WEBVTT

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Now let's take a quick look at the three standards that are concerned with

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entire payment solutions for face‑to‑face transactions.

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The aim of all these standards is to ensure that all payment data,

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whether that's PANs or PINs,

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is strongly encrypted and inaccessible in the merchant's environment,

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which massively reduces the number of requirements the

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merchant has to meet to comply with PCI DSS.

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The Point‑to‑Point Encryption, or P2PE standard,

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describes how to encrypt the primary account number in a

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POI device in the merchant's environment,

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and then to make sure it stays encrypted until it reaches a point of decryption,

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which is usually in a payment service provider or in an acquirer.

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It specifies the physical and logical controls for key management,

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the security of the decryption environment,

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and also how the POI devices should be managed.

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The P2PE standard was developed so that merchants could buy solutions

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from service providers and know that the solution had been assessed

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to a high standard and that cardholder data wouldn't be accessible in

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the merchant environment.

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Remember that when we looked at the face‑to‑face example earlier,

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there were lots of places you could potentially find

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authorization data‑‑in devices, in electronic cash registers,

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in point‑of‑sale systems, in store servers,

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and on servers in head office.

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Well,

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the goal of the point‑to‑point encryption standard is to

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make sure that all cardholder data in the merchant

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environment is strongly encrypted, and so useless to criminals.

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It does this very much in the way that PINs are encrypted,

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by strongly encrypting the track data within the PTS POI device using

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an encryption key that's been supplied by the acquirer or by the

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payment processor or by the service provider.

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So whoever provides the solution to the merchant puts their

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encryption key in the PTS POI device.

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So all the data flowing through the merchant system is now strongly encrypted,

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and so the criminal won't be able to get card data

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from the merchant environment.

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And, of course, nothing in the merchant's environment now stores,

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processes, or transmits unencrypted cardholder data.

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So the PCI DSS requirements won't apply to the majority of

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systems in the merchant environment,

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which is really cost effective for the merchant.

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There is a downside.

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Using P2PE means the merchant won't be able to retain cardholder data,

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for example, in a database like they used to.

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The P2PE standard relies on the merchant using a validated PCI PTS POI that also

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includes the capability to securely read and transmit PANs.

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Such POIs are actually quite expensive to manufacture because of the security

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and anti‑tamper mechanisms that they must have in them.

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And so innovative vendors decided that it should be possible to

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turn an off‑the‑shelf smartphone or a tablet into something that

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could securely accept payments.

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And so there are now two PCI standards that support this.

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They both have extraordinarily long names that use the term COTS,

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C‑O‑T‑S, which stands for Commercial Off‑The‑Shelf,

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or, in other words,

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things you can buy in normal shops such as smartphones and tablets.

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The first standard is called Software‑Based PIN Entry on COTS,

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or SPoC for short.

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A SPoC solution allows a merchant to use an off‑the‑shelf smartphone or tablet

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connected to a card reader to accept payment transactions.

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So the standard includes requirements for a secure encrypting card

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reader which connects to the commercial off‑the‑shelf smartphone or

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tablet either by a Bluetooth or by a cable.

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And it also includes requirements for some software running on the

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smartphone which accepts the PIN and then communicates with both the

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card reader and the solution provider.

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And, finally,

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requirements for a system at the solution provider that can

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decrypt the payment card data and can also monitor the security

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status of the smartphone or tablets,

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so the device where the PIN is being accepted.

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In a SPoC solution, the payment card data is read in the secure card reader,

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but the PIN is entered into the smartphone.

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Both the cardholder data and the PIN are actually

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encrypted by the external card reader,

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but then they are sent to the solution provider for processing.

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So very much like the P2P standard, the SPoC standard covers the hardware,

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the software, and the systems used by the solution provider.

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The second PCI security standard that allows a merchant to use a

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commercial off‑the‑shelf smartphone to accept payments also has a

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long name and a short abbreviation.

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This is the Contactless Payments on COTS Solutions standard, or CPoC short.

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A CPoC solution allows a merchant to accept contactless transactions that

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don't require a PIN on an off‑the‑shelf smartphone.

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The smartphone has to have the necessary NFC antenna and electronics

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in it to be able to pretend to be a card reader.

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Just as with SPoC,

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the standard covers the way that the software works on

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the device and the back‑end systems,

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which both decrypt the received data from the device and which can

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monitor security posture of the smartphone or the tablet.

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Ah, now it's time for a quick sidebar about device security.

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From a security perspective, in a SPoC solution,

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the PAN and the track data contained in the magnetic stripe or the

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equivalent from the chip are encrypted in the card reader,

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but the PIN is entered into an app on the device's screen.

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The PIN is then sent to the card reader to also be strongly encrypted.

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But at some stage, the device will see the unencrypted PIN,

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but it will never see the unencrypted PAN.

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In a CPoC solution, only the contactless information is read from the card,

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which will include the PAN and the mag stripe equivalent.

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And that will be received in clear text by the device,

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and then it's encrypted in the device.

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So the device sees the PAN, but it doesn't see the PIN because,

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remember,

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CPoC is only for transactions without the PIN where the

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value of the transaction is below the limit set for

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contactless transactions without PIN.

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Now you may be thinking, Well,

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what about contactless transactions with a PIN where the value of the

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transaction is over the limit allowed for transactions without a PIN?

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Of course, the issue then is that without an external reader,

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the device itself would have all the information from the card along

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with the PIN that's been entered on the device.

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And although that in itself wouldn't allow for a fraudulent transaction,

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it does remove one of the major protections.

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And so the industry is going to be cautious about this because

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some malware running on that device would be able to get access to

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unencrypted PANs and unencrypted PINs.

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However,

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at some stage I think that this cautiousness will be overcome so there may be a

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third acceptance‑on‑COTS‑device standard which allows for a device to act as a

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contactless card reader and also accept the PIN.

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Just like the P2PE standard,

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the SPoC and CPoC standards make sure that all payment card data is strongly

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encrypted and so inaccessible in the merchant environment.

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And that's important because it means that the merchant's again not

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going to have to take responsibility for security other than properly

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looking after the card readers and the devices.
