open the attached document,

00:14:05.470 --> 00:14:08.680
it looks exactly like every other document that they've been sent

00:14:08.680 --> 00:14:11.740
because the attackers have taken that, they have modified it just to

00:14:11.740 --> 00:14:13.760
include their own baking account number,

00:14:13.940 --> 00:14:18.430
and, surprisingly, this works more often than you would think.

00:14:18.440 --> 00:14:23.560
It really surprises me how many times a company will transmit

00:14:23.560 --> 00:14:27.040
millions of dollars, or potentially up to millions of dollars, just

00:14:27.040 --> 00:14:30.220
because they received an email which says,

00:14:30.220 --> 00:14:32.060
hey, please change the banking account number.

00:14:32.140 --> 00:14:35.480
There's no verification done, or if there is verification

00:14:35.480 --> 00:14:37.450
done, or supposed to be done, it's not.

00:14:37.450 --> 00:14:40.120
But we will absolutely get into talking about how you can

00:14:40.120 --> 00:14:41.670
prevent these types of attacks later on.

00:14:42.340 --> 00:14:46.270
‑So we're talking about financial institutions that make

00:14:46.280 --> 00:14:49.380
transactions, you said billions of dollars, millions, I mean,

00:14:49.380 --> 00:14:52.030
billions may be a little excessive, but millions of dollars at least,

00:14:52.030 --> 00:14:52.510
right?

00:14:52.520 --> 00:14:54.100
Billions, right.

00:14:54.110 --> 00:14:57.380
But that would be the jackpot. I'd have to change careers

00:14:57.380 --> 00:14:58.690
for that if that was a common thing.

00:14:58.690 --> 00:14:59.860
If you're about to tell me that you can make

00:14:59.860 --> 00:15:04.190
billions of dollars in like an email, I don't want to say it out loud,

00:15:04.190 --> 00:15:07.180
but I might be making some changes to my retirement plan.

00:15:07.190 --> 00:15:09.660
‑No, I totally get where you're going with this,

00:15:09.660 --> 00:15:14.160
and it's really surprising how effective this is.

00:15:14.170 --> 00:15:15.280
In 2019,

00:15:15.280 --> 00:15:19.260
the FBI came out with some stats that business email compromises

00:15:19.270 --> 00:15:23.350
accounted for more than $1.7 billion in losses.

00:15:23.540 --> 00:15:29.210
So, you can just imagine how effective this is if it's

00:15:29.210 --> 00:15:33.470
raking in that much money over a single year.

00:15:33.840 --> 00:15:37.020
‑That's collectively, right? That's like all these

00:15:37.020 --> 00:15:40.070
organizations over time, over this year maybe, or is that

00:15:40.080 --> 00:15:41.710
is that multiple years you think?

00:15:41.720 --> 00:15:47.050
‑I think that's over one year. I could be wrong, but you have to understand,

00:15:47.050 --> 00:15:47.190
too,

00:15:47.190 --> 00:15:52.050
that that's not just a company has lost $1.7 billion from business email

00:15:52.050 --> 00:15:54.550
compromises, it's everything that goes into the incident.

00:15:54.550 --> 00:15:58.240
So remember that, you know, it's not just the money you're losing.

00:15:58.250 --> 00:15:59.220
When that happens,

00:15:59.220 --> 00:16:01.420
you need to do the incident response, you need to do the

00:16:01.420 --> 00:16:04.960
protections, you probably need to upgrade your systems,

00:16:04.970 --> 00:16:07.180
implement MFA, all these different things,

00:16:07.180 --> 00:16:08.980
and that adds to your loss as well.

00:16:08.990 --> 00:16:09.180
You know,

00:16:09.180 --> 00:16:12.800
the attackers may have gotten $100,000, but it's going to

00:16:12.800 --> 00:16:16.430
cost you another $100,000 or $200,000 to remediate everything

00:16:16.430 --> 00:16:18.000
and get all the answers you need.

