WEBVTT

00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:02.080
So we just talked about a bunch of ways,

00:00:02.080 --> 00:00:05.320
or maybe not a bunch, but a few locations in that Kill Chain,

00:00:05.330 --> 00:00:07.250
and I love that we're all still bringing up Kill Chain,

00:00:07.250 --> 00:00:10.590
even though MITRE ATT&CK is totally killing the Kill Chain.

00:00:10.590 --> 00:00:12.380
I don't know, in my mind, that's how it's working.

00:00:12.390 --> 00:00:15.810
But as far as breaking the chain of attack,

00:00:15.810 --> 00:00:20.460
or the operations on the box from this specific malware infection,

00:00:20.940 --> 00:00:22.450
it starts with the document.

00:00:22.460 --> 00:00:24.900
And when we want to talk about prevention,

00:00:24.910 --> 00:00:28.050
that's exactly where we need to look to start talking about prevention.

00:00:29.440 --> 00:00:35.740
So, do you have some advice for what can we do to stop this thing from happening?

00:00:35.740 --> 00:00:38.020
Like, we talked about stopping it from the HTTP from happening,

00:00:38.020 --> 00:00:40.000
obviously, don't click the button in the first place,

00:00:40.010 --> 00:00:44.250
but what are some technical preventions that we can put in place to stop

00:00:44.250 --> 00:00:47.050
this from happening in the first place so we don't get further into

00:00:47.050 --> 00:00:49.170
having to do a full incident response motion?

00:00:49.170 --> 00:00:53.210
‑Well, probably the biggest one is just disabling macros.

00:00:53.210 --> 00:00:54.920
If the organization,

00:00:54.920 --> 00:00:58.090
and I know these sort of recommendations are usually hard

00:00:58.090 --> 00:01:01.840
because everybody has a unique network, everybody has unique endpoints,

00:01:01.840 --> 00:01:04.360
everybody deploys things different and have different needs,

00:01:04.360 --> 00:01:07.780
but stopping the macros are really the first step,

00:01:07.790 --> 00:01:10.110
whether it's the Salesforce style or the VBA.

00:01:10.120 --> 00:01:11.980
If those macros can execute,

00:01:11.980 --> 00:01:16.370
that really disables the threat right then and there.

00:01:16.370 --> 00:01:19.250
Filtering on the emails, that's another step.

00:01:19.250 --> 00:01:22.130
I mean, the further away from the user we can get,

00:01:22.140 --> 00:01:24.660
I think the better, and layer things in,

00:01:24.660 --> 00:01:28.760
the more likely that it's not going to get to them because then our

00:01:28.760 --> 00:01:32.570
security really rests on that user not enabling that content.

00:01:32.570 --> 00:01:34.110
From there,

00:01:34.110 --> 00:01:37.140
we're going to see here in just a little bit a lot of

00:01:37.140 --> 00:01:41.390
the process and behavioral patterns, both on the network and on the host,

00:01:41.390 --> 00:01:45.600
and so seeing PowerShell launch from Excel.exe,

00:01:45.600 --> 00:01:47.240
that's really odd,

00:01:47.240 --> 00:01:50.430
I don't know very many folks that write legitimate Office

00:01:50.430 --> 00:01:52.730
documents that use macros that launch PowerShell.

00:01:52.730 --> 00:01:56.580
And so being able to, you know, if not prevent that behavior,

00:01:56.580 --> 00:01:59.670
limit it, or at least be able to observe on it,

00:01:59.670 --> 00:02:02.990
and know that maybe something has occurred on an endpoint.

00:02:02.990 --> 00:02:06.490
We talked a little bit about these things change,

00:02:06.500 --> 00:02:09.850
and so these Office documents, they're continuously evolving.

00:02:09.940 --> 00:02:16.000
Oftentimes it's just minor modifications in order to bypass some endpoint

00:02:16.010 --> 00:02:20.650
protection agent or or some filtering on its way to the endpoint.

00:02:20.660 --> 00:02:24.280
And so we have to remain constantly vigilant on that

00:02:24.290 --> 00:02:27.830
because they make a small tweak,

00:02:27.840 --> 00:02:30.640
and maybe we were really reliant on them using PowerShell,

00:02:30.640 --> 00:02:33.320
but all of a sudden, it's DLLs and run dll32,

00:02:33.320 --> 00:02:35.980
and now they're bypassing these endpoints again.

00:02:35.990 --> 00:02:40.500
So those are the sort of techniques that we really need to stay

00:02:40.500 --> 00:02:44.530
up to speed on and make sure that in the environment we can

00:02:44.540 --> 00:02:46.450
limit that to the max extent possible.

00:02:46.840 --> 00:02:49.680
‑You mentioned one of my favorite keywords on security

00:02:49.680 --> 00:02:51.810
keyword Bingo was behavioral detections,

00:02:51.810 --> 00:02:54.050
and so I'm really excited to see what you have to share

00:02:54.050 --> 00:02:57.310
about that because the more we can vector towards a

00:02:57.310 --> 00:03:00.500
behavioral detection versus an indictor,

00:03:00.510 --> 00:03:05.370
the less we have to change our prevention capability or detection capability.

00:03:05.370 --> 00:03:05.460
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:03:05.460 --> 00:03:09.840
‑You have some documented behavioral action going.

00:03:09.840 --> 00:03:11.790
Show me what you got.

00:03:11.790 --> 00:03:13.380
‑Okay, so to start off with,

00:03:13.380 --> 00:03:16.590
I'd like to spend just a little bit of time on those lures,

00:03:16.600 --> 00:03:20.470
the images that are used inside of these malicious Office documents.

00:03:20.480 --> 00:03:23.850
As a research project that I've personally undertaken,

00:03:23.850 --> 00:03:28.210
I have found that those images can be a fairly strong indicator

00:03:28.210 --> 00:03:31.620
for correlating threat activity and campaigns.

00:03:31.620 --> 00:03:33.080
And so as you can see here,

00:03:33.090 --> 00:03:39.150
extracting those images allows us then to identify related documents,

00:03:39.150 --> 00:03:41.550
and again those related campaigns.

00:03:41.550 --> 00:03:45.810
Threat actors, like Dridex, they tend to use a variety of different lures,

00:03:45.810 --> 00:03:49.180
the lures being these images that are inside of the Office document.

00:03:49.180 --> 00:03:51.490
And as we discussed, because these are,

00:03:51.490 --> 00:03:55.630
the social engineering is really the primary point in

00:03:55.630 --> 00:03:59.360
which they are attacking the user, they have to look very realistic.

00:03:59.370 --> 00:04:02.250
Here's a Disney World one, one of my favorites.

