WEBVTT

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Often we find a problem within our systems that the normal corrective standard just can't be applied.

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This can happen because of a variety of issues, including how our enterprise environment is set up.

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It could be because of a specific policy.

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It could be for a variety of issues, but we refer to this as an inhibitor to remediation.

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When we look at the dependency on IT systems as a whole, we often find that some IT systems are outdated.

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They've got legacy components.

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The specific software that we're utilizing doesn't work on updated systems.

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I consulted for a tanning salon at one point, and the overriding POS system, or the point of sale

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system, as well as the inventory system that the tanning salon used, was backdated to Windows 7.

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So if you were using any type of windows product after Windows 7, the program specifically just didn't

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work.

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Now, we tried utilizing a Windows 10 system that you could then backdate to utilize Windows 7 settings.

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That didn't work.

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We tried it with Windows 8.

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That didn't work.

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There was specific program requirements or the way the program was originally designed, where it just

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did not implement well with anything past Windows 7.

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This obviously provided with a variety of issues because Windows 7 was no longer supported, but this

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is an example of a dependency on IT systems or outdated systems.

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There can be outdated policies in place where policies were in place 1015 years ago, and while they

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made good use of the requirements or good use of the problems and technology 15 years ago, new technology

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has arisen, new ways of doing things have arisen.

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There's better way of doing things.

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But those outdated policies came into play and are hampering our ability to remediate certain issues.

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For instance, there was a password policy put into place that specifically said that it had to be eight

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characters in length, with at least one uppercase, one lowercase, one number, and one special character

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that is an incredibly outdated policy when it comes to passwords, but because of the way the policy

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was written, it wasn't just cut and dry like that.

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It actually came to hamper our remediation factors to provide multi-factor authentication, because

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there was a line inside the policy that specifically said no technology could be added or deducted from

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the current policy without director approval, and we couldn't get the director to sign off on it.

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So it had to go through the entire remediation policy for a change.

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That literally took months when there was a better way of doing things right off the get go.

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There could be resource constraints where we want to go through.

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We want to do it, but the backlog of supplies isn't available.

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This happened quite often in Covid where we were trying to upgrade systems.

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We were trying to upgrade technologies, but their resources just weren't available.

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This could often pose problems within the infrastructure as a whole, where we're having to do compensating

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controls because resource constraints are available.

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The complexity of the issue, if you've got uh, IT professionals or cyber professionals.

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And the issue is very complex, and you're having to add technology on top of technology in a specific

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format that could pose issues.

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We've all had problems where we've ran into technology and we wrote the code, or we did something on

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the process, and it just didn't work because it was so complex.

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The different systems that were interacting with it just made the the configuration that we were trying

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to pull off within the system as a whole not work well together, and that fluidity just wasn't there.

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So complexity can often pose different issues.

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And that specific instance, we had to break down the different configuration and provide this system

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with this configuration, this system with this configuration, which obviously opened up some vulnerabilities,

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which then we had to mitigate in order to get the system to work functionally correct.

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There could be also resistance to change.

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This happens quite often with older employees or with management, where they see the act of doing something

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and they're just very resistant to change.

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With the password policy, for instance, getting three factor authentication actually go through,

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uh through the process of change policy was a nightmare because for the specific company, anytime you

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wanted to change a policy, it had to go through an entire council or a committee that voted on the

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password changing policy.

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And even though it made sense and it needed to be enacted and it should have been cut and dry, there

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was a lot of resistance to that change because, hey, we've always done it this way.

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Why do we need to change it now?

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Uh, and you'd be surprised how many people were just resistant to the type of changes that can occur,

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especially in technology.

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We usually don't have that big of an issue within it and cyber because we're used to changing constantly,

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but sometimes you just run into people that just do not want to change, and you have to provide a compelling

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argument based on facts.

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And even then, sometimes they're resistant to provide those different changes.

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We could do a memorandum of understanding as well.

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We talked about MoUs a little bit earlier in this course, but I wanted to reiterate it here in terms

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of, uh, in terms of inhibitors to remediation, if I have a MoU in play with different departments

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or between different organizations the way that we've been doing it could necessitate having a new MOU

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written.

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Well, the MOU was originally written and signed by people that aren't with the company anymore, or

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for a project that was long term.

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Maybe the project's getting ready to end in 3 or 4 months and they don't see the need to change the

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MoU.

