WEBVTT

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Hey Tyler.

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So thanks for explaining the way this attack works.

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I think it's really important that all of us really

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understand the differentiation between, not only complexity,

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but maybe even goals,

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as well as the different phases of what business email compromise,

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especially at enterprise level, looks like,

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how targeted it is,

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the things that we have to be concerned about with

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like the CEO and that kind of stuff.

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And really,

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we got into talking about the organizational processes and being able

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to hack that and like understand how organization does business and

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use that and exploit how they do business to be able to basically

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make money in a criminal way.

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And so, we talked about that.

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One of the things that's interesting to me about business email compromise,

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in general,

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is that there's like the whole organizational process

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hack part of it is interesting, it's all technical as well once we get into like,

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especially when we start talking about detection response,

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like how we do that,

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like we get into really technical kind of cloud areas that's not

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all incident responders are comfortable moving into as well so

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there'll be some really good nuggets there.

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But the part about it that's like really,

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it's banks moving money around too, and you mentioned recouping money.

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So as we're talking about prevention is obviously having a plan ahead of

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time like any good response and strategy make sense.

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What does it look like to try to recoup this money if you can pretty quickly

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realize that it's been stolen or sent to the wrong place?

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‑Typically, when that happens,

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when an organization gets attacked and they find out

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about it and money has been transferred,

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there is a limited window upon which they can go to their

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bank and try to pull that money back.

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And the big thing is, companies need to have,

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like you just said,

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some type of process so that they know what to do if this happens because,

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again, everybody is being targeted for this.

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There is no specific industry or vertical that's going to be targeted,

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it's everybody.

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And so,

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knowing how to go back to your bank and request this

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is something that needs to happen.

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You don't want to be trying to figure this out on a Saturday morning

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in the middle of November because you've never,

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you have done this before.

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And another thing that can be done is going to law enforcement.

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Law enforcement is obviously seeing a lot of this,

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and because of that,

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they have special resources that they can use in order to help you try to

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pull back that money or reverse those transactions.

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In my experience,

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sometimes they are successful or sometimes the organization's are successful.

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Most of the time they're able to recoup some money,

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but oftentimes they're not able to recoup all the money

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that was sent out to the attackers, unfortunately.

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‑Yeah,

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and I can see and I kind of wrote down a note of law

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enforcement because sometimes this trepidation about very

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quickly going to law enforcement,

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I know we have our like 3‑day reporting period thing,

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but, like do we expose ourselves to this event?

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We've all seen what happened with Uber and all of that on

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whether the embarrassment of reporting it,

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or the concern about reporting it and people's jobs,

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and all that stuff, but in this case,

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I think it's a little bit different than your breach,

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like you didn't have 400 million customer's credit card information

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stolen and that's going to be all over the headlines.

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When you go to law enforcement for this purpose because it's so

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targeted and something they're really comfortable with,

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it seems like there should be less concern about go ahead and

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engaging them as a partner to help get rid of that.

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Is that is that accurate?

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‑Yeah, I believe so, especially with business email compromises.

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This is definitely one of those types of attacks where I would recommend

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going to law enforcement as soon as possible because,

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again,

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there is a very short window of time that you can pull

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back money after it gets transferred.

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Once that time period has been exceeded it becomes less and less likely that

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you're going to be able to recoup any money from this.

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And so, going to law enforcement right away is going to assist in that process.

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‑Got you.

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And when I looked at some of the information,

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it seems like the time period is really based on how

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long it stays in that other account.

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Is that is that accurate?

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Because these kind of organizations have basically money mules,

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this is where it goes very like criminal,

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other organization, kind of standard, typical stuff you think of,

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right?

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Like they're money laundering, they're moving money around,

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people are moving money into different accounts.

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So when you're talking about a time period,

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is that the time period that we're talking about,

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or is there some,

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are there other limitations on what that time period would

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be to be able to get your money back?

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‑So I think the time period is more along the lines of what the

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banks have imposed or what the wire transfer systems have imposed

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on once you make that transaction,

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you have some time in order to reverse it and that's that time

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period that that we're talking about here.

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And, but you're absolutely right.

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An attacker could receive that money and immediately

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transfer it to another account, and then transfer that to another account,

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and so on and bounce those, bounce that money all over the place very quickly.

