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Hello and welcome to another practical in this practical, we are going to take a look at a simulated

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malware written in Java and the file is here, both Java demo, which are so going down on this and

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unzip it and put it on your desktop inside this folder, you will find in Java, in the Java, as I

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mentioned before, he said Java archive consisting of multiple class files.

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I got on my bike.

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He was open.

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So I'm going to open this jar file using my computer.

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So click on file and.

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And then open these wanya.

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There's no booking on it and then click on the plus symbol here and.

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Insanities, Jaffa, you can see there are multiple files, including one for the.

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He's imitating folder containing some information and also dates and cost and I mean that, plus the

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first thing you want to do is to detect, right, is to mean that the main method is where the program

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execution starts.

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So looking for the class, looking at the class name, this could be the class which might contain the

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main method.

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So you click on it and here you scroll down and you can see this is where the main method is form.

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The main method always have the same signature.

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Public static, void main together you say here this is string x array of elements containing the parameters

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for the whole program.

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So inside here you see that there are also some obfuscations.

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Trying to make it difficult for the analyst.

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So now you can see the E string, a hasty GPS and string B, string C and string UEA and strings that

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and I hear the first function is.

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So if you scroll down to VB, you can see it is creating an object by concatenating.

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Three strings, A, B and C.

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ABC, this three, one, two, three.

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So what is he trying to do is trying to create a you are ill so we can defeat this anti analysis obfuscation

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by trying to decode this.

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You can see it on the screen as an equal sign indicating that this is an accurate basis for so we can

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use any on line basis for only for this.

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So just directly on this double click,

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double click and select the Cosini to copy this in an open browser.

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And then use Google to search for base64 to string.

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Click on the first one, basically for the court or Haiji.

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And the basis for encoded string here and the.

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And we have discovered that you are.

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So just copy this and put it in that.

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Next, you go back and look at the next string.

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Be suing on these over here these days.

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So now we're looking to see see so here.

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So we also copy this include equals copy this and we will remove this and paste a new string here and

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click.

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And now you're getting a name of the strain that has to be decoded, he copied a name you put here.

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Now we go back to the court again and we have decoded ABC and you know that string a hasty TB's so we

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can copy this.

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And Paysite now.

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In front.

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So now if you combine three things together.

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And these folks, they're here, if you look back at the core here, there's a former slash, we just

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can't get any to anybody out of trees.

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So we in our forests this year and immediately we get our indicator compromised.

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So this is the father is trying to download.

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So we go back to court here and we can see that he's creating this object in your arm and then which

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is this is Hoti.

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And then he is going to.

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A hefty DPL connection object.

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And after that, he's going to open a commission.

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And then he's going to set a commission request again, using these diseases also, and this is before

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you can confirm this, if we click on this.

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See, the.

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Yes, he's coming from here and see you click on this A from here, you can see the function inside

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is basically for DeCota, not because this is not a confirmation that it is using base64, including

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something here in C deck.

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The day is the same function here.

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So this also basically for this.

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So if you want that, you can do the same thing.

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You can copy the existing easy variable all over you and then go to decoding, but leave it to you as

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an exercise.

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So now we know enough about what he's trying to do.

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It is trying to reach out to the command and control server and download the file.

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And then if the connection, response to hunger that Mr. Farr managed to download is going to do this,

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you.

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The connection is fierce.

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He is going to return the program.

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So after downloading the file, you open a buffer reader to read the input stream and then create a

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string out of it.

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And then here you assemble the string that you've written, the string.

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So the string is written.

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We're here and safe as the variable eighty nine zero Z, and in the next line we will split that string

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based on the separator, the colon separator, and then you will check the first part in a second.

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But in the first part of the string is C, and the second part is the one.

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Then you execute the function, call a function is down here.

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So in a function, you scroll down.

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It is trying to create a screen capture.

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We're here, and then after creating a screen capture, you is saving this local one.

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And over here is trying to create a random name, a random integer.

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And here is going to create a look of.

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Two star.

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To start a Philco extension GPG.

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And this is updated from the.

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Integer high here, which is a random number and over here is going to write to death for the local

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fire.

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The local object, one means, is going to store the captured desktop image.

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The screen capture into a look of which is the name Dungee RPG.

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So this is your mother artifact.

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You can actually trace this far it is in a 10 directory for your operating system.

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So from this analysis, we already know so much about what happened when this simulated malware is trying

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to do.

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We were able to defeat is and the analysis obfuscation.

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We managed to also find the indicator of compromise and also the malware artifact.

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So this is how you can use reverse engineering to help us do malware analysis on Java binaries.

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Thank you for watching.

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I'll see you in the next one.