00:04:02.250 --> 00:04:05.290
I also have, as another example, one from Capital One.

00:04:05.290 --> 00:04:09.220
And all of those common elements are present in this one as well.

00:04:09.220 --> 00:04:12.870
We have the brand abuse from Capital One, as well as the Office theme.

00:04:12.870 --> 00:04:17.279
We have some privacy sort of filter being employed,

00:04:17.279 --> 00:04:20.940
arbitrary text being blurred out, and then we have that call to action.

00:04:20.950 --> 00:04:25.360
The user needs to enable content in order to reveal whatever it is in

00:04:25.360 --> 00:04:29.240
this document that they are being prevented from seeing.

00:04:29.250 --> 00:04:33.440
So you can look at these images, and if you look at them enough,

00:04:33.440 --> 00:04:37.710
you'll be able to identify the threat actors that are using them.

00:04:37.710 --> 00:04:41.550
While there isn't right now a practical application

00:04:41.550 --> 00:04:44.350
of this sort of image similarity, again,

00:04:44.350 --> 00:04:46.690
it is actually quite a strong indicator because a lot of

00:04:46.690 --> 00:04:50.850
these threat actors are using the same images or the same

00:04:50.850 --> 00:04:53.640
group of images over their campaigns.

00:04:53.640 --> 00:04:54.310
‑So, how is that working?

00:04:54.310 --> 00:04:56.990
So you said that's a personal project of yours.

00:04:56.990 --> 00:05:00.510
Are you, is that like an image hash, or like,

00:05:00.510 --> 00:05:02.510
if we extract the image out and hash that image,

00:05:02.510 --> 00:05:04.400
and now we're comparing those hashes?

00:05:04.400 --> 00:05:06.460
Is that something that you're putting together for

00:05:06.470 --> 00:05:08.980
connecting campaigns and documents?

00:05:08.990 --> 00:05:09.300
‑Yeah.

00:05:09.300 --> 00:05:12.150
So, that is pretty much the approach.

00:05:12.150 --> 00:05:16.040
This technique has been applied for ransomware,

00:05:16.040 --> 00:05:19.940
for example, looking at the images dropped by ransomware or the ransomware notes,

00:05:19.940 --> 00:05:23.330
and can we correlate ransomware families off of those notes?

00:05:23.340 --> 00:05:28.820
If you look at any group that is worried about copyright on their images,

00:05:28.820 --> 00:05:33.790
there's an approach to say is anyone using an image that is similar to mine?

00:05:33.790 --> 00:05:35.770
And this doesn't use straight hashing.

00:05:35.770 --> 00:05:39.130
We don't take like an MD5 or a SHA‑1.

00:05:39.130 --> 00:05:43.780
It actually uses a perceptual hash, which is more akin to a fuzzy hash.

00:05:43.780 --> 00:05:45.260
And so we can get an approximation.

00:05:45.260 --> 00:05:46.520
We can say, all right,

00:05:46.520 --> 00:05:48.770
I have a collection of images that I've just extracted from all

00:05:48.770 --> 00:05:52.510
these mail docs. Let's go with 90% similarity.

00:05:52.510 --> 00:05:56.850
And once we've grouped them by that similarity threshold

00:05:56.850 --> 00:05:58.880
using this perceptual hashing approach,

00:05:58.880 --> 00:06:00.880
then we can connect them into these graphs,

00:06:00.880 --> 00:06:01.630
and then from there,

00:06:01.630 --> 00:06:05.880
we can assign them signatures and all sorts of really interesting things.

00:06:05.880 --> 00:06:07.500
So if you're interested in that work,

00:06:07.500 --> 00:06:10.780
there are some articles out there that discusses this,

00:06:10.780 --> 00:06:13.010
as well as some code on GitHub.

00:06:13.010 --> 00:06:13.660
‑Yeah, that's awesome.

00:06:13.660 --> 00:06:17.340
I'd love to drop that in the notes for this course for everybody in

00:06:17.340 --> 00:06:20.560
the exercise files so they can access that as well.

00:06:20.560 --> 00:06:23.880
‑And then I Tweet it for every week.

00:06:23.880 --> 00:06:24.990
‑Well, there's also that.

00:06:24.990 --> 00:06:27.380
Yeah, so you won't let us forget about it.

00:06:27.380 --> 00:06:28.310
That's good.

00:06:28.310 --> 00:06:31.680
‑It's really interesting, though, because what happens,

00:06:31.680 --> 00:06:37.000
as kind of a side note, you know, the classification of the document,

00:06:37.000 --> 00:06:40.610
you might get one or two, but then three or four don't get classified.

00:06:40.610 --> 00:06:44.030
Well, now if you've correlated them based off of the image,

00:06:44.030 --> 00:06:47.510
and I have two images in this group that are classified and two that aren't,

00:06:47.510 --> 00:06:49.880
we can sort of infer that the other two must have

00:06:49.890 --> 00:06:52.090
been delivering the same family.

00:06:52.090 --> 00:06:52.650
‑Interesting.

00:06:52.650 --> 00:06:52.840
Yeah,

00:06:52.840 --> 00:06:56.410
there's a ton of stuff you can start to infer between those connections as well,

00:06:56.410 --> 00:07:01.220
and I can even see that being used as a a detection/prevention

00:07:01.230 --> 00:07:03.070
capability when you're analyzing documents,

00:07:03.070 --> 00:07:04.450
again, further away from the user.

00:07:04.450 --> 00:07:06.230
That's really cool.

00:07:06.240 --> 00:07:07.600
‑Yeah.

00:07:07.610 --> 00:07:09.400
And on side note to the side note,

00:07:09.400 --> 00:07:14.140
we do have a Cuckoo plugin that has operationalized this,

00:07:14.150 --> 00:07:16.100
but that's way off topic.

00:07:16.100 --> 00:07:16.960
‑Impressive.

00:07:16.960 --> 00:07:18.570
Also, put it in the show notes, right?

00:07:18.570 --> 00:07:19.770
‑Okay.

00:07:19.770 --> 00:07:21.770
‑And don't stop Tweeting it.

00:07:21.770 --> 00:07:24.620
‑Don't stop Tweeting it, yeah.

00:07:24.620 --> 00:07:26.830
All right, so we've looked at the images.

00:07:26.830 --> 00:07:29.020
To help provide a little better context,

00:07:29.020 --> 00:07:33.040
here is one of these Dridex documents, just open it inside of Excel.

00:07:33.040 --> 00:07:37.870
And you'll notice that there is yet another lure, another image being used.