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So at that point,

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I have to imagine it's almost impossible to recover those funds.

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Now, at that point,

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organizations will be talking about going to a cyber insurance,

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should they have that,

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and things like that to kind of recoup funds that way as well.

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‑Yeah,

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my in‑depth understanding of that industry from Jack

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Ryan is basically that's how it works.

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So once it gets moved around very quickly, it's hard to follow.

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‑Absolutely.

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‑ That's good to know.

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I'm trying to wrap my head around.

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We're talking about prevention.

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I always want to try to make this relatable to a framework,

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not just for me, but just for others if you're comfortable with a framework,

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maybe it kind of helps you understand.

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So we're talking about attack chain.

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We see what that looks like kind of from initial compromise

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all the way through action objective,

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but we're also looking at techniques to identify,

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that let me know maybe what to expect next,

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right?

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‑Right.

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‑That's really something I'm always looking for as,

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especially for your continuous monitoring or in like a SOC,

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I'm like I solve this, I need to go look in these other places.

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And so, here is a little more difficult,

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though, right, because of the less technical nature,

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especially of initial compromise, of course,

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phishing stuff that we really well understand,

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so look for phishing kinds of things, and there is other detections we can do.

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Ahead of time before the attacker gets to you,

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I mean really, they're doing targeting, which is a preattack like category,

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right, and they're doing organizational information gathering.

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And that's everything that they do up until,

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like you said, it was two weeks from the time that they registered the domain.

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All that was done well before that, is there anything you're seeing done?

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I mean,

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like obviously dumpster diving is like one of the things that can be found,

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but I imagine it to be a pretty mature organization that sees people

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stealing papers from the dumpster and then like oh,

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we better go check for business email compromise,

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that'd be a hard link to make.

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‑Yeah,

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a lot of the things that typically happen on the recon side of the

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business email compromise is not going to be done physically,

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it's still within the virtual world,

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it's still within the online world so that you really

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have to more focus along those sides.

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But, you do have to look at it that there, again, there are two victims here.

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There are the victims that get compromised and there are

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the victims that send the money out.

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So both of those victims,

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they have to have the different prevention pieces in place in

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order to make sure that this doesn't happen.

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For example, for the victims who send the money out,

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really,

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the best way to do that is having processes in place so that

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if you do get a request to change accounts,

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that you actually talk to a human with this.

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The attackers, if you email them back, they're going to respond to you,

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they're going to try to talk you into doing it,

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they're going to pretend to be the person that you think they are,

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and I've actually seen them get very, very aggressive on the email say,

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well,

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we're going to close your account if you don't do this or we're going to

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sue you or something like that to try to get that,

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again, it goes back to that urgency.

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But this is definitely one of those cases where companies need to have that

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procedure in place where if they get this email that says,

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please change the account number,

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they pick up the phone and they call that person.

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You know, you want to speak to a human.

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You don't want to rely upon email for this.

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‑Yeah, that that's a really great answer,

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and I feel like as we talk about this, this is going towards user,

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end user training, right?

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And I know that that seems really generic,

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and so, before we even say those words,

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I want to kind of get ahead of it a little bit and say yes,

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it's user training,

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but very specific to the things that are relevant to

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prevention for business email compromise.

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So one of the things you mentioned is have a process in place,

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and I don't think I've ever seen this in user security awareness training,

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have a process in place for how you verify when money is sent,

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regardless of who asked you to send it, right?

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Call somebody on the phone.

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Maybe there is a two‑step like that's two‑factor

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authentication for do I send this money or not?

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Like I want audio and I want text as well.

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One thing I wanted to point out and we had talked about,

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and we'll probably see this in a second,

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is you were talking about an attacker who is logging into,

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I'm going to say, from the perspective of the US,

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right, I'm talking about a foreign attacker who is logging in through phishing,

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gaining email addresses,

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getting into an environment that's all mainly English based.

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And so, when you look at that,

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I think what the user normally expects is that there is going

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to be this very broken English responses,

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it's not going to be very professional sounding,

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words are going to be messed up.

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But we're talking about level of proficiency and organization

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where they can read through all of your documents,

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identify invoices, understand your business processes,

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all from reading every, all your things that are in English.

