WEBVTT

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Okay,

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so what I want to run through first of all is how does an

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organization find out it has a data breach?

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Well, hopefully they don't find out from Krebs.

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That's the worst way to find out.

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A lot of times merchants find out when a customer notifies them and says,

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hey, I've got this brand-new card.

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You're the only company I've used it at, and now it's being used fraudulently.

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Or they'll find out from their acquirer.

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The acquirer will call up and say, hey, our algorithms have tripped,

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and your location seems to be leaking card data.

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So, what'd you mean by that?

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The acquiring bank is looking for this happening?

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Yes.

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The card brands and the acquirers are watching the

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transactions on the back end looking for different anomalies

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that they call the common point of purchase,

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and they use different algorithms at each card brand,

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or each acquirer,

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to just monitor to see which cards can be

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triangulated back to a specific merchant.

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Yeah.

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When I was a Visa, we used to run this in the background basically.

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You looked at all the fraudulent transactions.

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You tried to take them back to, were they all used in the same place?

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Correct.

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And that's that common point of purchase, or CPP.