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All right, so in the last lecture, we talked about it, for now we're digging into cross site scripting.

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And boy, do I have a treat for you guys today.

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And this is going to be awesome.

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I've got a way to put this.

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It's going to be absolutely amazing because you're going to see the entire process from beginning to

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end.

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We're not just going to pop an alert box.

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Right.

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You can understand the impact behind the alert that you typically see in the SS p.l.c. or proof of concept.

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So let's get down to this.

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Let's just look at how last defines crosshatch.

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Good thing.

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So you can see here the most automated tools can detect accessors, and it's one of the most prevalent

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issues found in the OOS.

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And when you get to the impact, I think this is the part that confounds most new security researchers

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and even managers, because for the impact, it says you can still credential sessions, things like

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that.

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How do you actually do that?

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Right.

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Nobody really.

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I mean, yeah, there are articles online that show you how to do that.

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But today I'm going to show you how to do it so you can see the true impact behind us.

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And you also see there are different types of access.

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That's right.

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Stored Dom reflected.

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And some people have confusion over this.

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Just think of damage using JavaScript so that the document object model.

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So all the elements on its Web page or on all Web pages are defined in a hierarchical structure and

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you can manipulate and interact with those elements through JavaScript.

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Well, Dom, access, there's nothing bad about that.

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But Dom Access allows an attacker to manipulate the DOM to coerce the victim user into performing an

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unintended action.

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But right now, we're just going to get into reflected.

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Stewart is usually the highest severity.

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But I want to keep it simple because this is complicated enough.

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All right.

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So let's just jump right into this.

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I can barely hold my breath any longer.

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So here's what we're going to do right now.

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We are playing the role of the attacker and the attacker has public access to this website.

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Right.

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To use that Kadenbach.

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Darkon, if you haven't seen how we did this in earlier lectures, we set this up so that this is running

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entirely from our cyber range.

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This is not a publicly accessible website.

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OK, and our attacker is Mark Ruffino.

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All right.

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This is Mark Ruffino email address.

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He's just using Outlook dot com.

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Now, what are we going to do with Mark Ruffino?

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Well, first, we want to see if this Web application is vulnerable to crosshatch scripting.

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And one of the easiest ways to do that is to look for potentially vulnerable sources like input boxes

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that are not sanitized.

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So as an attacker, the first thing I might do is type, you know, type B, common alert, get the

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box, the the classic exercise payload.

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Right.

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And you see nothing happens.

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And you can see here, you know, what's basically happening to it just being your encoded.

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But clearly, at least it appears to be clear that it doesn't it doesn't appear to be vulnerable to

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access or does it?

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Right.

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Because if these script actually blacklisted, that might be why this is failing.

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So we need to think outside the box, you know, as the attacker, how can we bypass any excess filters?

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Right.

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You know, maybe we can try embedding access payloads into an iFrame attack.

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Let's try that.

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So let's go ahead and take this.

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Ice cream sauce equals what we'll put in here is JavaScript, and we'll just make it pop the alert,

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right?

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Of course, we need to make sure we have our syntax right.

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I close up, close it out, and then close out the iFrame tag and look at that.

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We just popped up.

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Now, most people see this.

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This is what you usually see.

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It stops here.

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It's like, oh, you guys are vulnerable to access, all right.

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And then you write the report and everything's over.

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No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

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We're not doing that here.

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I want you to see why this is bad, why it's really, really, really bad.

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So check this out, guys.

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This is working.

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I do remember where the attacker.

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So now we know that this computer, that this Web app is vulnerable to access.

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What we can do is play with this.

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OK, so let's go to the attackers computer real quick.

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This is actually my host machine, but we're going to do

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is we're going to SFH into our digital ocean droplet.

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We set this up in earlier lectures, OK?

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And this is running Calli in the cloud.

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And we're going to a and then what we're gonna do is we're going to see if we have Apache listening.

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And it is running and you can probably see.

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But it is listening.

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Yes, it looks like it is right here, too.

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All right.

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So that's a good sign.

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Now we're going to do is we're going to become route.

