WEBVTT

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one of the questions I'm always thinking about is,

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is this requirement a common one for compromises?

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Again, I think maybe 3.2 or 3.1 are things that make compromises worse.

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Yeah.

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I don't think the masking necessarily is common to compromises.

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Honestly, with merchants, particularly smaller or medium-sized merchants,

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yes, you decrease what we call your attack surface by eliminating storage,

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right,

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but when you look at card capture malware that gets deployed

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on point-of-sale systems by attackers,

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by and large it's capturing the data in transit.

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So it's not going out looking for stores of cardholder data?

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Yeah, the level of effort to attack even sort of badly encrypted,

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stored repositories of cardholder data is usually higher than

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sort of capturing it as it goes by in transit,

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and the malware to what we call scrape the memory,

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right,

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where I'm scraping now or look for stuff in volatile memory as it passes

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through the keyboard or the card swiper or whatever,

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is pretty well defined at this point.

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And we will talk about that in the next section,

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because we're going to come to an obvious hole in DSS where we're both going,

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yeah, that should probably be in that standard as well?

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Somewhere.

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So my experience is that as you say,

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the stored cardholder data makes compromises worse,

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and the excuse you usually get is,

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we didn’t know that database of 5000 cards was there.

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Right.

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We didn't know as an organization we were storing that data.

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So it's usually based around non-compliance with 3.1,

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of I didn't know we were doing that, and also for 3.2 with CVD stores,

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with e-commerce transactions, I didn't know we were capturing the CVV.

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Right.

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The developer didn't tell us they were doing it.

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So when I've looked at any compromises that involve CVV2,

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yeah,

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there were some where people were doing deliberately so

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they could do repeat transactions in CVV2 when that used to

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be a financial benefit to them, but it isn't now.

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It isn't now, and it hasn't been for a long time.

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And some people don't know that it isn't a financial benefit.

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Right, yes.

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So they still think they get their interchange rate if they have the CVV2.

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Yes.

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Then they haven't read the fact the rules have changed.

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Right.

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So it's always been, but generally it's been inadvertent storage,

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and if you look at some of the action,

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there were some quite big breaches in the U.K.

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where our information commissioner took action.

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You know, they had stored cardholder data,

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they just didn't know they had stored cardholder data.

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Right.

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And we'll talk about this, you know, in the other course,

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you know, achieving and maintaining compliance,

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but part of that roadmap is finding cardholder data you

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don't need and having that big clear-out,

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you know?

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Right, and well, if you go into the actual DSS itself,

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right,

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in the section before you get into the grit of requirements and read about

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the scoping and you read about sort of the data flow,

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alright,

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there's some pieces there that talk about how are you identifying

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your data flows and repositories of card data,

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and if you're saying, oh, I didn't realize that this database had all this stuff,

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or I didn't realize that somebody had copied this inadvertently onto some,

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you know, work station or some piece of removable media or something like that,

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then you've sort of missed some of the requirement-0 kinds of things.

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The requirement 0 that isn't written in the standard,

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but often people think about.

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But it kind of is, but really should just have a section called requirement 0.

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Yeah, there is a long story about that.

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I'm sure there is.

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There really is a long story about that.

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I'm sure there is.
