WEBVTT

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One of the coolest things about being in today's Internet is that our universe is filled with all of

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these amazing devices that I'm going to call static hoes.

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Now you might also when you use the term Internet of things but it basically boils down to those zillions

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of devices out there that have some form of embedded operating system.

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And they also have some type of network awareness so gosh I could go from a Google Home box to a Nest

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thermostat to a home router to a game controller.

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There are so many things out there that fit underneath that criteria.

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Now a lot of people would argue that mobile devices are static homes.

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They certainly have a specific operating system and it's also stored on firmware and they're very much

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internet aware.

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However these are kind of general purpose devices so when we're talking about a static host usually

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the best idea is to think about a device that's designed to do a specific things so.

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So there are arguments for mobile devices being static.

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However I'm going to save all that for their own episode and we can go into the security of mobile devices

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in great detail but there's lots of static hosts all around us.

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I mean look what I got right in front of me here.

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I've got a wireless access point.

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I've got a nice switch here.

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Got an old but good router right in front of me.

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I've got a network aware printer right here.

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All of these are single purpose devices whose job is to do whatever they are supposed to do.

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They are network aware very much network aware and they have some form of operating system stored on

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some kind of firmware so these are all static.

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Now I'm not done yet.

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Let's keep going here.

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Let's take it up to more of an industrial level and talk about some of the stuff that we see for example.

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Industrial control systems everything we do when it comes to industrial anything these days usually

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means you've got some kind of machines some kind of something with a computer that is network aware

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that is single purpose.

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Who is going to control that thing to make it do whatever it wants to do.

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So I don't care if you're baking bread or making motherboards there's invariably going to be some type

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of industrial control system.

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Now probably one of the more famous industrial control systems is heating ventilation and air conditioning

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systems or HD AC.

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Pretty much any office building any industrial building today has an HD AC system and all of that is

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powered by some type of specialized computer whose only job is to keep us warm or to keep us cool.

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Now we can even take it one step further than that.

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What I want to do is take the idea of industrial control and take it out over long distance.

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We have a lot of situations.

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Railroads oil pipelines electrical distribution systems that require industrial controls.

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But because of their physical distances involved they actually go into a whole new class of devices

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that we call supervisory control and data acquisition systems or skater.

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So Scates systems are pretty much icy Yes but the only big differences is they usually have to have

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some kind of like a cellular connection or something like that they have a lot of autonomy to make sure

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that they can do whatever they have to do.

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So there is a lot of stuff out there that we have to deal with when it comes to static hoes.

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So the big question is is how do we secure them.

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The biggest challenge to securing static hosts is understanding that in many ways they are like any

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other type of host and in many ways they're not.

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So first of all they act a lot like any regular host in that just like Rieger Windows system for example.

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I will have user accounts with passwords.

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This has a user account with passwords and invariably it's going to have some default user account password.

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You know what you probably want to change that.

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Also like a regular host you want to turn off unnecessary services.

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This particular router right here has a built in telnet server which I don't like to have turned on.

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It has an s S-sh server which is fine with me.

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So I make sure to turn off that telnet server.

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So the first thing you're going to do when you're dealing with a static host is think about that static

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host as a regular host.

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There's a lot of things that you can take care of.

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However the other problem with static most is that it doesn't act like a regular host in many ways.

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I don't have any windows update that comes with this that automatically updates the built in operating

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system.

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I don't have any anti-malware on this guy that allows me to make sure I'm not being corrupted by something.

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So when you have static hosts in your life you're going to spend a lot of time monitoring your network

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monitoring what's going on out there and making firmware updates.

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Hopefully a lot will depends on the device you run into a lot of interesting problems like for example

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a very popular brand of home routers.

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People discovered fairly recently you could just type something into a screen and it would automatically

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allow you to take full control of them.

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A wonderful injection attack but it's because I watch the news and I discovered something like that.

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Also this is a Cisco device.

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I tend to live on the Cisco sites always watching for particular problems for any piece of firmware

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that needs an update.

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And then I'll go ahead and do those updates.

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And in 99 percent of the cases it's a manual thing that you have to watch manually.

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Now that's great but there's a lot of aspects about this device that you're not going to be able to

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do anything about.

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For example there is no anti-malware built into the Cisco router.

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There are things I'm going to have to do to protect this and I can't do it on the device itself.

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So I start to create layers of protection around it.

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Or what we call defense in depth.

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And the best way to do defense in depth is through network segmentation.

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Let me show you what I mean.

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So here's Mike's bread baking company and I've got a big industrial control system where I make lots

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of delicious bread.

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Now what I need to do is perform network segmentation here to give my self defense in depth.

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For example here I have all these bread baking machines.

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What I'm going to do is separate these bread making machines from the rest of my network using the lands

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in that way making sure that I get some good control and I can even put a firewall between the separate

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villans to make sure the traffic that I don't want to have going between these two will take care of

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it.

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Now if I want to scale this up a little bit let's just say I've got Mike's pipeline here.

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So instead of an icy Yes now I've got to scale the system so here's my pipeline with a few different

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terminals along a thousand mile pipeline.

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What I can do in this situation is that if any of these systems need to phone home or if I need to talk

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to them I can go ahead and use a VPN network to allow me to talk to these guys with a high degree of

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security.

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You're going to see questions on the exam about static hosts.

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Remember a few things though and you shouldn't have any trouble.

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Number one treat a static host like any other regular host at first but then secondly if there are unique

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aspects to that host Don't be afraid to throw in some really good network segmentation to protect your

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static hosts from the mean outside world.
