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Man, the minute a tax or an item.

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OK.

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Now, what is meant in the attack now it is a common type of cyber security attack that allows attackers

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to eavesdrop on the communication between to target.

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The attack takes place in between two legitimately communicating posts, allowing the attacker to listen

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to a conversation they should normally not be able to listen to.

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Hence the name man in the middle.

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As you can see from this graph, we have and we have Bob and I will send a message to Bob now.

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We have Eve, which is the eavesdropper, and it will start listening to that message and intercepting

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the traffic.

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And actually, this is what Eliot did in the scene, when you start intercepting the traffic and he

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noticed that our website.

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Don't worry, we will talk about this later on, indicates how he managed to do such a thing technically.

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I mean.

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Now, here you can see that Alice and Bob are having conversation and even want to eavesdrop on the

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conversation, but also remain transparent.

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Now, Eve could tell that she was booked and that she was Alice.

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This would lead us to believe she's speaking to Bob while actually revealing her part of their conversation

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to it.

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And if I could then gather information from this and have the responses.

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The message I wrote to Bob, who thinks he's talking to Alice as a result, if he's able to transparently

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hijack their conversation.

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So the types of men in the middle attacks, we have the privilege at this point.

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So device is equipped with wireless cards, with open try to connect to the access point that is emitting

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the strongest signal.

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Attackers can set up their own wireless access point and track nearby devices to join.

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It's to meet all of the victims network traffic can now be manipulated by the attacker.

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This is a dangerous because the attacker doesn't even have to be a trusted network to do this.

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The attacker simply needs a close enough physical proximity.

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We have to stop spoofing.

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Now, Art is the address whose illusion of Brautigan and it is used to resolve the IP addresses to physical

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makk or media access control addresses in a local Nettwerk area.

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OK, now, when a host needs to talk to us with a given IP address, it references the art cache to

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resolve the idea.

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This to a Mac address.

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If the evidence is not known, a request is made asking for Mac address of the device with the IP address.

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Because after all, this is a letter to the detailing player, which is Mac address.

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So we need the answer to resolution or to map the IP to Mac and vice versa.

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Actually we have something called Reverse R US as well.

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Rob, this is to do the bus visit.

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Think OK.

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No, actually, this is the thing that it used to hijack the traffic technique.

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OK, but again, we will talk about this, how he managed to do that.

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What are the tools and how to do such a tech?

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Don't worry, we will do that and we will build the environment for that.

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Now we have and also the dotcom wishing to pose as another host.

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Good response to request.

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It shouldn't be responding to it with its own Mac address.

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So with some precisely placed Becket's, an attacker can sniff the private traffic between two hosts.

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Valuable information can be extracted from the traffic, such as the extent of station Tucanes yearning

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for access to application accounts that that should not be able to access.

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Now we have the DNS spoofing or the multicast DNS.

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So the multicast that is similar to DNS, but it is done on local area network Dilan using broadcast

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like the.

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This makes it the perfect target for spoofing attacks and the local Namba solution system is supposed

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to make the configuration of the device extremely simple.

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Also, the that do not have to know exactly which addresses their devices should be communicating with

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them.

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The system preserves it for them.

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Devices such as TVs, printers and entertainment systems make use of this protocol since they are typically

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on trusted network.

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So when an application needs to know the address of a certain device such as TV, the clothing and attacker

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can easily respond to that request, with big data instructing it to resort to an address it has control

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over.

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So since devices keep a local cache of addresses, the victim will now see that device and trusted for

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a duration of time.

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We have the DNA spoofing similar to the way our IP address to Mac address on the Lamborghini's resolved

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domain name to EBE.

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OK, I think you are familiar with that.

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If you are not, it's OK.

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This is the domain name system or server.

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This is to map domain names to IP or IP to domain names.

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So when using DNA spoofing attack that Dukkha attempts to introduce corrupt DNS cache information to

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a host in an attempt to exploit another host using their domain name.

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OK, so this leads to victim sending sensitive information to malicious hosts with the belief they are

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sending information to a trusted source.

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An attacker who has already spoofed an IP address could have a much easier time spoofing Deanna simply

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by reserving the IP address, by reserving the address of a DNS server to attack us at this.

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So we have men in the middle attack techniques.

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The first thing which is the sniffing attackers can use Becket's capture tools to inspect baggage at

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a lower level.

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Using specific wireless devices that are allowed to be put into monitoring or promiscuous mode can allow

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an attacker to see Becket's that are not intended for a see, such as addressed or to other hosts.

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Now we have the injection, and Ataka can also leverage their devices, monitoring not to inject malicious

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Becket's into data.

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Communication streams to markets can blend in with their data communication streams appearing to be

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part of the communication.

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But many issues in nature and Beckert injection usually involves first sniffing to determine how and

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when to craft.

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And Becket's we have the session highjacking most web application use and Nojin mechanism that generates

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a temporary session talking to us for future requests to avoid requiring the user to type a password

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at every page so an attacker can sniff sensitive topic to identify the session, talking for a user

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and use it to make a request as the user and the attacker doesn't need to speak once he had a session

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talking.

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We have the Strabane, since using HDTV is a common safeguard against art or DNA spoofing, attack US,

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use SS and strobing to intercept packets and act up their HDTV Espace address requests to go to there

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actually to be equivalent point forcing the host to make requests to the server.

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Unencrypted sensitive information can be leaked in a plain text.

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No how to detect man in the at.

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Now, do think many the middle at that can be very difficult without taking the proper steps, if you

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are actively searching to determine if your communication have been intercepted, the Middle East,

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that can potentially go unnoticed until it is too late.

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So checking for proper authentication and implementation, some sort of time detection are typically

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the key methods to detect possible attack.

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So the timber tomber or timber detection.

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But this procedure might require extra forensic analysis after the fact.

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OK, so it is important to take precautionary measures to prevent many attacks before they occur rather

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than attempting to detect them while they are actively accurate, being aware of browsing practices

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and recognizing potentially harmful areas can be essential to maintaining a secure network.

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OK, now what is the best practices to prevent many of the major attacks?

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The first thing, strong web or web encryption on access point.

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So having a strong encryption mechanism on wireless access point prevents unwanted user from joining

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your network just by being nearby.

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A weak encryption mechanism can allow an attacker to brute force his way into a network and begin management

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genetic.

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So the stronger the encryption implementation, that's easier for you are.

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Another thing which is strong Rolton login credentials, of course, don't you, as admin admin, so

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it is essential to make sure your login is checked, not just your wi fi password, but your router

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login credentials if an attacker finds your login credentials.

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They can change your DNS servers to their malicious servers or even worse, infect your rather with

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the malicious software.

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We have virtual private network, the VPN, so we can be used to create a secure environment for sensitive

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information within a local area network.

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So they use a key best encryption to create a subnet for secure communication.

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This way, even if an attacker happens to get on a network that is shared, he will not be able to decipher

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the traffic in the VPN because it is encrypted.

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We can force activities so actually we can be used to securely communicate over activity using public

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private key exchange.

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This prevents an attacker from having any use of data.

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He may be sniffing website.

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So you should only use expletives and not provide alternatives.

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Users can install browser ins to enforce always using HDTV on requests.

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The public Quebecer based authentication, many of them attacks typically involve spoofing something

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or another.

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So public Kieber based authentication like oracy can be used in various layers of this deck to help

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ensure whether the things you are communicating with are actually the things you want to communicate

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to be communicating with.

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Thanks for watching.