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So I imagine there is a higher level of English

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proficiency in the communication as well.

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‑Yes, there absolutely is.

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I've read through a lot of these business email compromised emails,

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and it can actually be pretty difficult to tell just by looking at the body of

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the email when you're dealing with the attacker versus when you're dealing

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with the real person that they're Impersonating.

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I've even seen it where attackers have basically just copied and

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pasted from other emails a person has sent,

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changed a couple of words, and have sent it out that way.

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So you're right, you're not going to get those misspellings,

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you're not going to get that broken English that I think a lot of

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people have been used to for some of these scams.

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‑That makes a lot of sense and it's important for people who are like oh,

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well, user awareness training is one of the prevention measures for this,

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right?

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It's like, not necessarily,

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your standard users awareness training is not going to cover the

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level of which these are current because you'll see,

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oh, if you see misspellings,

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if you see this like that's part of awareness training I've seen in the past,

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that's great, it's not going to stop this from happening,

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right?

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‑Right.

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I mean, and you're right.

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User awareness training is not the end all be all for something like this.

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We still need to do it,

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we still need to educate everybody about how to

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recognize these types of attacks.

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but you do also need to kind of put those procedures in place,

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verify those procedures are being worked.

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and then there are technical things that you can put into place or at least

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proactive monitoring to help prevent something like this.

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‑Yeah, absolutely and you talked about the audio confirmation as well,

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or even I saw one case when I was doing some research on it where basically,

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the organizations will target when the CEO is on vacation and not reachable

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because they have access to their schedule through office 365,

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and then it's like you couldn't call them if you wanted to.

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And so that's another kind of another level to be aware of is they're

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monitoring who is coming and going and they're monitoring schedules

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because they also have access to that information,

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so it's important to know.

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‑Yeah, and and they use that to their advantage as well.

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If they know the CEO is out,

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they're going to send an email that looks like it's

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coming from the CEO to accounting and say,

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hey, I just got this, I can't do this myself.

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Please send this out as soon as possible.

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Again, it's coming from your CEO, I mean are you going to tell your CEO no?

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Probably not.

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So that's, again, one of the tactics the attackers use.

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‑Yeah, it kind of freaks me out a little bit because I'm like,

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oh, this is a bit smarter than my average bad guy I go up against,

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right?

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Yeah, a little bit more in‑depth capability there.

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So when we talk about prevention then,

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obviously training awareness we talked about,

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we talked about making sure you have processes in

00:12:08.990 --> 00:12:11.760
place for when money is transferred, that totally makes sense.

00:12:12.240 --> 00:12:13.620
You know, maybe just a personal thing for me,

00:12:13.620 --> 00:12:16.830
but let's get away from like sending paper invoices for stuff,

00:12:16.840 --> 00:12:19.760
but that's another, that's a whole another discussion,

00:12:19.770 --> 00:12:22.600
right, about how we do virtual banking.

00:12:22.600 --> 00:12:27.150
But what are some other things we can do to help prevent this from happening?

00:12:27.640 --> 00:12:32.250
‑Yeah, So I will say probably the number one thing that a company can do,

00:12:32.250 --> 00:12:36.520
especially if they're using a cloud‑based email system like Office 365,

00:12:36.530 --> 00:12:40.080
is put in multifactor authentication.

00:12:40.080 --> 00:12:43.890
Yes, you can bypass that, we will talk about that,

00:12:43.900 --> 00:12:48.470
but multifactor authentication is absolutely key because users are

00:12:48.470 --> 00:12:51.350
going to use the same password in other places,

00:12:51.360 --> 00:12:53.000
they can be brute forced.

00:12:53.000 --> 00:12:54.650
And so,

00:12:55.340 --> 00:12:58.190
having that multifactor authentication makes it just that

00:12:58.190 --> 00:13:00.220
little bit more difficult for the attacker.

00:13:00.230 --> 00:13:01.130
I can tell you,

00:13:01.130 --> 00:13:05.980
in 90% of the investigations that I work that

00:13:05.980 --> 00:13:09.590
involve business email compromises, when I asked the victim,

00:13:09.600 --> 00:13:11.730
do you have multifactor in place,

00:13:11.730 --> 00:13:15.350
the answer is either no or we're in the middle of implementing it.