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And so there's resistance to changing the MOU, which means there's resistance to way we can do technology,

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then requiring us to hold two different systems in place to necessitate meeting that MOU requirement.

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MOU can provide us with a great system and ability.

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It can provide a great policy and a great working understanding between two departments or organizations.

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But it can also be an inhibitor to change if we're required to meet specific guidelines or specific

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functionality within systems that call for outdated or legacy systems that we want to upgrade.

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There's also service level agreements.

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We often talked about SLAs, meaning a specific requirement, and we said, hey, I want to have a 99.5%

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uptime on this SLA.

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Well, we may come up with a more secure system on that provides us better security, better encryption,

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but it also brings down the download speed or the upload speed.

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And yet our SLA dictates that we have to have this set of bandwidth or meet these specific requirements.

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And by adding those encryption and adding that security, it actually drops that SLA.

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Check down below what our SLA is required to be.

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And so that can be an inhibitor to change.

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When we have an SLA that says you will meet 99.5% of this data speed of, let's say, a gigabyte download

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speed.

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And that's great.

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And all our bandwidth didn't change, but we started adding encryption.

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We started adding more security on the system.

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And now instead of getting that one gig, we're at 9.9.

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Did it have a vastly different, changed approach to it?

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No, but it now does not meet that SLA requirement.

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We have to go back through and do a new SLA agreement based on the security needs and some businesses.

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Again, resistance to change, resistance to that SLA benefit, they're not going to want to do it.

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So SLA checklist SLAs could necessitate an inhibitor to change.

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There's corporate governance or organizational governance, where it refers to a framework of processes

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and regulations.

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This is often employed by different organizations to provide a specific way of doing things or a specific

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way.

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Our, uh, our different departments interact with one another.

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This often is transparent within it, and it provides corporate leadership to allow and assess ramifications

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of actions within our business.

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When it comes to decisions that they make, when this comes to remediation, if they go into effect

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and they start saying, hey, we want to do this framework, this is what we employ, this is the relation

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we're meeting.

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This is how we do business.

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And we want to come through and say, oh, we would like to increase our security or we'd like to do

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this.

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Uh, it may affect that regulation or it may affect that corporate compliance that thereafter, which

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then says that we can't do it because we've dropped our download speeds or we've dropped our bandwidth,

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or maybe we're employing new security, but the current compliance regulations say that you will do

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des older encryption algorithm or Triple-des.

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Right.

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But we just came out with this new thing called.

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TLS or SSL that's supposed to be bigger and better and all the way across the board.

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But the compliance and regulations say that you will hold up to triple death.

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This could be an issue because even though we know SSL is better, way better, the specific governance

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comes into play and says we will do triple death.

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This often times can be a problem when it comes to corporate governance by outlining specific technologies.

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So a lot of times when we talk about specific technologies, we will say or better or better, so meet

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the minimum requirements or better in our corporate compliance.

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But if that little word isn't in there, it could affect our, uh, our problems with remediation of

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moving forward.

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And so that's an inhibitor to trying to fix a security vulnerability by upgrading to a new encryption

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standard.

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That's obviously better.

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But because we didn't do that or better, it has to go through the entire framework, the entire governance

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protocols, all that problems for going to a better, um, encryption standard that has little to no

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effect on our overall infrastructure.

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There's also business process interruption.

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Anytime I want to change something within our enterprise environment, especially for security, ultimately

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I'm most likely going to have to take a system down, or I may have to patch a system, or I may have

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to upgrade that system, which may have an expanded lifetime or an expanded maintenance window within

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the process.

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This means that let's say I want to upgrade a router, and the normal maintenance window is only four

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hours.

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But because of the way our network is set up, maybe we anticipate the router being offline for six

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hours.

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This could provide an extended maintenance window or a system downtime that the company isn't willing

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to accept, which means we can't upgrade the router because our maintenance window is only four hours.

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But we need to do all the prep work.

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This could pose some issues or problems to inhibitors, to remediation of fixing or replacing this router

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where we have a router where the maintenance window should only take three hours, but the backup procedures

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to get out of it and reconfigure the old router made the two hours.

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If we have to back out this would override our maintenance window of only four hours to be five hours

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and that may come into technical issues.

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We've also seen technical issues where the original plan was to only take two hours.

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We have a four hour maintenance window.