00:16:18.010 --> 00:16:23.130
And that's before there may be regulatory penalties that could be applied.

00:16:23.140 --> 00:16:25.640
‑Right. So, let me let me back up one second.

00:16:25.640 --> 00:16:30.180
So they got in through phishing, they have access to all the

00:16:30.180 --> 00:16:33.370
emails and/or OneDrive and documents, or anything really

00:16:33.370 --> 00:16:35.460
connected to Office 365 enterprise account,

00:16:35.460 --> 00:16:40.450
right, and once they have that, they're now able to hang around for a while,

00:16:40.450 --> 00:16:43.650
maybe send some information to themselves that matches the word invoice for

00:16:43.650 --> 00:16:47.630
this kind of stuff, but I guess maybe it's my ignorance, like we're talking

00:16:47.630 --> 00:16:51.230
about an invoice kind of version of paper document like obviously it's not

00:16:51.230 --> 00:16:54.980
mailed in the snail mail anymore, but it's emailed over to someone,

00:16:54.990 --> 00:16:56.770
and then they're sending this money.

00:16:56.780 --> 00:16:59.860
Just, no questions asked to a bank account.

00:16:59.860 --> 00:17:02.400
Is that something that really happens? I feel like I'm having

00:17:02.400 --> 00:17:04.310
a hard time wrapping my mind about like,

00:17:04.319 --> 00:17:04.760
hey,

00:17:04.770 --> 00:17:10.060
you owe me $1.7 million, if you would just kindly send this to this bank account

00:17:10.060 --> 00:17:11.990
that's never the bank account that you normally send it to.

00:17:11.990 --> 00:17:13.589
And they're like, yeah, sure. ‑Yeah,

00:17:13.599 --> 00:17:18.530
it boggles my mind every time I work one of these investigations. And, yes,

00:17:18.530 --> 00:17:20.410
that is exactly what happens.

00:17:20.420 --> 00:17:24.900
Sometimes companies do have verification procedures, and definitely if

00:17:24.900 --> 00:17:28.490
you look back a year ago to what's going on now,

00:17:28.500 --> 00:17:31.430
people are a lot smarter about this attack, but it still happened,

00:17:31.430 --> 00:17:35.710
and it all comes down to somebody receives an email that says please

00:17:35.710 --> 00:17:39.240
pay this invoice, here is a new account number,

00:17:39.240 --> 00:17:41.690
and they just go and do it. Now, you know,

00:17:41.690 --> 00:17:45.250
sometimes the attackers, they will switch it up a little bit.

00:17:45.250 --> 00:17:52.570
It may look like it comes from that person's CEO or CFO, and they always

00:17:52.570 --> 00:17:55.300
put that sense of urgency into the request as well,

00:17:55.310 --> 00:17:56.610
to kind of get people to think, oh,

00:17:56.610 --> 00:17:59.550
I need to do this right now or I'm going to get in trouble. And that,

00:17:59.550 --> 00:18:01.400
I'm sure, kind of adds into it as well because,

00:18:01.410 --> 00:18:03.420
you know, people just want to do their jobs.

00:18:03.430 --> 00:18:04.750
They want to get things done.

00:18:04.750 --> 00:18:06.930
And, the attackers are kind of playing off of that.

00:18:06.940 --> 00:18:09.230
‑Yeah, so those are common social engineering tactics,

00:18:09.230 --> 00:18:10.450
and not just here,

00:18:10.450 --> 00:18:13.330
but kind of across anywhere that that's part of your phase of attack.

00:18:13.330 --> 00:18:14.110
That makes sense.

00:18:14.120 --> 00:18:15.470
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:18:15.440 --> 00:18:16.000
‑I'm curious.