00:13:15.740 --> 00:13:18.710
So that is definitely key there.

00:13:18.710 --> 00:13:21.260
So So get that in place, get that working.

00:13:21.260 --> 00:13:22.630
I know it's a pain,

00:13:22.640 --> 00:13:25.630
users hate multifactor authentication because there is one more step,

00:13:25.640 --> 00:13:29.710
but it's going to save you a a lot of heartache in the long run.

00:13:29.710 --> 00:13:34.040
In addition to that, these start with phishing attacks.

00:13:34.050 --> 00:13:37.000
So have that phishing detection and protection in place,

00:13:37.010 --> 00:13:40.530
whether that's going through your current email system,

00:13:40.530 --> 00:13:43.700
Office 365, again, we're kind of focusing on that,

00:13:43.700 --> 00:13:46.010
but they've got a lot of phishing,

00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:49.270
anti‑phishing detection and prevention you can turn on,

00:13:49.240 --> 00:13:52.060
there are external services you can bring in to do that,

00:13:52.040 --> 00:13:55.000
and, again educating your users.

00:13:55.000 --> 00:14:00.000
I know you've look into this with some of the things that

00:14:00.010 --> 00:14:04.250
organizations can do in order to help identify external

00:14:04.250 --> 00:14:05.750
emails and things like that, right?

00:14:05.760 --> 00:14:06.790
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:14:06.800 --> 00:14:09.760
Some of the neat solutions that I found,

00:14:09.760 --> 00:14:10.370
again,

00:14:10.740 --> 00:14:12.920
we're looking at this as it's a hacking humans

00:14:12.920 --> 00:14:16.890
hacking organizational processes and, you know,

00:14:16.890 --> 00:14:19.400
go figure some of the answers for provision are

00:14:19.400 --> 00:14:22.680
actually just changing processes, and again,

00:14:22.680 --> 00:14:25.450
kind of changing the way that humans look at the information they're

00:14:25.450 --> 00:14:27.520
given so that they can identify stuff more easily.

00:14:27.520 --> 00:14:31.980
So one of the neat things I found was actually color coding virtual emails where

00:14:31.980 --> 00:14:34.700
the correspondence is from from the external organizations.

00:14:34.710 --> 00:14:38.660
I really like that one and wanted to point it out because like that's a

00:14:38.660 --> 00:14:43.070
neat technical solution that makes it easier for humans to identify when

00:14:43.070 --> 00:14:45.060
they need to pay extra attention to something.

00:14:45.440 --> 00:14:47.920
Another thing that you already brought up was just

00:14:47.920 --> 00:14:50.020
verifying the payment location, right?

00:14:50.030 --> 00:14:52.590
Maybe you have something, some sort of, you know,

00:14:52.590 --> 00:14:56.430
system of record that makes sure that like that change of like where you pay

00:14:56.430 --> 00:14:59.720
something to and this is from the other victim perspective,

00:14:59.720 --> 00:15:03.940
the change of where you pay something to shouldn't be so easy,

00:15:03.950 --> 00:15:04.380
right?

00:15:04.380 --> 00:15:06.420
Like there needs to be additional verification,

00:15:06.420 --> 00:15:08.810
maybe multiple people's verification before you change

00:15:08.820 --> 00:15:11.280
the location that you pay something to.

00:15:11.280 --> 00:15:14.090
Yeah, that was, those are the other things.

00:15:14.090 --> 00:15:16.390
Other than that, you kind of brought up the multifactor authentication thing,

00:15:16.390 --> 00:15:20.090
that's most of what I found, but I really liked the color coding one,

00:15:20.090 --> 00:15:23.420
that seems like just a nifty good solution.

00:15:23.430 --> 00:15:29.060
‑And that's really more effective than I think people give it credit for,

00:15:29.060 --> 00:15:32.490
just having that indicator when you receive an email that it came

00:15:32.490 --> 00:15:35.930
from outside your organization is really key.