00:07:37.870 --> 00:07:40.370
There is the banner, the enabled content,

00:07:40.370 --> 00:07:44.030
that's what they're trying to social engineer the user into clicking.

00:07:44.030 --> 00:07:47.530
So, they will enable content, the macros will run.

00:07:47.530 --> 00:07:49.970
Typically, the macros are tied into some lifecycle event,

00:07:49.970 --> 00:07:54.170
like the auto open or the auto close, so that once they click the button,

00:07:54.170 --> 00:07:56.040
the user's job is done.

00:07:56.050 --> 00:07:59.590
Some documents will have a button like you see here,

00:07:59.590 --> 00:08:03.620
OPEN AND VIEW, and that might additionally execute the macros,

00:08:03.620 --> 00:08:07.550
but for the most part, the threat actors want a higher success rate,

00:08:07.640 --> 00:08:11.340
so they're going to go ahead and they're going to have an auto capability,

00:08:11.340 --> 00:08:14.040
auto open, run the macros when it's there.

00:08:14.050 --> 00:08:16.520
Some stealthier actors actually don't do that.

00:08:16.520 --> 00:08:18.880
They do rely on the button click,

00:08:18.880 --> 00:08:21.640
and so you can think about that as sort of an anti‑analysis

00:08:21.650 --> 00:08:23.780
technique and that if we throw this in a Sandbox,

00:08:24.060 --> 00:08:25.850
our Sandbox probably isn't going to click the button,

00:08:25.850 --> 00:08:26.830
but our users will,

00:08:26.830 --> 00:08:29.660
and so they might look a little bit more benign as they're going

00:08:29.740 --> 00:08:34.990
through the threat analysis at a larger scale.

00:08:34.990 --> 00:08:36.780
‑That's really interesting,

00:08:36.780 --> 00:08:39.450
especially just from a malware analysis inside of an

00:08:39.450 --> 00:08:41.000
automated Sandbox perspective.

00:08:41.000 --> 00:08:44.750
And kind of the first course in this series of prevention

00:08:44.750 --> 00:08:46.950
and detection response also goes over why would you build

00:08:46.960 --> 00:08:48.540
your own analysis capability.

00:08:48.540 --> 00:08:51.240
Why would you have something like Cuckoo Sandbox or

00:08:51.250 --> 00:08:53.400
build up your own analysis platform,

00:08:53.400 --> 00:08:58.390
just a Windows 7 with a list of stuff loaded to analyze it.

00:08:58.400 --> 00:08:59.590
And I always talk about that.

00:08:59.590 --> 00:08:59.840
It's like,

00:08:59.840 --> 00:09:06.040
there's lots of ways to evade or trick or be waiting for

00:09:06.040 --> 00:09:10.050
user reaction as a piece of malware, in an automated sense that,

00:09:10.050 --> 00:09:14.900
like stop execution from a Sandbox, that make it not 100% effective.

00:09:14.910 --> 00:09:17.330
A great point, especially for this.

00:09:17.330 --> 00:09:19.600
‑And that's one of the main reasons they would do that,

00:09:19.600 --> 00:09:23.710
is just that the user is going to provide that manual interaction,

00:09:23.710 --> 00:09:26.110
whereas the Sandbox at scale,

00:09:26.120 --> 00:09:30.040
if I'm trying to analyze hundreds of these documents a day,

00:09:30.040 --> 00:09:31.990
it's not an easy thing to do, and certainly,

00:09:31.990 --> 00:09:34.700
I might miss that step as it's being introduced,

00:09:34.700 --> 00:09:37.400
as these documents evolve and change over time.

00:09:37.400 --> 00:09:41.040
And so it might go with much lower detection for several

00:09:41.040 --> 00:09:43.880
days before I notice or observe that, oh hey,

00:09:43.890 --> 00:09:48.260
I've got to click a button now in order to get these macros to execute.

00:09:48.740 --> 00:09:48.930
‑Right.

00:09:48.930 --> 00:09:50.390
And so this one is automated, though,

00:09:50.390 --> 00:09:53.610
or you do have some automated samples you can show us executing.

00:09:53.610 --> 00:09:53.740
Right?

00:09:53.990 --> 00:09:55.660
Is that kind of what we're getting into?

00:09:55.660 --> 00:09:59.580
‑Yeah, let's take a look at the first one.

00:09:59.580 --> 00:09:59.820
Okay,

00:09:59.820 --> 00:10:03.760
so we're going to go through a few samples here that are very exemplary

00:10:03.760 --> 00:10:06.620
of how these these malicious Office documents operate.

00:10:06.620 --> 00:10:07.820
We're going be using ANY.RUN,

00:10:07.820 --> 00:10:11.560
a very popular online Sandbox platform with the Freemium model,

00:10:11.560 --> 00:10:13.380
so anybody can go there, set up an account,

00:10:13.380 --> 00:10:16.500
and start utilizing their capabilities.

00:10:16.510 --> 00:10:18.700
Some things that I really like about the platform,

00:10:18.700 --> 00:10:21.600
you'll see we have really three main components to our interface here.

00:10:21.600 --> 00:10:26.570
We have the operating system view, which is the Office document right now.

00:10:26.570 --> 00:10:28.870
To the right, we have the process activity,

00:10:28.870 --> 00:10:32.240
so we can we can really observe what's happening on the system.

00:10:32.240 --> 00:10:36.420
And then towards the lower left, we have all the network activity,

00:10:36.420 --> 00:10:40.040
connections, DNS requests, IDS alerts, HTTP requests,

00:10:40.040 --> 00:10:42.390
typically the really important stuff.

00:10:42.390 --> 00:10:44.320
All of this information comes in in real time.

00:10:44.320 --> 00:10:47.930
So when you upload a sample, it all starts to filter in in real time.

00:10:47.940 --> 00:10:50.660
So here we can see an Excel document.

00:10:50.660 --> 00:10:52.870
We have a Tesla lure.

00:10:52.870 --> 00:10:56.580
Again, very similar to all the ones that we've previously discussed.

00:10:56.590 --> 00:10:58.890
To the right, though, with the behavioral,

00:10:58.890 --> 00:11:04.440
this is where we can really start to see some interesting patterns here.

00:11:04.440 --> 00:11:06.110
We have our Excel doc.

00:11:06.110 --> 00:11:07.870
So, Excel.exe, our main process.

00:11:07.870 --> 00:11:10.240
When Excel launches, this would be very similar to Word,

00:11:10.240 --> 00:11:12.220
Word.exe, or PowerPoint.

00:11:12.220 --> 00:11:15.680
But the processes that it spawns are what are interesting.

00:11:15.680 --> 00:11:20.260
So in this use case, we have Excel launching WMIC.