00:18:16.000 --> 00:18:18.080
So it seems like this is plenty profitable for the

00:18:18.080 --> 00:18:19.310
organizations that are doing it,

00:18:19.310 --> 00:18:23.030
but they make money off of having people send them stuff, but they also have

00:18:23.030 --> 00:18:25.950
access to all of the company's information at this point,

00:18:25.950 --> 00:18:26.360
right?

00:18:26.540 --> 00:18:30.260
So are we seeing organizations stealing information

00:18:30.260 --> 00:18:32.150
and reselling that or releasing it,

00:18:32.150 --> 00:18:36.860
or maybe a ransomware like a cloud version of a ransomware attack? ‑Not yet.

00:18:36.870 --> 00:18:41.660
I'm sure some of that does happen, but it's pretty rare at this point.

00:18:41.640 --> 00:18:45.350
The attackers they want to get in there and they want this to go undetected for

00:18:45.350 --> 00:18:48.270
as long as possible because the longer it goes undetected,

00:18:48.270 --> 00:18:51.380
the less likely the victims are going to be able to recoup that

00:18:51.380 --> 00:18:55.110
money or reverse those transactions. And so the attackers want

00:18:55.110 --> 00:18:56.520
to stay as silent as possible,

00:18:56.520 --> 00:18:59.910
which is typically why they get in, they put those inbox forwarding rules,

00:18:59.910 --> 00:19:02.690
and then they don't access the inbox again,

00:19:02.700 --> 00:19:05.190
and there's a pretty quick turnaround.

00:19:05.190 --> 00:19:08.260
I can tell you that in some of the investigations that I've worked,

00:19:08.340 --> 00:19:12.310
they will do the recon for a couple weeks because we see those typosquatted

00:19:12.310 --> 00:19:16.730
domains registered weeks before the attack, and then they send the phishing

00:19:16.730 --> 00:19:20.930
emails and we have actually been able to tie the phishing emails, or when

00:19:20.930 --> 00:19:24.780
somebody enters in their credentials to the phishing emails, that once they

00:19:24.780 --> 00:19:29.450
do that, I've seen cases where the attacker logs in less than 4 seconds

00:19:29.450 --> 00:19:33.320
after that, grabs the email, and then starts doing their thing.

00:19:33.320 --> 00:19:37.410
And then usually within a day or two, they're sending out those payment emails.

00:19:37.410 --> 00:19:39.620
So it's a very quick turnaround for them because the

00:19:39.620 --> 00:19:41.410
faster they can do this, the better.

00:19:41.420 --> 00:19:44.020
And, again, they're going to be smart about this.

00:19:44.030 --> 00:19:47.150
They're going to send out those payment emails so they get to the victims

00:19:47.160 --> 00:19:50.350
Friday afternoon so nobody figures it out until Monday,

00:19:50.350 --> 00:19:53.360
and by then it might be too late for for them to try to recoup that money.

00:19:53.640 --> 00:19:54.120
‑I see.

00:19:54.120 --> 00:19:54.660
I mean,

00:19:54.660 --> 00:20:00.000
this is a hack in the sense that they're hacking that environment, but it's also

00:20:00.000 --> 00:20:04.780
a hack in the sense that they're hacking the process of the organization. This

00:20:04.780 --> 00:20:07.010
is what what everybody always talks about is like,

00:20:07.010 --> 00:20:08.150
it's not just the computer.

00:20:08.150 --> 00:20:11.270
If you tie all the things we can do on the computer, all the cool

00:20:11.280 --> 00:20:17.810
exploits and new CV this and new RC that, you tie all that to just

00:20:17.810 --> 00:20:20.240
someone who's really smart about how the organization works, like that

00:20:20.240 --> 00:20:22.490
makes it exponentially more effective, I think.

00:20:22.500 --> 00:20:24.060
It's interesting.

00:20:24.070 --> 00:20:24.880
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:20:24.880 --> 00:20:26.780
And just like what you brought up before,

00:20:26.840 --> 00:20:30.230
the victims have to kind of think of, you know,

00:20:30.240 --> 00:20:34.320
the attackers, they're not just doing this to get money.

