WEBVTT

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So, Aaron, we've talked about business email compromise for a while now.

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If we wanted to summarize everything up, where would you start?

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‑I mean,

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my first thing I'd want to understand and probably we should put

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some emphasis on is what actually is a BEC,

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or business email compromise,

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and how does it differentiate from some standard stuff that we've seen.

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So, as we've talked about that,

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I think we've seen that it's really different from just the original email.

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There's a lot of complexity to it, it is very targeted,

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and they're mainly after money,

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and there's probably some more you could add to that as well.

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‑Yeah, absolutely, I 100% agree with that.

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I think the big thing that people need to understand is anybody

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in any organization can be affected by this.

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It's not targeting just a finance or health care or manufacturing,

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it's targeting everybody, because every business,

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whether it's a small mom‑and‑pop shop,

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all the way up to like a Fortune 50 company,

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is going to have somebody who pays bills,

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and so anybody can be targeted.

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‑Yeah,

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that reaches right back to kind of the next point of

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like what is that prevention point?

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All of us pay bills, all of us have processes where we have to,

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especially organizations, have to be able to send money back and forth somehow.

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But there's ways that companies can change those processes,

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like being able to double‑factor whether or not you send money,

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like I need to call somebody and verify that the email and text with audio,

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or whatever your process needs to be,

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the process can also be the prevention tactic as well.

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‑Yeah, absolutely.

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And not only on the human side of the problem,

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getting those processes in place,

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there are some technical preventions that we can put into place as well.

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Turning on multi‑factor authentication, yes,

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it is not the end all be all of security,

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it's not going to 100% prevent it,

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but it's going to go a long way into helping prevent that.

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Doing things like putting in anti‑phishing,

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because again, BECs, they start with a phishing attack.

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Stopping it at that point in the attack chain is going to

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stop the whole attack from being successful.

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‑Yeah, absolutely.

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And then if, in case they are successful,

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now we have to worry about detections like we do with any other type of attack.

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Like they're always changing tactics,

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and sometimes they can get past the phishing guards that they have up,

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and so we want to make sure that we can detect on

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these things that they do afterwards.

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Like whether they get valid credentials from phishing,

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we can check their geolocation and look for weird,

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impossible travel logins,

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we can do things like looking for those inbox rules that you

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mentioned and the way that they're brought up,

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and be able to really identify if this is already happening in our

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environment or look for if they do get past those initial preventions

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when it does happen in our environment.

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‑Right, and once you detect that, then we move into the response.

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We want to find the users that have been compromised.

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We want to kill their active sessions, force a password reset,

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and then start doing analysis on their little realm in the Office 365

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or cloud environment or whatever you have set up.

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You want to, again, look for those inbox rules to get them removed,

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you want to look for any potentially malicious apps that could be

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involved or associated with their accounts,

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get those out there, because we want to contain the incident,

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we want to prevent the attacker from being able to do anything else,

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and we want to eradicate the incident and kick the attacker out

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so that they can't do anything moving forward.

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‑Yeah, and as you explained,

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it really seems like their ability to do that is really predicated

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upon how much money they're spending on licenses,

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what data they have available to them, and that speaks directly to,

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maybe you don't need to spend that money if you don't have sensitive

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data that you're concerned about in the first place,

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or if you don't do wire transactions that way,

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then this isn't a consideration that you have to have.

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So to me that really goes back to the unfortunate part of security,

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the not so fun part of security is looking at kind of your risk matrix

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and your business impact matrix and understanding,

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yeah, this is a really scary thing that can happen,

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but how much mitigation do I need to put around this so

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that the mitigation doesn't cost more than the actual

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problem happening in the first place.

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‑Yeah, exactly.

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This is a conversation that security people need to be

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having with their senior leadership, with the people in charge,

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with their accounting and financial departments,

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so that they can understand what the risk is,

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so that all the proper protections can be put into place,

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all of the things that need to be put into place to detect,

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prevent, and respond to this can happen in a very quick time,

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should it need to happen.

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‑Yeah, and to me,

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this one differentiates itself a little bit because

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when we add in the cloud environment,

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when we add in the subscription models for Office 365 or Gmail

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Enterprise or whatever it is that we're using,

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what's interesting,

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that's a different type of money math than I think the

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standard maybe CISSO is even used to doing,

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because they're now having to talk to the IT organization and say,

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hey, we actually need a bumped‑up version of this user's account.

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You're not trying to argue to get money to put in an IDS,

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you're not trying to argue to get money to turn Sentinel Defender on,

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that's not,

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you're not trying to get money to fund like new people in your organization.

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You're actually needing another organization to spend money to upgrade

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licenses to be able to have the correct information that you need to do a

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response or a detection in the first place.

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‑And I think a good argument for the people,

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or a good point for the people trying to make that argument is

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you don't need to do this across the board.

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It's not like if you have 100,000 users,

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you need to upgrade 100,000 users to the next version of the license.

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You can do it user by user,

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so you pick and choose which users are most susceptible or

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most at risk to an attack like this.

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You upgrade their accounts so that you do have that

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information should you need it.

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It's all a guessing game on if you're going to need

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this information in the future, but, again,

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it comes down to the risk versus the reward.

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If that were to happen at that time, you want to have that information.

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It's going to save everybody a lot of headaches.

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Yeah,

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I think this being kind of a non‑standard or maybe not the

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typical path from like a pure malware infection,

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it can be a little bit scary to understand,

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or maybe even ambiguous to understand where those endpoint packs are

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that you can have a security organization to stop it,

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though, I will say like you've done an excellent job explaining like,

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hey, here's where, here's the things we can do to actually be successful,

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and not just prevention, not just detection,

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but also on what we can do when we respond to it,

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and being able to scope everything properly.

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It kind of takes it from this ambiguous,

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scary like, oh, I'm not really sure how to handle this,

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and we're adding in some cloud stuff to it that maybe I'm not used to,

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to, oh,

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this really just looks like any other attack with just

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kind of slightly different tactics.

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It's, if anything more hands on, like there's more human stuff,

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even on the other side.

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On the organizational, the criminal organization is more hands‑on and human,

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so there's all that stuff that you can get around as well.

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‑Yeah,

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and I think the biggest takeaway that anybody should have from this is that,

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yes, this is a major issue that's going on,

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these attacks happen every day, however,

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it is something that organizations can go in,

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they can apply the right preventions, detections,

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and response techniques to in order to stay ahead of it and

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do what they need to do in order to minimize any impact

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should something like that happen.

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So it's a very, it's a problem that is very easily,

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and I'm not going to call it solved, but able to be responded to,

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able to be taken care of as best as possible.

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‑Yeah, none of this has ever solvable, but it's definitely,

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I would say,

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solvable to any point that any of these other problems are with like

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any other malware infection that we're talking about,

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even though it's not technically malware.

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‑Exactly.

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‑Well, thanks for being here with me, Tyler.

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I really appreciate your expertise, it's invaluable in this area.

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You brought like so much to this, and even helped me understand it a lot more.

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So a benefit for me, I get to learn a lot from this too.

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Well, I appreciate you being here.

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‑Yeah, absolutely.

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Thank you for having me.

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‑Yeah, thank you.

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And thanks everybody for watching this Pluralsight

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course on business email compromise.

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We look forward to seeing you in the next one.