00:15:35.930 --> 00:15:37.030
What I would like to see too,

00:15:37.030 --> 00:15:40.720
and I have yet to see a service that does this or something implemented,

00:15:40.720 --> 00:15:44.710
is the first time you receive an email from a specific domain having a

00:15:44.710 --> 00:15:50.060
different color code pop up as well so that if I'm used to getting you know

00:15:50.060 --> 00:15:52.390
something from AaronRosenmund@pluralsight.com,

00:15:52.390 --> 00:15:57.030
the first time I get it, I see that indicator and the rest,

00:15:57.030 --> 00:16:03.540
I don't, but if I get a phish from AaronRosenmund@pluralsgt.com,

00:16:03.550 --> 00:16:05.470
I may not notice that domain change,

00:16:05.470 --> 00:16:08.550
and so having that color coded indicator would be awesome to have.

00:16:08.550 --> 00:16:09.860
‑Oh yeah, that's a really good point.

00:16:09.870 --> 00:16:13.470
Like, hey, you've never seen this one before, pay extra attention to it.

00:16:13.480 --> 00:16:14.390
Yeah, that's great.

00:16:14.400 --> 00:16:15.130
‑Absolutely.

00:16:15.130 --> 00:16:15.860
‑Pretty cool.

00:16:16.040 --> 00:16:18.700
So that's the type of squatting thing that we talked about.

00:16:18.700 --> 00:16:21.310
There is also stuff you can use to detect type of squatting, right?

00:16:21.320 --> 00:16:22.010
‑Yeah,

00:16:22.010 --> 00:16:25.690
there are a lot of services out there that you can go and do

00:16:25.690 --> 00:16:29.640
that analysis in order to see if there are any domains out

00:16:29.640 --> 00:16:31.120
there that are very similar to yours.

00:16:31.120 --> 00:16:32.980
There are free resources to do it.

00:16:32.990 --> 00:16:36.120
I highly recommend having somebody go out and,

00:16:36.250 --> 00:16:39.080
even on a weekly or monthly basis,

00:16:39.080 --> 00:16:43.290
just run your domain or domains through one of those free

00:16:43.290 --> 00:16:46.930
services and look at the domains that pop up,

00:16:46.930 --> 00:16:48.820
how old are they?

00:16:48.820 --> 00:16:52.650
If somebody registers a domain that's very similar to yours yesterday,

00:16:52.660 --> 00:16:53.790
that's kind of interesting.

00:16:53.790 --> 00:16:55.090
You want to pay attention to that,

00:16:55.100 --> 00:16:58.860
especially if it has a mail MX record associated with that

00:16:58.870 --> 00:17:00.980
because that means they can start sending emails and

00:17:00.980 --> 00:17:02.570
receive the emails to that domain,

00:17:02.580 --> 00:17:07.560
so that is a great indication that somebody could be starting to spoof

00:17:07.560 --> 00:17:10.760
your domain or start to send one of these attacks.

00:17:10.839 --> 00:17:13.109
‑Yeah, that's awesome and that applies to like,

00:17:13.109 --> 00:17:17.089
that's maybe one of the few places where we can get ahead of the attack,

00:17:17.089 --> 00:17:20.109
like this is where they're doing that preparation of their attack,

00:17:20.109 --> 00:17:23.290
it's where they're doing their organizational information gathering,

00:17:23.300 --> 00:17:24.339
set up a domain.

00:17:24.339 --> 00:17:26.000
They haven't really touched our stuff yet,

00:17:26.010 --> 00:17:28.610
but that's something you can check and identify ahead of time.

00:17:28.620 --> 00:17:29.260
That's awesome.

00:17:29.340 --> 00:17:30.460
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:17:30.460 --> 00:17:33.360
And you have to kind of remember that usually the attackers,

00:17:33.440 --> 00:17:37.750
they set up these domains days to weeks to even up to

00:17:37.750 --> 00:17:40.410
a month or so prior to the attack.

00:17:40.420 --> 00:17:44.460
So if I had to guess what happens is once the attackers

00:17:44.460 --> 00:17:45.990
figure out who they want to target,

00:17:46.000 --> 00:17:48.540
they start setting up that infrastructure a little bit

00:17:48.550 --> 00:17:51.620
so they can grab those domains and, let's face it,

00:17:51.620 --> 00:17:54.580
the longer those domains are out there, the more valid they're going to look.