00:20:34.320 --> 00:20:36.560
They've got access to all of your emails.

00:20:36.560 --> 00:20:40.180
So imagine if you were like a medical institution this happened to. You

00:20:40.180 --> 00:20:45.230
probably have something like PHI within those emails. That could lead to a

00:20:45.230 --> 00:20:48.180
violation of HIPAA even though the attackers aren't necessarily going

00:20:48.180 --> 00:20:49.610
after that. So on the victim's side,

00:20:49.610 --> 00:20:51.910
it's not just they're losing money, they could be losing

00:20:51.910 --> 00:20:55.670
reputation, they could be fined through regulations because

00:20:55.670 --> 00:20:57.450
of privacy issues, and so on.

00:20:57.840 --> 00:20:58.140
‑Yeah,

00:20:58.140 --> 00:21:01.430
and then like you said, HIPAA is a great example, then same with the

00:21:01.430 --> 00:21:04.300
fines from GDPR if this is a European company or has European

00:21:04.300 --> 00:21:07.360
customers in that some of that's leaked in some emails that are sent

00:21:07.360 --> 00:21:10.120
around, that's also where you can start getting hit with some pretty

00:21:10.120 --> 00:21:11.180
big fines as well.

00:21:11.190 --> 00:21:14.840
‑Yes. ‑That's really interesting, and we're definitely in an environment now

00:21:14.840 --> 00:21:19.660
where like regulations or regulatory requirements are a portion of the, or a

00:21:19.670 --> 00:21:23.500
percentage of the assigned costs to any event happening anyway, so not only is

00:21:23.500 --> 00:21:25.950
it bad enough that you just sent a whole bunch of money to somebody that

00:21:26.540 --> 00:21:29.540
wasn't who they were supposed to be, but now you also have to get hit with

00:21:29.550 --> 00:21:30.670
regulatory requirements.

00:21:30.670 --> 00:21:32.820
That's kind of a bad day. ‑Right. Yeah,

00:21:32.830 --> 00:21:35.620
and as we'll see when we start talking about the response and what

00:21:35.620 --> 00:21:38.150
you can go in and look at, a lot of victims,

00:21:38.150 --> 00:21:41.260
they want to know what the attackers looked at while they were in the email.

00:21:41.260 --> 00:21:44.180
And as we will find out when we talk about some of the

00:21:44.180 --> 00:21:46.160
investigation that you can do with this,

00:21:46.240 --> 00:21:48.600
depending on your license level, and again we're focusing on

00:21:48.600 --> 00:21:51.080
Office 365, depending on your license level,

00:21:51.080 --> 00:21:53.720
you may not be able to say that. You may only be able to

00:21:53.720 --> 00:21:57.120
say that the attackers had access to this email account

00:21:57.120 --> 00:21:59.030
from this date to that date.

00:21:59.040 --> 00:22:00.990
And at that point,

00:22:01.000 --> 00:22:03.610
you may have to assume that they looked at everything in that email,

00:22:03.610 --> 00:22:05.760
which is not a situation that a company wants to be in.

00:22:05.760 --> 00:22:06.490
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:22:06.490 --> 00:22:08.840
That makes it even that much worse.

00:22:08.840 --> 00:22:10.090
So, that's good.

00:22:10.090 --> 00:22:11.830
I think as we move on through this,

00:22:11.830 --> 00:22:15.710
maybe we'll start talking about what we can do to prevent it, but

00:22:15.710 --> 00:22:18.720
also look at some of those license features that you can do to get

00:22:18.720 --> 00:22:20.900
the information to see what they've looked at, if that's

00:22:20.900 --> 00:22:22.870
available, and some detections.

00:22:23.240 --> 00:22:24.240
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:22:24.250 --> 00:22:25.890
‑I'm ready to move into that if you are.

00:22:25.900 --> 00:22:27.050
‑Yeah, let's do it.