00:11:20.260 --> 00:11:25.380
It's using some arguments to execute essentially another Excel document,

00:11:25.390 --> 00:11:27.040
which it dropped itself.

00:11:27.040 --> 00:11:29.390
And then that launches rundll32.

00:11:29.390 --> 00:11:32.390
We'll notice that with those arguments,

00:11:32.390 --> 00:11:35.130
not only do we see this sort of abnormal process behavior,

00:11:35.130 --> 00:11:40.940
Excel launching WMIC, which is the Windows Management Instrumentation Console,

00:11:40.950 --> 00:11:42.650
but then also run dll32.

00:11:42.650 --> 00:11:45.560
You know, that in and of itself is pretty odd.

00:11:45.940 --> 00:11:50.600
But the arguments also provide us information about where some of

00:11:50.600 --> 00:11:52.920
these artifacts are written to the file system,

00:11:52.920 --> 00:11:56.130
and so we can see that on these systems,

00:11:56.130 --> 00:12:05.120
C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\EDC6.xsl is a document that we could look for.

00:12:05.120 --> 00:12:08.580
If we found these XSL documents,

00:12:08.580 --> 00:12:12.250
likely the name is going to be generated randomly every time it runs,

00:12:12.250 --> 00:12:13.890
but we could look in those folders,

00:12:13.890 --> 00:12:16.770
and if we find evidence of these XSL documents there,

00:12:16.770 --> 00:12:20.370
that could be an indicator of a possible infection or compromise,

00:12:20.370 --> 00:12:22.870
very similar with the rundll32 command.

00:12:22.870 --> 00:12:25.800
Rundll is going to be used to execute the trojan.

00:12:25.800 --> 00:12:27.420
The trojans are DLLs.

00:12:27.430 --> 00:12:32.120
So, it's not the same as what we would consider a normal executable.

00:12:32.120 --> 00:12:34.940
These DLLs are being written to C:/Windows/Temp,

00:12:34.940 --> 00:12:37.850
and then there's the name of the DLL, pjqbi.

00:12:37.850 --> 00:12:42.530
And so we can now use that information about where these are being

00:12:42.530 --> 00:12:46.170
written to the file system to either block write access,

00:12:46.170 --> 00:12:47.950
which is hard to do with an app data folder,

00:12:47.950 --> 00:12:51.940
that's why not only Dridex, but many threat family use that location,

00:12:51.940 --> 00:12:54.680
but then also observe, maybe monitor,

00:12:54.680 --> 00:12:57.290
or if we were doing some sort of proactive threat hunting

00:12:57.290 --> 00:12:59.170
through maybe an EDR‑type solution,

00:12:59.170 --> 00:13:03.650
we could look for evidence of these things in those locations.

00:13:03.650 --> 00:13:03.910
‑Right.

00:13:03.910 --> 00:13:05.610
Even from, you mentioned EDR,

00:13:05.610 --> 00:13:08.610
from an EDR perspective trying to look at this for prevention,

00:13:08.610 --> 00:13:15.420
I see a really good point here to say some of the more advanced EDR

00:13:15.420 --> 00:13:19.220
will detect behavior of that process execution chain,

00:13:19.220 --> 00:13:21.480
so like parent process launching this process,

00:13:21.480 --> 00:13:24.170
which had originally spawned from Excel,

00:13:24.170 --> 00:13:27.320
here you can see in ANY.RUNS does a really good job of drawing the little

00:13:27.320 --> 00:13:29.720
line for you to tell you which one is the parent process.

00:13:29.720 --> 00:13:32.490
Looks like Excel actually spawns a separate process as

00:13:32.490 --> 00:13:35.440
opposed to being the parent for WMIC,

00:13:35.440 --> 00:13:37.900
which would then also be an indicator in itself,

00:13:37.900 --> 00:13:38.890
as it originally launched it,

00:13:38.890 --> 00:13:42.010
and then removed itself from being the owner of that process.

00:13:42.010 --> 00:13:46.580
That's another behavioral detection that EDR can use for this kind of thing.

00:13:46.580 --> 00:13:48.540
Though, when you get into,

00:13:48.540 --> 00:13:50.900
it depends what your environment is and how clean your environment is,

00:13:50.900 --> 00:13:53.700
a lot of other software can do things that are similar to this.

00:13:53.700 --> 00:13:56.670
So you have to kind of for prevention, like anything else,

00:13:56.670 --> 00:14:00.180
EDR is just like IPS, that you need to tune it,

00:14:00.180 --> 00:14:03.860
right, and make it and and test things before you implement a block rule.

00:14:04.940 --> 00:14:05.780
Right?

00:14:05.790 --> 00:14:09.520
‑Yeah, and that's the challenge with these sort of recommendations,

00:14:09.530 --> 00:14:12.390
is we've touched on it earlier,

00:14:12.390 --> 00:14:14.670
everybody's environment is going to be a little bit different,

00:14:14.670 --> 00:14:18.580
and so you do have to spend the time monitoring,

00:14:18.580 --> 00:14:22.720
observing, and sort of testing what happens in your environment,

00:14:22.720 --> 00:14:28.490
and can you roll out a prevention technique based off of this process behavior,

00:14:28.490 --> 00:14:29.410
and if so,

00:14:29.410 --> 00:14:32.350
is it not going to impact any of your business

00:14:32.350 --> 00:14:33.760
operations or any of your employees?

00:14:33.770 --> 00:14:39.040
And so it does take a period of trial and error.

00:14:39.050 --> 00:14:42.550
‑So that's what's happening on the device itself,

00:14:42.550 --> 00:14:46.600
within the OS and processes, but I'm guessing there's,

00:14:46.600 --> 00:14:48.900
especially since you mentioned the PE, kind of dropped the PE hints,

00:14:48.900 --> 00:14:53.480
that's in the clear, it's going to ports that are not using TLS or SSL,

00:14:53.480 --> 00:14:56.340
we can probably work on some detections there that we

00:14:56.340 --> 00:14:58.700
can turn into preventions as well.

00:14:58.700 --> 00:15:01.150
Is that accurate?

00:15:01.160 --> 00:15:01.530
‑Yeah.

00:15:01.540 --> 00:15:05.710
So, let's go ahead and talk a little bit about the network then.

00:15:05.710 --> 00:15:11.150
One of the really important capabilities,

00:15:11.160 --> 00:15:14.750
and it seems a little bit trivial when you look at a Sandbox

00:15:14.750 --> 00:15:16.830
because it's all the data that you're looking at,

00:15:16.830 --> 00:15:19.440
that the Sandbox is already filtering a lot of the

00:15:19.440 --> 00:15:21.270
operating system level noise out.

