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So that's one of the things that we are doing up and testing.

2
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You actually have to keep in mind that some of these devices that you may actually be able to enumerate

3
00:00:08,670 --> 00:00:13,770
whenever you do reconnaissance on the network or either you are scanning and that perhaps are actually

4
00:00:13,770 --> 00:00:17,800
vulnerable to something, they may actually be managed by an MDMA.

5
00:00:18,030 --> 00:00:24,540
So try to actually find ways that you can bypass or even block the communication between the MDMA and

6
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the mobile device.

7
00:00:25,380 --> 00:00:25,730
Right.

8
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So, of course, that's easier said than done.

9
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But there may be ways that you can analyze the communication of that device is actually allowed to do

10
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or not to do.

11
00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:36,140
Right.

12
00:00:36,630 --> 00:00:42,960
So you can actually do this by actually monitoring the device activity or perhaps you say, OK, you

13
00:00:42,960 --> 00:00:48,240
know, this device perhaps is actually communicating that I am seeing these type of transactions to

14
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some in the Internet and this medium is actually allowing that to happen.

15
00:00:53,160 --> 00:00:59,140
So now you actually have a footprint and if an attack surface that you can actually further explore.

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00:00:59,250 --> 00:01:05,280
So, for example, if that API perhaps is actually doing with crypto, you probably can take advantage

17
00:01:05,280 --> 00:01:11,820
of a vulnerability to hijack that transaction, for example, or an EPA abuse vulnerability that may

18
00:01:11,820 --> 00:01:13,800
actually be irrelevant in that case.

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But always keep in mind that a lot of organizations now are actually using MDMA to actually manage those

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devices, monitor them and also patch them.

21
00:01:22,720 --> 00:01:23,040
Right.

22
00:01:23,280 --> 00:01:29,460
So it's getting a little harder to actually do some of the bypasses nowadays, but definitely is possible

23
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now, actually, not only looked at the infrastructure here, but what the devices are actually communicating

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outside of the company as well.