00:17:54.580 --> 00:17:59.180
A domain that's a day old is a lot more suspicious to receive an email

00:17:59.180 --> 00:18:03.370
from than a domain that's 2 months old or a month old.

00:18:03.380 --> 00:18:06.660
So that's kind of their mindset in it as well.

00:18:07.440 --> 00:18:08.370
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:18:08.370 --> 00:18:12.180
And another thing I want to point out before we move too much further is

00:18:12.180 --> 00:18:16.070
that when we're looking at type of squatting and phishing,

00:18:16.640 --> 00:18:19.450
there are a few different versions of the way this attack goes

00:18:19.450 --> 00:18:21.990
that don't necessarily require type of squatting,

00:18:21.990 --> 00:18:25.800
and there is another version that doesn't require phishing either.

00:18:25.800 --> 00:18:31.760
So if I gain from a breach valid credentials for your Office 365 environment,

00:18:32.140 --> 00:18:33.800
I didn't have to phish to anybody to get it,

00:18:33.800 --> 00:18:35.870
I just use those credentials that were already out there

00:18:35.870 --> 00:18:38.480
in the public that I can pull and use.

00:18:38.490 --> 00:18:40.990
So now I'm already in, and then from there,

00:18:40.990 --> 00:18:46.150
I can send valid emails from that location to your customers.

00:18:46.150 --> 00:18:48.800
So in that situation, probably most dangerous,

00:18:48.800 --> 00:18:50.470
there weren't a lot of indicators,

00:18:50.470 --> 00:18:52.470
but I do want to make it clear that's an option.

00:18:53.040 --> 00:18:54.090
‑Oh, yeah, absolutely,

00:18:54.090 --> 00:18:56.920
and we've kind of been focusing on the attacker

00:18:56.930 --> 00:18:58.790
setting up this type of squatter domain.

00:18:58.800 --> 00:19:02.430
There are cases where absolutely the attacker will just get into

00:19:02.430 --> 00:19:04.850
that email and send all the emails from there.

00:19:04.860 --> 00:19:09.330
I've even seen cases where they do that and they include the type of

00:19:09.330 --> 00:19:12.660
squatted domain cc'd on that to make the emails look a little bit more

00:19:12.660 --> 00:19:16.200
legitimate because if I'm sending you an email asking for payment and

00:19:16.200 --> 00:19:17.790
I'm the only one sending it,

00:19:17.790 --> 00:19:20.750
that may look a little bit less legitimate than email

00:19:20.750 --> 00:19:22.780
where I've CC'd two of my colleagues on,

00:19:22.790 --> 00:19:26.940
even though those are to another domain or I've also

00:19:26.940 --> 00:19:29.090
compromised those email accounts.

00:19:29.100 --> 00:19:30.280
So again,

00:19:30.280 --> 00:19:31.970
it's just the attacker trying to make this look as

00:19:31.970 --> 00:19:34.080
legitimate as possible to convince the victim.

00:19:34.090 --> 00:19:35.450
Yes, you need to send the money.

00:19:36.440 --> 00:19:39.870
‑Yeah, that's pretty slick and pretty aware of them.

00:19:39.870 --> 00:19:40.220
I guess,

00:19:40.230 --> 00:19:43.070
I'm sure the criminal organizations have somebody who's also worked

00:19:43.070 --> 00:19:44.700
in Enterprise where they check emails all day.

00:19:44.700 --> 00:19:47.520
So they have plenty of, we all have plenty of experience on how to do that.

00:19:47.530 --> 00:19:50.760
But do you have an example we can see?

00:19:50.760 --> 00:19:54.590
Like I think we'd be remiss if we didn't do the stereotypical example of here's

00:19:54.590 --> 00:19:56.740
what this email looks like and things you should look for,

00:19:56.750 --> 00:19:57.070
right?

00:19:57.340 --> 00:19:57.690
‑Yeah.

00:19:57.700 --> 00:20:02.630
So what we see here is, this is a business email compromise email or one that's,

00:20:02.630 --> 00:20:07.150
you know, typically seen or something along what a person might see.

00:20:07.160 --> 00:20:08.530
We mocked this up,

00:20:08.540 --> 00:20:12.310
but it's based off of a number of different ones that I

00:20:12.310 --> 00:20:14.510
have seen during my investigations.