00:15:21.270 --> 00:15:24.390
If you've ever turned on Process Monitor from Sysinternals

00:15:24.390 --> 00:15:26.550
on a host and started collecting events,

00:15:26.550 --> 00:15:27.730
you'll understand what I'm saying.

00:15:27.730 --> 00:15:29.880
It's a massive amount of information,

00:15:29.880 --> 00:15:35.510
so it seems a little bit less important when it's already being filtered.

00:15:35.520 --> 00:15:38.280
But one of the areas that is really hard,

00:15:38.280 --> 00:15:41.950
but really valuable to draw a connection on is what

00:15:41.950 --> 00:15:44.960
processes are making what network activity.

00:15:44.960 --> 00:15:45.700
And with ANY.RUN,

00:15:45.700 --> 00:15:48.680
you can see on the Connections tab that they are

00:15:48.680 --> 00:15:49.830
drawing that correlation for us.

00:15:49.830 --> 00:15:52.140
They are saying here are the process names,

00:15:52.140 --> 00:15:56.710
the process IDs, and here are the connections that it's trying to establish,

00:15:56.710 --> 00:15:58.460
and so that can be very helpful.

00:15:58.460 --> 00:16:00.280
Although, again, in this scenario here,

00:16:00.280 --> 00:16:04.210
it's a little bit more obvious as to most of this network activity

00:16:04.210 --> 00:16:08.650
as related to our malicious Office document.

00:16:08.660 --> 00:16:12.740
‑I do really like the idea of, and I run into this a lot,

00:16:12.740 --> 00:16:13.420
especially with threat hunting,

00:16:13.420 --> 00:16:16.610
is you look at everything going on in the operating system,

00:16:16.610 --> 00:16:18.040
it's a lot of stuff, right?

00:16:18.040 --> 00:16:20.010
And Windows does some weird things sometimes.

00:16:20.010 --> 00:16:22.730
But if you narrow that down, it's like, okay, what's our chokepoint?

00:16:22.730 --> 00:16:24.190
Like, how can we narrow this down?

00:16:24.190 --> 00:16:27.030
Let's now get to processes that are reaching out to the internet,

00:16:27.030 --> 00:16:28.720
and that like scopes you down quite a bit.

00:16:28.720 --> 00:16:30.170
Now you can start to search through, like,

00:16:30.170 --> 00:16:31.610
well, what's weird from here,

00:16:31.610 --> 00:16:35.970
and kind of pull in other indicators to not have to look at so much stuff.

00:16:35.970 --> 00:16:41.130
It's a great kind of methodology standpoint for this as well.

00:16:41.140 --> 00:16:41.270
‑Yeah,

00:16:41.270 --> 00:16:44.420
and that's hopefully one of the big takeaways that everybody

00:16:44.420 --> 00:16:51.090
will get out of the session is that there's very few individual

00:16:51.090 --> 00:16:56.060
alerts or signatures that will just will be an absolute 100%

00:16:56.060 --> 00:16:56.700
something bad has happened.

00:16:56.700 --> 00:17:00.250
A lot of it is contextual‑based, and looking at those TTP,

00:17:00.250 --> 00:17:01.820
you know, looking at tactics, techniques,

00:17:01.820 --> 00:17:04.190
and procedures, looking at patterns of behavior,

00:17:04.200 --> 00:17:07.990
effectively filtering out the noise,

00:17:07.990 --> 00:17:10.680
and sometimes we can do that in very broad swaths,

00:17:10.680 --> 00:17:16.030
to say, okay, I don't want to see any activity that is to this set of IPs.

00:17:16.089 --> 00:17:18.490
The other times we have to be a little bit more precise and say,

00:17:18.490 --> 00:17:18.540
okay,

00:17:18.540 --> 00:17:24.369
I only want to look at certain processes by name or by category or something.

00:17:24.369 --> 00:17:26.420
And so it is very important.

00:17:26.420 --> 00:17:30.550
And oftentimes we have to do that process of massaging

00:17:30.550 --> 00:17:33.710
that data in order to get to and find the things that

00:17:33.710 --> 00:17:35.820
we're interested in discovering.

00:17:35.820 --> 00:17:37.020
‑ We're really just data scientists.

00:17:37.020 --> 00:17:37.900
It's fine.

00:17:37.900 --> 00:17:42.730
‑Yeah, I guess that's kind of where it's going, isn't it?

00:17:42.740 --> 00:17:44.700
So with the connections, then,

00:17:44.700 --> 00:17:49.020
it's important to not only understand what processes are

00:17:49.020 --> 00:17:50.820
trying to create those network connections,

00:17:50.820 --> 00:17:54.280
but then also where and how are they communicating?

00:17:54.280 --> 00:17:54.410
So,

00:17:54.410 --> 00:17:57.970
we can use the DNS tab to get a clearer picture of the

00:17:57.980 --> 00:17:59.750
DNS names that are being utilized.

00:17:59.750 --> 00:18:02.270
As I mentioned, typically with these Office documents,

00:18:02.270 --> 00:18:04.810
they're going to reach out to compromise servers,

00:18:04.810 --> 00:18:07.560
so they're not going to use an IP address to make a direct connection.

00:18:07.560 --> 00:18:10.180
They're going to first resolve the domain name.

00:18:10.180 --> 00:18:13.110
The challenge here is that they're compromised.

00:18:13.110 --> 00:18:17.660
So, most of these servers are actually legitimate websites,

00:18:17.660 --> 00:18:20.780
regardless of how unrecognizable their domain name is,

00:18:20.780 --> 00:18:22.130
they're legitimate websites,

00:18:22.130 --> 00:18:23.910
which makes it a little bit more challenging to

00:18:23.920 --> 00:18:26.410
just block them at the perimeter.

00:18:26.410 --> 00:18:28.900
Here you can see a few examples from the sample.

00:18:28.900 --> 00:18:32.190
All of them would certainly raise my suspicion,

00:18:32.200 --> 00:18:36.250
but if we were to visit them, and I'm not suggesting that anybody do that,

00:18:36.250 --> 00:18:38.670
they're likely legitimate websites.

00:18:38.670 --> 00:18:41.690
So we've got a domain name, that can be another indicator, right?

00:18:41.690 --> 00:18:45.020
Here I see these rather suspicious domain names,

00:18:45.020 --> 00:18:46.590
suspicious top‑level domains,

00:18:46.590 --> 00:18:53.130
and that would kind of raise my curiosity and just

00:18:53.130 --> 00:18:55.520
something bad is occurring on my network.

00:18:55.530 --> 00:18:59.850
And from there, we can then move into the IDS alerts.