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And we're going to find any files that were modified today, Apache to in time is equal to the last

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day and we're going to run against it.

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So these files were modified the last day.

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Let's just hit this domain up real quick, because if you look you can see the IP address or droplet

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is one sixty five twenty two to twenty three.

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And you can see this IP maps to road by X.com.

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Right.

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Let's see if we can go to road bikes dot com and trigger an event.

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So if we go to road bikes dot com you can see the Diffa page and now if we go back to the log directory,

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we still don't see.

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I was hoping to see an access log.

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That's where we might need to restart a party.

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Let's do that zero system, CDL restart party to state as a party to.

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All right.

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Let's go back into the.

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Access like, right, to have access to nothing there, so.

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We need to get some input in there.

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Let's go back to this page and see if we can force a request against it.

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Let me try a different browser in case this is cached now I'm on edge.

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I was in Chrome.

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Let's see if I did something.

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Yes.

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Now we can see it's three point nine K, and if we tell it, we got some input.

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Awesome, awesome, awesome, awesome, awesome.

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OK, so now we want to do is we want to see if we can we want to basically watch this log, OK, because

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we're going to try to steal Randy's cookies.

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We don't know Randy right now where the attacker, but we're just eating up our infrastructure.

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So if we do this, we can say watch.

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And this will just basically watch or constantly pull a particular file over and over again so we can

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see the changes.

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So if we type watch color interval, see the interval, we'll set that to zero point one seconds.

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And what do we want to do every zero point one seconds var log Pache to access to.

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All right.

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So we're going to tell this suite now.

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Let's go back here.

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Let's see if we can weaponize the payload, right, what we want to do is we want to modify this a little

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bit.

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So let's take this out of here and let's open it in mousepad

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so we can build out our malicious payload.

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We need to modify essentially this right here.

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We don't want to do an alert, instead, we want to send the cookie to us.

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So what we could do is we could say, all right, we want the window, that location to be the following

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HDB, road bikes, dot com, and they want to put in a fake file.

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This file does not exist.

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It doesn't matter such that it does not exist on my server.

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But I'm putting it here anyway.

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To make it look legitimate to the victim.

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Doesn't matter if it exists or not.

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Server can return for, for but it's going to send the cookie in this document, that cookie javascript

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parameter.

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Right.

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That looks good.

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Copy that.

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Sandroff, do we get anything?

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No, we didn't, and we may need to like, encode it in some way.

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All right.

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You can see up here what we're sending, but let's see if we can call this.

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What we'll do is we'll grab the malicious payload.

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And Google like access encoder.

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Sure, that looks good.

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Based in a string, and that's all we care about and code.

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And we'll grab the hex to get rid of that me to pass it and send it up now.

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Look at that.

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Interesting, this not found is from our server.

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The thing wasn't found, resource wasn't found.

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OK, so you can see we did get the request and it came in.

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Now all we need to do is weaponize a file like a word document, send it to a victim, get them to execute

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it, and we should get their cookies if they're logged into the Web app as an administrator, which

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is exactly what we're going to do.

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So now that we have this in place, let's go and create a document.

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Write.

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Libra office download, and when we want, we want not the bleeding edge, we just want something that

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will work.

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LENNIX Yes, we'll get the Debian version since we're running Debian callisthenics is based on Debian.

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So we'll click, download and let's get this guy going.

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All right, save.

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All right, so let's let this run and then we will install it.

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All right.

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The download is done.

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Should be able to tower this thing out.

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X extract the zip, be verbose, and the file we want is LibreOffice.

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Katie LibreOffice.

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And I think we can just go into this Debs Folder zero deed package TICC minus I to install start Deb,

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will that work?

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Basically telling it to install all of it, the dead files, which is what we want.

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Right.

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Right.

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We want everything.

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So it looks like it's installed like I wasn't sure if that was going to work.

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So we'll let this install and then we'll come back and once offices installed.

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All right.

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So we've got LibreOffice.

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Bibra office still red to show up here.

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There we go.

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All right, so let's open up writer.

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This is kind of like Microsoft Word.

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All right, cool.