00:20:14.520 --> 00:20:20.380
What you have here is you have it from a salesperson@corp.com.

00:20:20.390 --> 00:20:22.620
We just kind of made that up.

00:20:22.630 --> 00:20:26.720
The subject, Action Needed: Invoice Payment Needed,

00:20:26.720 --> 00:20:28.810
so you have that sense of urgency there,

00:20:28.810 --> 00:20:30.030
and it's going to the clients.

00:20:30.040 --> 00:20:34.530
And the email is going to say something like dear client,

00:20:34.540 --> 00:20:37.760
per our previous discussion, please remit payment for the attached invoice,

00:20:37.760 --> 00:20:42.970
and they would attach a PDF that contains the changed account number.

00:20:42.940 --> 00:20:46.580
Failure to do so will result in a late fee and so on.

00:20:46.580 --> 00:20:48.990
A couple of things that were not showing here,

00:20:48.990 --> 00:20:53.430
but often happens too is, attackers will often hijack existing conversations.

00:20:53.440 --> 00:20:56.170
So when they go into your email, they'll,

00:20:56.170 --> 00:20:59.140
instead of creating a new email like what we see here,

00:20:59.150 --> 00:21:01.780
they will actually just reply to an existing thread.

00:21:01.840 --> 00:21:04.660
Or when they reply to the existing thread,

00:21:04.640 --> 00:21:09.190
they will take that email and make it look like their replying to it

00:21:09.200 --> 00:21:11.140
if they're sending it from a different domain.

00:21:11.150 --> 00:21:14.850
What we've also seen done too is here you see that from,

00:21:14.850 --> 00:21:19.180
so in theory, if you click reply, it would go back to that,

00:21:19.190 --> 00:21:21.780
they may actually have the from address to be the legitimate

00:21:21.780 --> 00:21:26.180
person's email address and then add in a reply to feature so

00:21:26.180 --> 00:21:29.070
that when you reply to the email, it actually goes to a different place,

00:21:29.070 --> 00:21:30.960
which is an account the attacker owns.

00:21:31.340 --> 00:21:32.130
‑I see.

00:21:32.140 --> 00:21:33.430
And that's another place,

00:21:33.430 --> 00:21:36.800
especially in the detection we can start to see because there are

00:21:36.800 --> 00:21:41.480
rules you can see set for if replied to is different from the from

00:21:41.480 --> 00:21:44.550
address then alert on that and take action,

00:21:44.550 --> 00:21:44.820
right?

00:21:44.820 --> 00:21:46.370
‑Yes, yes, absolutely.

00:21:47.040 --> 00:21:48.230
‑Yeah, that's interesting.

00:21:48.230 --> 00:21:50.940
So what we're not seeing here too is they're going to have an

00:21:50.940 --> 00:21:55.530
attachment attached to this that is literally one of your PDFs

00:21:55.530 --> 00:21:59.030
from your organization that that they stole and attached to it

00:21:59.040 --> 00:22:02.180
and then changed the numbers on, so nearly no difference at all,

00:22:02.180 --> 00:22:05.160
especially if they hijack an existing conversation.

00:22:05.540 --> 00:22:11.600
This is, I mean, it would work on me like very difficult to identify.

00:22:11.600 --> 00:22:13.250
I can, in the hustle bustle of the day,

00:22:13.250 --> 00:22:15.540
you're definitely going to have this happen.

00:22:15.540 --> 00:22:16.550
‑Exactly.

00:22:17.040 --> 00:22:17.210
‑Yeah,

00:22:17.210 --> 00:22:18.800
I can see why it would be really hard to prevent

00:22:18.800 --> 00:22:22.310
anyone across your entire organization, right?

00:22:22.310 --> 00:22:25.510
Like we, you and I will be like, yeah, of course, how did you click this?

00:22:25.520 --> 00:22:28.070
But the reality is is that across the entire organization,

00:22:28.070 --> 00:22:31.120
someone in some situation on their phone while

00:22:31.120 --> 00:22:33.350
they're driving and watching Netflix, they're going to click it,

00:22:33.360 --> 00:22:33.990
right?

00:22:34.000 --> 00:22:39.140
And so when they do that that's not necessarily the end.