00:18:59.850 --> 00:19:03.870
Now, for this particular sample, there really aren't any relevant IDS alerts.

00:19:03.870 --> 00:19:06.700
There is one about a TLS handshake failure,

00:19:06.710 --> 00:19:09.580
but that really doesn't matter in the context of what we're

00:19:09.580 --> 00:19:12.430
trying to discover about this threat.

00:19:12.440 --> 00:19:15.210
This threat is attempting to download a PE file.

00:19:15.210 --> 00:19:17.940
I've said that most of the time the PE files will come from

00:19:17.940 --> 00:19:21.580
those compromised servers in plaintext, so not obfuscated,

00:19:21.580 --> 00:19:22.930
not encrypted,

00:19:22.930 --> 00:19:27.660
and that's an opportunity to generate alerts from an intrusion detection system,

00:19:27.670 --> 00:19:29.820
but all of those are absent here.

00:19:29.820 --> 00:19:34.710
And so if we just let the analysis continue,

00:19:34.710 --> 00:19:38.150
it eventually generates this message box that appears to be from

00:19:38.150 --> 00:19:42.560
rundll that says there was a problem starting the DLL,

00:19:42.670 --> 00:19:47.020
that is the argument, the path, for our rundll32 process.

00:19:47.030 --> 00:19:51.100
Now, these message boxes, again, because they've written code,

00:19:51.100 --> 00:19:54.380
macro code, they can simulate this sort of a message,

00:19:54.380 --> 00:19:56.900
and that's something that some threat actors will do.

00:19:56.900 --> 00:20:00.000
They'll give you an error‑looking sort of a message to

00:20:00.000 --> 00:20:03.000
make it appear as if the document failed,

00:20:03.000 --> 00:20:05.850
when in actuality, it actually succeeded.

00:20:05.850 --> 00:20:09.900
In this case, though, this is an indication that the document failed.

00:20:09.900 --> 00:20:13.440
It attempted to download the PE file of that DLL.

00:20:13.440 --> 00:20:17.090
It wasn't able to obtain a valid PE file.

00:20:17.090 --> 00:20:19.720
So that compromised host is no longer online,

00:20:19.720 --> 00:20:22.710
DNS no longer resolves, maybe the DNS is sinkholed,

00:20:22.710 --> 00:20:25.090
maybe the website owner actually is aware that they're

00:20:25.090 --> 00:20:27.180
hosting malware and then they cleaned it up,

00:20:27.180 --> 00:20:29.230
and this is a true error message.

00:20:29.230 --> 00:20:30.360
So in this case,

00:20:30.360 --> 00:20:34.630
the failures are that the malicious Office document got through to the user,

00:20:34.630 --> 00:20:36.310
that they enabled the content,

00:20:36.310 --> 00:20:39.400
but there is no persistent infection here because the

00:20:39.470 --> 00:20:42.350
trojan never made it to the system.

00:20:42.840 --> 00:20:43.150
‑Excellent.

00:20:43.160 --> 00:20:46.290
And so when we talk about, again, reaching out,

00:20:46.290 --> 00:20:47.590
trying to prevent this,

00:20:47.590 --> 00:20:50.680
we're saying if that URL happened to already be on a bad

00:20:50.680 --> 00:20:53.580
boy list somewhere and you had a threat feed at the edge

00:20:53.580 --> 00:20:56.700
that was doing URL inspection, or even just DNS inspection,

00:20:56.700 --> 00:21:00.970
and then cut off that connection, that would be a great place.

00:21:00.970 --> 00:21:04.600
But again, they're changing those URLs frequently within this document,

00:21:04.600 --> 00:21:08.020
so that's not necessarily even going to be a high

00:21:08.020 --> 00:21:10.400
percentage of success for prevention.

00:21:10.400 --> 00:21:14.350
Another point here is we see WMIC make an external network connection,

00:21:14.350 --> 00:21:18.960
or at least being the source process for an external connection being made,

00:21:18.960 --> 00:21:21.620
so maybe there's some sort of capability there,

00:21:21.620 --> 00:21:25.180
though admins often use WMI internally.

00:21:25.180 --> 00:21:28.180
Another tweak here is, hey, we use WMI internally,

00:21:28.180 --> 00:21:31.270
we use it from maybe an admin server to

00:21:31.270 --> 00:21:33.700
workstations or even between workstations,

00:21:33.700 --> 00:21:37.670
fine, I mean not the best, but if you could limit that to say,

00:21:37.670 --> 00:21:40.220
hey, this executable doesn't get to go external,

00:21:40.220 --> 00:21:44.450
that'd be another great prevention point as well.

00:21:44.450 --> 00:21:44.800
‑Yeah.

00:21:44.800 --> 00:21:48.610
And I would assume, too, that standard user accounts,

00:21:48.610 --> 00:21:50.940
just like PowerShell, if you disabled PowerShell,

00:21:50.940 --> 00:21:54.010
with those standard users that, I don't know for sure,

00:21:54.010 --> 00:21:57.310
but I would suspect that there's an ability very similar with our standard

00:21:57.310 --> 00:22:00.140
users account to say you don't have this capability,

00:22:00.140 --> 00:22:06.230
which would then be another potential to stop it from even getting

00:22:06.230 --> 00:22:08.520
to the point where it can make that request.

00:22:08.530 --> 00:22:12.090
You mentioned the domains, and with the compromised servers,

00:22:12.090 --> 00:22:17.250
it's quite impressive how much infrastructure they have compromised.

00:22:17.250 --> 00:22:19.930
We'll take a look a little bit more of the internals of this

00:22:19.940 --> 00:22:21.730
document before the end of the session here,

00:22:21.730 --> 00:22:24.790
and you'll see that all of these documents right now come

00:22:24.790 --> 00:22:29.420
with 50 or 60 domains baked into them, and then it picks one at random.

00:22:29.420 --> 00:22:31.190
So even with the one document,

00:22:31.190 --> 00:22:33.860
you might get a different domain every time it runs

00:22:33.860 --> 00:22:35.490
and tries to communicate with.

00:22:35.500 --> 00:22:40.750
So, the odds that every single one of those domains is on a block list somewhere,

00:22:40.750 --> 00:22:42.810
the odds, I think go down.

00:22:42.810 --> 00:22:43.080
‑Right.

00:22:43.080 --> 00:22:44.370
That makes a lot of sense.

00:22:44.370 --> 00:22:46.590
And it's not like they don't understand that math, either, right?

00:22:46.590 --> 00:22:48.200
That's on purpose.

00:22:48.210 --> 00:22:49.040
‑Right.

