WEBVTT

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[Autogenerated] you know, one of the questions we always asked.

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Is this a big source of compromise?

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I don't think so.

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Code.

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You know,

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there was a very famous cardholder data breach from a data center where

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people just walked up the data center and stole the servers.

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But that was 10, 12 hours a while.

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That was a while ago.

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I think we've moved on quite and cloud based debts.

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And you have no idea where your data is gonna be in in a date.

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Center, right?

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Often.

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Yeah, right.

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But what about ignoring the code a little bit?

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What about other breaches of requirement nine that have

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led to colonel the decent breaches?

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So I don't know of particular cases,

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but I think one of the major sort of risk areas would be like a contact center

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where you have a heap of workstations handling payment cards,

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right.

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And if somebody can get into that space and attach

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some sort of keystroke capture, you know,

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device or deploy some malware on those workstations or

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adversely affect that network traffic, right?

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You know,

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compromise that network device and then man in the middle of the traffic,

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uh, that I think that that would be, you know,

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a very significant possibility.

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Yeah, I can read I can, you know,

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relate to the fact that having seen compromised reports,

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that's the sort of thing that typically have a USB

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key loggers into contact center.

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You don't have control over who is in the context

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center is not in the contact center.

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There's often a lot of like paper.

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Leak is from contact centers where people are writing card numbers down,

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which you're allowed to do.

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By the way, the standard You know, I've seen some QoS.

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Is that make contact centers like you can't write?

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Cardinal first one doesn't say that anywhere in the stand,

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Yeah, but that you need to dispose of it properly.

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You can't leave it around forever.

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Year.

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You can't.

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You can't, you know, not then have some meaningful sort of tread process for it.

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Thinking about going to do an assessment of requirement nine.

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What a sort of stand out points you're gonna be looking at.

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So for many of my clients any more,

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there's not really anything for me to do for requirement.

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So it may be the case that you know there's not much or if there is it's a

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contact center or its a series of retail locations Back office,

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right?

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Yeah, or yeah,

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some increasingly unusual set of circumstances

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where there is that kind of space.

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Uh, but for for many of my like, sort of service provider clients that are,

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uh, in some technology or sort of, you know,

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fintech payment service, right?

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They don't want their own data center.

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They wanted in a cola or they want it in a cloud environment.

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Um, so, yeah,

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you have this increasing sort of split where there's either not much to

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do or you have these kind of interesting corner cases or you have a

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fleet of POS devices that you have to manage.

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We're going to get first things first on second assessments,

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any any stand out things where people just get it wrong.

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On the second assessment, Um,

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I have a few situations where maybe a client has moved

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from one data center to another, right.

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And then, you know, maybe neglected some steps along the way.

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Um, you know, or or occasionally, um, you know,

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if it's their own data center, if it's their own facility,

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Um, you know, I have let some things fall down right where?

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Oh, yeah, I guess we didn't keep CCTV footage for 90 days.

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You check that.

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I'm gonna go to I'm gonna go to 90 days, and I want to 90 days ago.

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Show.

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Right?

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Yeah.

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Show me the still image from 90 days ago with the time stamp on,

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And then give me the JPEG or the PNG of that as a work paper.

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Okay, I think that's wrapped up physical ability.

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Um, and again, if you have, it's a thing.

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I have no idea why, but some QoS NuGet really fixated about physical security.

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Um,

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maybe because they don't they don't do it all the time And like logical

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security so that their risk thead goes out the window and they just they do

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the black letter interpretation over interpret standard.

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So if you get that, you know, talk to the USA,

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look at the guidance column in the standard.

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And if you're still struggling, get another QoS a from the same company.

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Speak to try and get someone more senior,

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because this is this is not a major source of risk and compromise.

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But I've seen organizations be forced to spend thousands and thousands

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of dollars on controls that they really didn't need,

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uh, so that that's requirement nine.

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Most of requirement mind wrapped up In the next module,

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we look a special part of Requirement nine,

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which requirement 9.9, which is the security of devices that read cards.