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Everything's approved, but we got so, uh, streamlined, so focused on the issue that we looked up

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and we saw this router that's down, but it's been almost three hours and 45 minutes, and we've exceeded

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that maintenance window, because there's no way we can back out with the old router back in within

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15 minutes to meet the maintenance window guidelines.

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This could be technical issues that come into play.

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It could also be technical issues in the fact that we wanted to go to a new encryption standard, but

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the new encryption standard isn't taking place.

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It's not doing hold properly.

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Uh, we're having configuration issues or software issues with the system we're trying to deal with.

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That could be a technical issue, and it's taking longer than expected.

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We'd have system failures where again, the router just goes offline.

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It takes the entire system offline.

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We need to replace it.

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And again it's going to take 4 or 5 hours to do that.

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That could be a business process interruption where it's inhibiting our ability to remediate the overall

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issue.

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We could also see where we've got a problem with insecurity.

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We will replace a system, but in order to replace this system, we have to replace this system as well.

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Or we had a system fail the night we were supposed to replace something.

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So that's a system failure.

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Natural disasters come into play where we may have a tornado or a hurricane that comes into play, or

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even an earthquake or another natural disaster fire, flood.

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It doesn't matter.

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That comes into play, and we can't readily replace that issue or fix that remediation process because

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we had something unexpected come into play.

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And of course, there's human error, which makes up a majority of our problems where originally we

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were to replace this router.

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It's going to take three hours, but all of a sudden we had somebody click on a phishing link.

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Now we have an incident and it's all hands on deck to fix this incident because it's playing havoc with

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our systems and we can't remediate the overall issue that can be modified.

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We also have degrading functionality.

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This could be from our malware infections.

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It could be from any number of different aspects, but usually with malware infections coming into play,

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we have the malware that's taken hold within our system.

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We have to get out that malware.

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And because of that, now we've degraded our functionality of our overall client base.

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It's not uncommon for malware to spread, and when that spreading takes place, we no longer have access

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to the systems or the degraded functionality of those systems because we have to go through and wipe

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the program.

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We have to wipe that malware from existence that poses issues, gives us degraded functionality, cache

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management issues where we're trying to run into patches.

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We want to streamline that patch management window within the maintenance window.

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And because we're implementing patches, we have degraded functionality across our spectrum of our enterprise

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environment, which means our help desk can't normally do what they would like to do.

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It's not uncommon, especially in large environments where we're doing a major system overhaul or we're

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doing a major patch and something that would normally wouldn't be an issue, like a password reset.

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The help desk can no longer do because we're patching the different systems, and we told them not to

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do anything.

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So degraded functionality of that aspect, denial of service or distributed denial of service attacks

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on our system.

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Since our clients can access the overall system.

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It's restricted because we're hitting too much traffic.

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That could pose issues and of course, overly restrictive controls or misconfigurations where the client

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or the people trying to get access to our systems can't meet all those problems or meet all the functionality

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of those systems because we've made restrictive controls too much, and so they can't authenticate,

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or they can do one thing like they can write in the Excel spreadsheet, but then they can't save to

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it because they're restrictive controls don't allow them to, or they can read it, but they can't write

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to it, or they can write to it, but they can't save to it.

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These are all restrictive controls that I've seen in the past that just provide major issues within

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an overall environment and degrades functionality across the board.

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When we talk about legacy or proprietary systems, I've given numerous examples in the past where I've

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got an older system that's no longer supported, but it contains a specific software or a specific data

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that we can't easily translate over to a newer system.

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This often relates to a major problem when we're trying to remediate an issue.

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If Guy has got an older server and I've got newer technology that's coming out.

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Not only do I have to protect that system that is out of state or at its end of life and no longer supported,

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but I also have to remediate security around that specific legacy or proprietary system.

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And this could easily come into different functionalities where we're trying to do something with our

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network.

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But I've got this older legacy system that just doesn't work into play.

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This is a major issue, especially across larger environments where they may have 2 or 3 different legacy

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or proprietary servers or even different systems that we have to hide behind firewalls, we have to

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add additional security, but we still have to allow people to gain access to it, and we have to safeguard

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those systems, and we want to remediate or we want to upgrade our servers, and we can't because of

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this singular legacy system.

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This often resolves into the fact that we segment that system into its own environment.

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We virtualize it.

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We do all kinds of different compliance issues or mitigation strategies to protect that system and lower

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the impact of it.

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But never underestimate legacy proprietary systems.

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They're all over the place inside larger enterprise environments.