00:22:49.040 --> 00:22:49.190
Yeah.

00:22:49.190 --> 00:22:50.550
They're just playing the numbers.

00:22:50.560 --> 00:22:52.900
They figure eventually, they'll, you know,

00:22:52.910 --> 00:22:55.300
the numbers are there, they have enough victims,

00:22:55.300 --> 00:22:58.800
the techniques that they're using are working.

00:22:58.800 --> 00:22:58.960
‑Okay.

00:22:58.960 --> 00:23:00.450
So let's look at our next sample.

00:23:00.450 --> 00:23:05.610
Here you can see process behavior is identical, or very close.

00:23:05.610 --> 00:23:07.600
Excel, WMIC, rundll.

00:23:07.600 --> 00:23:12.860
What I want to focus on are the IDS alerts because the IDS alerts are changing.

00:23:12.860 --> 00:23:14.640
The context of what they're telling us about what occurred

00:23:14.640 --> 00:23:16.930
on the network has changed a bit here.

00:23:16.940 --> 00:23:19.150
We have this Suricata stream timeout.

00:23:19.150 --> 00:23:21.380
You can ignore that one, that's just an underlying,

00:23:21.380 --> 00:23:23.470
something kind of weird went on in the network.

00:23:23.470 --> 00:23:25.210
The ones we want to focus on, though,

00:23:25.210 --> 00:23:28.870
are the POLICY PE EXE or Windows file download,

00:23:28.870 --> 00:23:31.790
and then the malicious SSL certificates.

00:23:31.800 --> 00:23:35.870
So those are the two alerts that we can focus on.

00:23:35.880 --> 00:23:39.490
So, what they're telling us is that with this document,

00:23:39.490 --> 00:23:42.560
it was successful in retrieving that executable file,

00:23:42.560 --> 00:23:43.560
the DLL.

00:23:43.790 --> 00:23:46.190
That's what that first alert is telling us.

00:23:46.190 --> 00:23:49.630
Now, we can't let that alert run all the time because,

00:23:49.630 --> 00:23:50.770
as you may be thinking, well,

00:23:50.780 --> 00:23:54.790
we probably have in any given network a lot of PE files being

00:23:54.790 --> 00:23:58.840
downloaded on a regular basis because that's the primary

00:23:58.850 --> 00:24:01.050
container for executable content in Windows.

00:24:01.050 --> 00:24:02.580
But we'll get into the signature a little bit,

00:24:02.580 --> 00:24:05.180
you'll see there's things called flow bits that allow us to

00:24:05.180 --> 00:24:08.060
tie the executable download to other events,

00:24:08.070 --> 00:24:10.280
so reducing the false positive noise,

00:24:10.280 --> 00:24:12.860
making it more relevant to malicious activity.

00:24:13.340 --> 00:24:16.310
Additionally, we see the use of an SSL certificate,

00:24:16.310 --> 00:24:20.530
and so that clues us in to the fact that now the trojan

00:24:20.530 --> 00:24:22.490
has switched its command control.

00:24:22.490 --> 00:24:25.640
It's no longer using that compromised infrastructure,

00:24:25.640 --> 00:24:27.750
which it does to retrieve the trojan,

00:24:27.750 --> 00:24:31.170
it's now using a different set of infrastructure,

00:24:31.170 --> 00:24:32.460
more permanent.

00:24:32.470 --> 00:24:37.710
It uses things like secure sessions, and as you'll see in a little bit,

00:24:37.710 --> 00:24:40.250
nonstandard ports, and other things that we can detect on.

00:24:40.260 --> 00:24:41.940
So that's what that alert is telling us,

00:24:41.940 --> 00:24:44.350
is that the trojan is now running on the system,

00:24:44.350 --> 00:24:50.030
it's starting to beacon out, so you have a no kidding infection on this endpoint.

00:24:50.040 --> 00:24:54.440
‑And so what I see from this is that this is very similar, but still changing.

00:24:54.560 --> 00:24:57.060
I even see like what we're getting on the network traffic

00:24:57.070 --> 00:24:59.070
is showing up a little bit different.

00:24:59.070 --> 00:25:03.540
But we're also seeing that, like, I can't help but glance at the process,

00:25:03.550 --> 00:25:05.710
but its capitalization is different for WMIC,

00:25:05.710 --> 00:25:08.790
and so they're alternating a bunch of different

00:25:08.790 --> 00:25:13.420
things to be able to avoid detection, or probably to try to avoid similarities.

00:25:13.430 --> 00:25:17.710
So, are there more samples that you have that show kind of like another,

00:25:17.710 --> 00:25:20.060
just another example?

00:25:20.070 --> 00:25:20.580
‑Yeah.

00:25:20.590 --> 00:25:23.260
The biggest difference between this one and the previous is

00:25:23.260 --> 00:25:25.730
that there was a successful download.

00:25:25.730 --> 00:25:27.600
So now we have an infection.

00:25:27.600 --> 00:25:29.650
Some of the IDS alerts change.

00:25:29.650 --> 00:25:32.300
Because of that change in network activity,

00:25:32.300 --> 00:25:37.330
what's happening on the host itself via those processes is different.

00:25:37.340 --> 00:25:41.420
The changing in casing of some of those words is exactly what you said,

00:25:41.420 --> 00:25:43.980
it's oftentimes going to be used to try to bypass,

00:25:43.980 --> 00:25:46.520
you know, very basic signature detection,

00:25:46.520 --> 00:25:48.990
so a signature that's written to detect PowerShell.

00:25:48.990 --> 00:25:51.010
If you've ever looked at the obfuscated code,

00:25:51.010 --> 00:25:53.060
that's why you'll see the casing change,

00:25:53.060 --> 00:25:56.830
or you'll see that they've taken the string PowerShell or WMIC,

00:25:56.830 --> 00:26:00.130
and they've broken it up, and then they concatenate it back together.

00:26:00.140 --> 00:26:04.650
It's very simplistic, but it's proven to be quite effective over the years.

00:26:04.650 --> 00:26:06.130
The next sample, then,

00:26:06.130 --> 00:26:10.390
that we have to look at is a couple of changes on really both of

00:26:10.390 --> 00:26:12.740
those primary behaviors that we're observing.

00:26:12.740 --> 00:26:19.440
First is that we don't see the WMIC rundll combination, we see regsrv32.

00:26:19.440 --> 00:26:22.460
Different process, different operating system process.

00:26:22.460 --> 00:26:25.620
It's one of those living‑off‑the‑land binaries,

00:26:25.620 --> 00:26:27.110
but it serves the same purpose, right?