00:22:39.150 --> 00:22:41.410
That's why the prevention here is in,

00:22:41.410 --> 00:22:44.020
the prevention point to stop this from happening is having that

00:22:44.020 --> 00:22:48.530
process for not paying to accounts that don't exist or having to

00:22:48.530 --> 00:22:51.900
call somebody because just because you opened this and and looked at

00:22:51.900 --> 00:22:53.950
it and got tricked in that moment,

00:22:53.960 --> 00:22:56.320
there still should be some extra steps required before you start

00:22:56.320 --> 00:22:59.150
transferring bulks of money over wire transfers.

00:22:59.160 --> 00:23:00.300
‑Yeah, exactly.

00:23:00.300 --> 00:23:01.930
I mean, if you think about it,

00:23:01.930 --> 00:23:06.770
I have to imagine that companies don't change account numbers very often,

00:23:06.740 --> 00:23:10.050
it's pretty rare for somebody to do that or an organization to do that.

00:23:10.060 --> 00:23:14.070
So getting those emails should be a rare circumstance to begin with,

00:23:14.070 --> 00:23:17.100
and so that should start to trigger some flags as well.

00:23:17.110 --> 00:23:21.660
And then, like you said, have that process in place so that if you do get those,

00:23:21.670 --> 00:23:24.990
call the person up and make sure you talk to them,

00:23:24.990 --> 00:23:26.280
or talk to their supervisor,

00:23:26.280 --> 00:23:29.760
or you talk to somebody at that organization to make sure that,

00:23:29.760 --> 00:23:32.390
yes, they did actually send this, or no,

00:23:32.390 --> 00:23:34.140
they did not send this.

00:23:34.150 --> 00:23:38.150
‑What we get from there is now that we have that process in place,

00:23:38.150 --> 00:23:40.550
that's great, but we hear, honestly,

00:23:40.550 --> 00:23:43.050
I've heard about business email compromise all the time,

00:23:43.050 --> 00:23:46.000
lots of it come at us, but that's why we actually wanted to do this.

00:23:46.000 --> 00:23:48.510
You came up the idea because because we just saw some pretty

00:23:48.510 --> 00:23:51.580
big ones happen and you've seen them so I think it's a good

00:23:51.580 --> 00:23:54.400
idea to let's assume compromise.

00:23:54.400 --> 00:23:57.010
Let's now move into, prevention is awesome,

00:23:57.010 --> 00:23:58.340
here is the stuff you should have in place.

00:23:58.340 --> 00:24:00.390
What if I don't and I now need to go Tech?

00:24:00.580 --> 00:24:02.870
What if this is happening in my organization right now?

00:24:02.870 --> 00:24:06.560
What can I go do to detect some of the indicators that this is going on?

00:24:06.560 --> 00:24:08.710
Because there's this dwell time, like we said,

00:24:08.710 --> 00:24:12.680
and even if there, have you seen it where like they'll send it,

00:24:12.680 --> 00:24:13.640
the money gets sent,

00:24:13.650 --> 00:24:17.110
and then like nothing bad happens and they kind of like keep doing it?

00:24:17.110 --> 00:24:19.460
They're like, well that worked out, let's do it again.

00:24:19.470 --> 00:24:22.000
‑Oh yeah, yeah.

00:24:22.010 --> 00:24:22.170
Yeah,

00:24:22.170 --> 00:24:25.560
if they do it for one customer or a couple of different

00:24:25.560 --> 00:24:28.770
customers and they don't get caught, they'll come back and do it again.

00:24:28.780 --> 00:24:32.230
They're just going to keep doing it until they get caught because,

00:24:32.240 --> 00:24:34.900
at that point, they just lose access.

00:24:34.910 --> 00:24:39.650
There is nothing that's really preventing them from from stopping,

00:24:39.650 --> 00:24:43.160
and if it works, they're just going to keep getting that money.

00:24:43.840 --> 00:24:44.920
‑That makes sense.

00:24:44.920 --> 00:24:47.790
So we need to move into detection so we can figure out if this is

00:24:47.790 --> 00:24:49.520
currently happening in someone's environment,

00:24:49.530 --> 00:24:52.270
how they can find it, so we'll talk about that next.
