WEBVTT

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As a cybersecurity analyst, we often look at phishing or spear phishing emails, and we wonder ourselves

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how somebody could fall for it.

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As a security in the field, you have to remember that you're properly trained and you're constantly

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looking at these little hints or clues that identify it as a phishing or spear phishing email.

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But what happens when that email is more than just a phishing or spear phishing email?

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Maybe it's spoofed and it's coming from what looks to be a legitimate user or legitimate domain.

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That's where email analysis really comes into play.

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And you, as a cybersecurity analyst, need to be able to identify very quickly.

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Is this a legitimate source for the email?

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Did it properly come into play and into our environment from a legitimate source?

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Email analysis is really one of those things that you have to take for heart and understand the proper

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clues and the technology to utilize in order to understand if that email is truly valid, coming from

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a legitimate Source.

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In this episode, we're going to go over email analysis.

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We're also going to talk a little bit about the frameworks associated with how to secure our systems

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and the technology that we can utilize, both from a protocol standpoint as well as some of the other

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systems that we can use to ensure that somebody that's trying to pull off a spoofing email attack against

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our systems isn't successful.

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For Cisa exam, you need to understand these technologies, these protocols and how they interact with

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our different systems.

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Email analysis is more than just understanding if the email is coming from a legitimate source.

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We need to be able to analyze the content of the email itself.

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Does it have malicious links embedded in it?

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Are there attachments that could provide some unfortunate compromises to people that download them and

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click on them?

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It's not often that we don't see a piece of email with an associated invoice, or a link attached to

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it, that is actually leading to a piece of malware.

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We need to provide to our organization a clear cut pathway to stop these types of attachments and links

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from getting through our systems.

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We can also do what's called metadata analysis.

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This is where we look at the actual data that's hidden within the email body or the email contacts to

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find out where did the data really come from.

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We can track the different routers and the source and destination codes.

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We can track the legitimate information that's inside the email because it cannot be changed.

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It cannot be spoofed.

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We can look at the different links within the email, and we can look at the behavior that the email

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has when it's going through our system.

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All of these forms of analysis that go through our systems provide us a clear direction of whether the

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email is legitimate or if it's coming from a malicious actor.

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Within the email, there's something called the header.

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The header is the portion of the messages that contains details about the actual sender of the email,

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the route taken, and who it's going to.

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Analysts can use this email to detect whether an email is spoofed or suspicious in nature, and we can

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kind of derive from that information if that email has a legitimate purpose on our network.

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You can see here that we provided a legitimate header information, and that it shows us that the information

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is actually going to a specific user.

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If you pay attention, you can see that it goes to past the yahoo.com to yahoo.com dot pH.

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This means the recipient of the email isn't an actual user and is most likely spoofed.

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It's not often that we don't see someone trying to pose as somebody they're not.

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This is where impersonation comes into play.

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They spoof the address that the email came from in order to make the victim feel like we are a position

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of authority, a close relative, or even a friend, and impersonation is a major form or factor that

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can provide the gateway from a legitimate email passing through our security systems, or a phishing

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email passing through our systems.

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This plays a major role in email security.

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There is something called Sender Policy Framework, or SPF.

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This works by allowing domain owners to publish their DNS records that specify which email servers are

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authorized to send emails on behalf of their domain.

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I want you to picture this sort of like a phone book.

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I receive a phone call from somebody and that somebody is claiming to be my son.

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Obviously, it sounds like my son, because of deepfakes and all this other technology that's out there,

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but the phone number just doesn't look right.

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I can go through and actually go, hey, who are you calling?

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Oh, I'm on my cell phone.

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Well, obviously you're not on your cell phone because my caller ID identifies that that phone number

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isn't legitimate.

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Now, the first thing that comes to your mind is, wait a second.

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What if they're spoofing my phone number?

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Well, we understand that, but that's where the Sender Sender Policy framework comes into play.

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Unlike a phone system, we can actually go back to the DNS and identify is this a legitimate domain

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that they sent the email from?

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We.

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This provides us enhanced email delivery because we know that the domain that they sent it from is legitimate

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in nature.

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And we can have our systems to identify those legitimate servers as part of our inward ingress into

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our system, thereby allowing that email to process more smoothly.