00:26:27.110 --> 00:26:30.030
It's not a different payload that it's trying to execute,

00:26:30.030 --> 00:26:32.010
it's that same Dridex DLL.

00:26:32.310 --> 00:26:33.980
The other is in the network activity,

00:26:33.980 --> 00:26:38.580
in that we not only have the observable detection of

00:26:38.580 --> 00:26:42.040
that malicious TLS SSL certificate,

00:26:42.040 --> 00:26:47.050
but we also have an alert now that's based off of this Feodo Tracker,

00:26:47.060 --> 00:26:50.700
which it just is simply detecting based off of IP address.

00:26:50.710 --> 00:26:54.390
The challenge with all of these is that they're

00:26:54.390 --> 00:26:56.330
only as good as the data we have.

00:26:56.330 --> 00:26:59.950
As soon as the threat actor changes its infrastructure,

00:26:59.950 --> 00:27:02.880
if we don't have visibility into that yet,

00:27:02.880 --> 00:27:05.540
then we don't have observability.

00:27:05.540 --> 00:27:07.570
We can't have these alerts generated.

00:27:07.570 --> 00:27:12.950
Dridex, much like the group formerly known as Emotet,

00:27:12.950 --> 00:27:15.420
their infrastructure didn't change all that often,

00:27:15.420 --> 00:27:18.420
and so we got pretty good at being able to track it

00:27:18.420 --> 00:27:21.020
and to monitor and to observe it.

00:27:21.030 --> 00:27:24.080
That didn't necessarily change their effectiveness,

00:27:24.080 --> 00:27:27.480
but it did make it a little bit easier to know that when

00:27:27.480 --> 00:27:31.150
something beaconed out to a command control IP,

00:27:31.410 --> 00:27:34.180
that was a high fidelity alert.

00:27:34.190 --> 00:27:34.840
‑Yeah, absolutely.

00:27:34.840 --> 00:27:38.540
Again, this kind of reaches back to infrastructure.

00:27:38.540 --> 00:27:42.330
A good point to call a definition between URLs and IPs.

00:27:42.330 --> 00:27:45.550
Like, we all know this, but there can be multiple URLs and one IP,

00:27:45.550 --> 00:27:47.750
but changing that IP if that's dedicated

00:27:47.750 --> 00:27:50.270
infrastructure for them is much more difficult.

00:27:50.840 --> 00:27:52.380
So yeah, that's something they'd have to,

00:27:52.380 --> 00:27:54.340
especially if they have like a big network,

00:27:54.340 --> 00:27:58.660
for C2, their bots, like changing that is kind of more of a bigger upgrade.

00:27:59.040 --> 00:28:01.890
So, having these lists to be able to detect that, that's great.

00:28:01.890 --> 00:28:05.020
‑You know, at the end of the day, the malware actors,

00:28:05.020 --> 00:28:09.380
they're deploying software like normal, legitimate organizations.

00:28:09.380 --> 00:28:11.950
Of course, there's some significant differences,

00:28:11.960 --> 00:28:16.530
but some of the same challenges that anybody deploying software at scale has,

00:28:16.530 --> 00:28:17.310
they have as well.

00:28:17.310 --> 00:28:19.220
And so changing that infrastructure,

00:28:19.220 --> 00:28:22.000
it's not something that they can simply just flip a switch,

00:28:22.000 --> 00:28:24.660
and now they've got a whole new series of C2 nodes

00:28:24.660 --> 00:28:26.040
that they can communicate with.

00:28:26.050 --> 00:28:26.530
So,

00:28:26.530 --> 00:28:31.400
there is just some inherent resiliency in the system of how all of this operates

00:28:31.400 --> 00:28:34.660
and connects together that prevents them from moving along.

00:28:34.660 --> 00:28:37.120
As I'd mentioned with Emotet,

00:28:37.120 --> 00:28:41.120
they had massive operations for years before they were

00:28:41.120 --> 00:28:43.060
finally taken out by law enforcement.

00:28:43.060 --> 00:28:46.620
And so you might think that from their perspective,

00:28:46.620 --> 00:28:48.620
what's the point of changing?

00:28:48.620 --> 00:28:50.750
If people can see it and they can track it,

00:28:50.750 --> 00:28:54.030
but it's not stopping us from infecting victims,

00:28:54.030 --> 00:28:55.500
stealing their data,

00:28:55.510 --> 00:29:00.940
then we'll just keep going with it until the pain of using those nodes and

00:29:00.940 --> 00:29:05.080
operating that method becomes too great that it forces a change.

00:29:05.080 --> 00:29:05.210
‑Yeah.

00:29:05.210 --> 00:29:08.030
And that's, absolutely, keep making it costing them money,

00:29:08.030 --> 00:29:11.140
too, just like it's costing us money and time.

00:29:11.150 --> 00:29:13.500
And hopefully, we eventually catch up to them.

00:29:13.500 --> 00:29:17.600
And then from, you know, kind of wrap up this prevention piece of it,

00:29:17.600 --> 00:29:19.750
is we have endpoint EDR,

00:29:19.750 --> 00:29:23.890
if we're talking about some advanced behavioral detections that

00:29:23.890 --> 00:29:26.180
you have been able to apply in your environment,

00:29:26.180 --> 00:29:28.300
they're not breaking other stuff,

00:29:28.300 --> 00:29:30.950
there's a potential there to prevent that kind of

00:29:30.950 --> 00:29:33.920
process execution based on the indicators.

00:29:33.920 --> 00:29:38.160
It's talking about the parent process down to the target

00:29:38.160 --> 00:29:40.800
process that's then also making a network connection and

00:29:40.800 --> 00:29:42.560
the initiating part of that.

00:29:42.560 --> 00:29:45.140
And if we can stop that initial connection,

00:29:45.140 --> 00:29:47.480
like you said, it doesn't download the PE,

00:29:47.480 --> 00:29:49.970
it doesn't launch, and we're safe.

00:29:49.980 --> 00:29:52.660
And another point, probably much less effective,

00:29:52.660 --> 00:29:57.450
is if we can notice that URL happens to be on a block list.

00:29:57.450 --> 00:30:02.150
Although, again, they're compromised servers, right?

00:30:02.160 --> 00:30:05.330
So, they are a legitimate server that they compromise and then launching from,

00:30:05.330 --> 00:30:08.270
so kind of less likely to be on a list to be able to block.

00:30:09.140 --> 00:30:10.740
But say we don't do those things,

00:30:10.740 --> 00:30:12.490
I guess now we need to make sure that we're

00:30:12.490 --> 00:30:14.740
detecting this live in the environment, right?

00:30:14.750 --> 00:30:16.460
That's what we're going to talk about next.