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Don't care about that.

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Say hi, Randi.

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Please see the below link to activate give you the latest juice shop budgets for twenty twenty one.

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Thanks.

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Mark, right.

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And what will half of the budget's.

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There's a link, right, so right click this guy will say, can we insert a link and let's see insert.

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00:11:58,820 --> 00:12:06,790
Eyeblink, All right, so this year will be our accessors payload and we'll just put it like twenty,

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twenty one budget budget.

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Apply.

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OK, that looks good to me.

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Let's save this guy and I'll just name it budgets and we'll save it as a Doc X. if possible.

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Can we do that?

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That Doc ex?

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No, I don't want to go there if I want to use a word.

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All right.

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So it looks like it's made it very cool.

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Now we can close it out, close this out, go back to Mark and we'll compile our email to Randy.

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All right, Randy.

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Um, juice shop, twenty twenty one twenty twenty two budgets oh, Mandy, I've compiled the latest

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budget data for your review.

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Please see attached.

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00:13:19,280 --> 00:13:19,810
Thanks.

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00:13:21,230 --> 00:13:21,590
All right.

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So we're going to go ahead and attach it.

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Budget, there it is, more clicks and.

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All right, so it is in our Sint folder that looks good.

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Let's pivot over to Randy now as the victim right now.

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Randy and you can see Randy is log into the app as.

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An administrator, OK, this is why it's dangerous to do all of your work in a super context.

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You can see now we've got this e-mail that just came in right from Mark Ruffino.

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Take a look at it.

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All right.

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So what do we have?

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Hello.

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You have compiled the latest batch of data for your review suite.

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It's going to open this guy up.

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OK, and we're going to click enable editing, you know, because we're just going to Trustmark Rovito

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and we'll just click Jaisha budget and you can see that is our payload right there.

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Right.

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So control click to activate.

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Let's see what happens.

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It automatically brings up our browser and it should immediately invoke the exercise payload and send

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us Randy's cookie.

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Right.

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You can see the not found.

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So that is a good sign for us.

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Now, Randi might look at this and be like the site looks kind of broken.

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I'm not sure what happened.

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Right.

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So he's going to write back.

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Mark.

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The link seems to be broken, to be broken.

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Can you.

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Thanks.

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All right, so we're going to send it out.

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And in the meantime, look what happened to the attacker, so step over to the attackers.

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You can see now what do we have here?

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It's juicy.

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It's delicious.

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We have his cookies.

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Look at this cookie consent status, dismiss token.

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We have his token.

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We've got to can only deduce paste this into our browser and send it out and we will become.

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Randee, we've essentially hijacked this session.

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Right.

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So we can literally grab this entire thing right here.

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Right.

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Click copy.

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As an attacker, we can essentially go here.

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Did you shop?

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And we can just go and look at these storage.

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Inspector.

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See the cookies and see this token, see that these values down here, all we need to do is update the

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continue code and the token with what we received from the victim.

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And we basically walk in as him in a way to do that would be to use a tool like Cookie Ed Cookie.

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Ed Firefox's.

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Right, so you would grab this tool added to Firefox?

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All right.

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And then you would go to your shop.

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You would basically just add these values and right continue code, but what is the continued code?

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Well, we have it right.

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Everything is in here.

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Language is in the percentages of space.

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It's just you are all encoded so we can actually break this down so we can see how the cookie values

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quite easily.

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You can see here's a token, we could simply grab that token and put it in here.

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Right, take it out, piece said, and save it.

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And then we're basically on our way.

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That's all I have for this guy.

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I really want to show you how dangerous exercise can be.

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And, you know, obviously, it's really important to sanitize your logs, properly, escape the fields,

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you know, make sure that you're not just blindly accepting untrusted user input and then processing

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it in an unsafe way, because if you do crosshatch, good thing can become a reality, which you don't

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want, obviously.

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Right.

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So I hope you guys enjoyed this lecture.

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The next one.

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We're going to dig into the next option here, which is insecurity serialisation.

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So I will see you guys in the next lecture when we jump into this scene a little bit by.