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We can also do spoofing protection through this.

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If someone's claiming to have a domain such as, I don't know, yahoo.com, but it doesn't come from

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a legitimate server, then we can identify that as a spoofing email and protect ourselves from it.

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This reduces fraud and increases trust from that server, as we've identified the DNS associated specifically

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with that email server.

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Domainkeys identified mail, or DKIM, is another feature.

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This generates a pair of keys, much like a public private key that we see in encryption, where the

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organization's public key is published to the DNS records for later querying and in use by the recipient

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when sending a message to Kim.

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The sender includes a special signature header containing the hash of the email header, thereby stopping

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the or providing integrity for that email.

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A hash or a portion of the body and the details about the hash function can then be used to verify the

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email came from a legitimate user.

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Just like probit private encryption.

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We can then see the publisher or the sender of the email, because they've signed the email and provided

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the hash value of the content.

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This stops man in the middle, attacks.

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It verifies the signature of the sender and provides us a true trust determination through identification

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of legitimate user, thereby stopping spoofing emails from crossing through our systems.

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However, it should be warned that while it does verify the sender information, that doesn't mean that

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the sender may have put or implemented spoofing or malware within the email, it only verifies that

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the information was sent from a specific server, not that the email doesn't have, uh, malware embedded

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within it.

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Finally, we have something called domain based message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance,

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or dMarc.

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That's a mouthful, but this email authentication protocol is designed to empower email domain owners

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and prevent spoofing and mitigate spam originating from their domain.

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This is done through a series of technology, but provides spoofing prevention DNS record.

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Cross examination and cross reference.

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It can also be manually queried to ensure that the emails are actually coming from the legitimate server

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in which it was supposed to originate on.

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This, again, is just one more message protocol that we can utilize to ensure that our emails are safe.

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It's not uncommon within our normal emails to see embedded links, whether it's a click here box or

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a direct email link.

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It doesn't matter what it is, but we see embedded links scouring our different emails from both legitimate

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users as well as malicious users in certain contexts.

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This isn't always a good thing.

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You can see on our example here where we have a legitimate, uh, link or an embedded link within our

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system, but it's providing an illegitimate or spoofing link.

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If the user were to click on it, they would end up@malware.com or a malware site.

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This provides an embedded link or a way for malicious users to provide a quick link for users to utilize

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that could potentially lead to an unwanted or unauthorized Authorized website.

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This is a major problem with an email today, and we should provide some policies or procedures to ensure

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that our users aren't clicking on them.

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One of the surefire ways is training, and with training, we can identify and say, hey, don't click

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on the links, identify where the link is taking you first, and if it doesn't add up, don't click

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on it.

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If you don't recognize the user, don't click on it.

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A lot of systems in place for many organizations today don't allow embedded links, and if you provide

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an embedded link, it tells you exactly what the link is so you don't even have to hover your mouse

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over it.

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That provides us an additional security layer within our email security protocols.

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Within this episode, we covered our email analysis.

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We also covered how to look for headers and how headers can be utilized to identify spoofing or malicious

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emails.

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We covered impersonation and how users or senders aren't always who they say they are.

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We've identified different frameworks and protocols that we can utilize to more safeguard our systems

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and security within our email program to ensure that authenticity of the email sender as well as the

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domains that are supposedly being sent from.

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We also talked about embedded links to where we can ensure that our users are only clicking on links

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that they know where it's going to, by ensuring that we don't allow the short fuse links in, and we

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only provide the long link that actually proves they're going to a safe place.

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We also provide training to ensure, on top of those embedded links that users aren't clicking on malicious

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software.

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Throughout this episode, we've talked about all these different things, but what I really want you

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to get out of this is that for Cisa plus, you need to understand the common sense protocols that come

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with not only embedded links, but also through domain based authentication, reporting and conformance,

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or that dMarc protocol.

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The DKIM or Domainkeys identified mail, as well as Sender Policy Framework or SPF.

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These protocols you should expect to see on your Cisa plus exam, make sure that you understand the

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acronyms associated with them and how that technology is pulled off.

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If you can do that, you should be good for those scenario based questions within your Cisa exam.
