WEBVTT

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[Autogenerated] we're going to skip over pan testing, right?

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And talk about the other two requirements in

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requirement and are two search requirements.

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So IDE s and file integrity want to right,

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a za ancestor again, these error, these error,

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these error detective controls there because it's not IOPS and ideas.

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So tell me what you look at when you go to do an assessment.

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Sure.

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So when I look at something like intrusion detection,

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right, it could be network or host based,

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Right?

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Right.

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Uh, you know, when it's network based, write the requirements,

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talk about, you know, at the perimeter and a critical points.

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So I want to see where is the sensor looking for intrusions, right.

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Uh, and then how is that?

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How is that being managed?

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Right, if it's a physical device, right,

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which is increasingly sort of not the case,

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but still, every now and again, how is that device being managed?

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Right?

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How is it getting, you know, signature updates or or things like that, right.

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How is how is it configured to watch for,

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uh, you know, potential adverse traffic?

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Right?

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And if that's being managed by a third-party,

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maybe then my client doesn't have much visibility of the devices is a black box,

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right?

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Uh,

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but then I want I want to see something from the

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service provider that's offering that, you know,

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showing me something about how it's how it's how it's working,

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right.

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But you gotta test it.

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Try and you're going to try and be an intruder and see if it detects.

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So I'm not going to necessarily expressly do that in

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the course of my assessment work, right?

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I may say, Show me, you know,

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like with your pen test look like from an intrusion detection standpoint,

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right?

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And maybe the ideas was white listing the pen testing effort.

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Um, you know,

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or or white listing some vulnerability scans just so

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it doesn't generate a lot of noise.

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But But there there's very often some opportunity to say here,

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with some event that's already happened,

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that I don't have to do create that should have yielded some

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some output from your intrusion detection,

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You know, show me what you got because you're testing requirements.

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Just examine configurations.

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Basic Muslim, right.

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Well and again, what do you do when you get an alert?

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Right.

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How do you respond to a potential intrusion And,

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you know,

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if you can't have you can't show me that you've got some meaningful process

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there that you've got some intelligence behind how to respond,

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You know that we have a problem.

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Thin.

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So Right, so which is the final one?

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So this is interesting.

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I mean, the PC I language sort of updated.

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It used to say file integrity monitoring expressly.

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And now it has changed detection, right?

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So e conventional film still qualifies is change detection.

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So if you've been doing that all along, Okay, Carry on.

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Uh, there are potentially other ways to approach that.

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If you're looking for change detection,

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maybe that's like some sort of application white listing or something like that

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to say I only allow these things to work the way they were.

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Maybe not application white listing and its conventional sense,

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but, uh, some sort of restrictive capacity on important files,

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right?

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To prevent them from being modified.

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Now, the common struggle is here.

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I see a lot of organizations use, you know,

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a handful of relatively popular tools, Uh,

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very often just sort of installing it and then not even looking at,

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like, the configuration file, right.

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And if it's not focused on what's important.

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Not just for your organization, but for that host.

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Right then you sort of missed the boat, right?

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Uh, if it's a Web server, right, you should be.

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You should be looking specifically at the Web server

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binaries at the Web server configuration file,

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Uh, at at, you know, the web content of static content stuff,

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right?

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The JavaScript, you know, or whatever other stuff that you put their,

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uh, you know, to make that web server do its job.

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Because if we think about the recent breach of a big airlines

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exactly how they have been looking at those JavaScript files

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IT that would have been detected, throw it away,

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it would have.

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But what I read about that particular incident was that they had a

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third-party essentially crawling there website and doing def SSHD

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off site content over periods of time, right?

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And so that that third-party found a change in the site, right?

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You know,

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a tiny little 11 line bit of JavaScript that was that was different from from

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the last time they scanned it and they looked at it and said,

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That's not right.

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I actually think now for that JavaScript attack.

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You need internal thin.

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You also need some that's not understand,

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which is external external change detection.

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Well,

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and so I think you could You could make the argument that that

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sort of service was providing change detection?

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Absolutely.

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For that website.

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Now,

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that kind of external service isn't necessarily going to be

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providing changed section for your hosts.

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That error not exposed to the internet.

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So you know that won't that won't do it for your

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necessarily your whole environment.

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But if you're saying, hey,

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I've got a service like that that goes and crawls on my

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site content every day and then gifts looking for

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variances and then alerts me on those.

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Sure.

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Yes, do that.

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Absolutely.

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Do that.

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Do that as well As have something internet, right?

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Right.

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And then particularly for your internal hosts.

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Right.

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Then you need some other kind of change detection mechanism.

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But I think if you if you're not thinking about what this is intended to do,

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right and you're not tuning it, you're missing a lot of important stuff.

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Yeah, I mean, from my perspective, I recently employed film somewhere,

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but the film was brilliant because it also did

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requirement to for us eso the film.

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The film had the CSS hardened builds loaded into it.

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So it checked that'll the house work correctly

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configured against the CSS building, showed us showed us where it wasn't right.

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And then every time the CSS bill gets updated,

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the fin till tells us you're running out of sync.

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Now,

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with CSS hardened built So it was doing fine integrity monitoring

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on harden build monitoring at the same time.

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So we got double the money, double the benefits for same money, right?

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And there's some utilities that will do essentially file integrity,

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checking and also essentially host based,

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you know, hits.

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Yeah, right.

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So, yeah,

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you can deploy one tool and maybe cover a couple of

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different requirements that way.

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Eso Yeah.

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There's a lot of benefit to like thinking about how to make the best use of

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your tools a za necessity Come back with second year.

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What do you What are you looking for?

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To make sure that film is working properly?

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What I what I have found is again They always You know,

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that guy that was watching the store sort of left okay.

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And we didn't replace that person.

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So the FIM administrator, right?

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Right.

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Or the person dealing with the alerts, right?

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Or, you know, again, they're not bothering to configure it appropriately.

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And then they have, you know, 70 more hosts than it did last time.

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And they just dropped the stock config.

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I tell my client I harp on this a lot because I see this as a as a regular,

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sort of falling down kind of point.

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I tell my clients,

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start thinking about categories of device that merit

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different configuration types.

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You know, we have web servers.

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So here's how we do integrity checking for web servers,

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right-click database service.

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Here's how we do integrity checking for database services.

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We have other kinds of house.

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Okay, so we do that right.

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And you know, most of my clients error to roll my eyes like,

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you know, show me where in the DSS It says those words exactly.

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Right.

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And e mean it doesn't, but come on, use your head right
