WEBVTT

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[Autogenerated] thinking really required altogether then Typical

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assessment behavior points Where do people go wrong here?

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Starts moving leaving VLANs certain movies levers that generic users

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You know too many add mons and Chrome E m f a o k.

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Chrome YAML-file.

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Alright, like the lousy like p k I certificates.

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Um uh, you know,

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one of the problems I think that's going to sort of rear its ugly head a

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little bit more is the idea of independence of factors,

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which shows up in guidance documents published by PC I

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but is not currently a requirement.

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But the idea that if I can get access to one of the factors,

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you know that maybe I could get access to the other factor,

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right?

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So if it's a username and password and a certificate on a laptop

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and I compromise that laptop with some malware,

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I've got them both.

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Right, So that's a that's a sort of future warning.

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If you're building some new M f A today,

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think about independence of factors,

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so you don't have to end up re engineering this a couple years down.

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The really good partner, right?

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Yeah.

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Um, So second assessments, I guess the B a U failure is just mostly starts,

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movies, levers, but you're looking.

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And there are people who have got accounts that are

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no longer in the organization.

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That is, that is the most common failure I find secondary year or thereafter,

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and failures of requirement e mean I can say a massive course of compromise

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after requirement six about just building insecure systems.

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Now it's you've got a secure system,

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but you don't ask your access to it s so that's a really common one,

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especially the, you know,

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in large service providers for any of the large service

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provider forensic reports I used to see it was always a

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compromise of the corporate network.

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Then pour apps is control into the car load OData environment, right?

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I think one of the things that you're maybe gonna start to see um,

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going forward is attacks against even users that

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have multi factor authentication, but have kind of lousy MF a using you know,

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OTP over SMS or something like that.

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You like that, Reddit Security incidents earlier this summer where they got Cem.

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Cem read it at Mons, right?

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Who had the one time password over over text message.

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Right, which is relatively easy to suborn on.

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So if if you've got a lousy M f a infrastructure and you're

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you're not sort of moving off of that, that's gonna,

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you know, that's that's the slowest moving target.

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That's an interesting point,

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which I'd like to probably finish on that one but missed.

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Have deprecate id OTP over SMS?

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Yes, you know, they said, was about a year ago that this really wasn't.

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It's a terrible idea.

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A za QoS a way.

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Follow the mist guidance for strong cryptography If a

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client comes to you and they say, Well, you know,

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I have my two factor Authentication is SMS OTP.

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Are you saying that's OK?

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Or you You give in the past where you go in the past with warning or failure.

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So I don't know if I've seen too many cases of that,

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at least in my clients in the last year or so.

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I have certainly talked about it and said,

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Hey, these error, these areas of concern,

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um,

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you know when when I've had a chance to do some

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speaking events or the like and I've said,

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Look, if you're using a semester over OTP,

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now is the time to get moving off of that because it's

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going to start causing problems.

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I am inclined to tell people that it's not compliant because it

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is so easily sort of suborned and misdirected.

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And if if you're a high enough value target,

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um, you know, then somebody going to Somebody went after.

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Read it right?

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So think of what happens when there's something actually valuable.

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DOM Great e Think that wraps that requirement eight Jacob next week.

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So that's logical access to cardholder data.

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And I guess the next thing we're gonna talk about is physical.

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Physical APIs?

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Yeah, bring it.
