WEBVTT

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 Hello and welcome to this video titled,
 Configuring DHCP Snooping in Cisco

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 iOS. In this video, I'm going to show
 you the commands to actually get

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 DHCP snooping working, and a commander
 to verify that's actually turned

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 on and doing what you
 expected it to do.

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 So let's start with our configuration
 commands for DHCP snooping.

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 Step number one, we have to enable it
 globally with the IP DHCP snooping

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 command. Now, this command is a little
 funny because when you turn this

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 on, it doesn't appear
 to be doing anything.

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 There's no tables that are built.

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 DHCP snooping doesn't appear
 to be doing much.

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 So here's an analogy I want
 to draw with this command.

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 If you have ever configured a routing
 protocol in a Cisco router before,

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 now if you haven't, this analogy is
 not going to make much sense to you.

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 But in a router, if you configure routing
 protocol, what do you normally

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 do? You say at the global configuration
 level, you say router, and then

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 you configure your protocol.

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 For example, router, rip.

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 Now, once you do that and you hit enter,
 they'll drop you down into a

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 sub-mode called config-router.

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 Now, if you configure router rip or
 router OSPF or router EIGRP, that

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 alone is not really
 doing anything.

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 It won't start the
 routing protocol.

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 It won't learn routes.

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 It won't advertise routes.

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 But that command is doing something
 in the background.

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 It's actually doing
 several things.

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 It's telling the central processing
 unit, the brain of the router, hey,

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 start up this routing
 protocol process.

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 In other words, get ready
 to run the logic.

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 It's also saying, hey, this routing protocol
 is going to need some memory

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 for things. Like it's going to need
 to carve out some memory to store

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 routes and to store the information
 about routes it's about to learn.

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 So this command here says, hey, let's
 take some of our memory and carve

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 out a section of it that this routing
 protocol is going to use.

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 So now when we do our next command to
 actually start the routing protocol

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 and get it operational, everything's
 already pre-built in the background

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 and ready and working
 and ready to go.

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 Same thing is true here with
 the IPDCP snooping command.

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 You see DHCP snooping is going to require
 a DHCP snooping binding database

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 to be built. So this command here tells
 the CPU, hey, get ready, carve

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 out some memory, structure it the way
 we're going to need to create the

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 DHCP snooping binding table
 and get it ready to go.

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 The next command after that is actually
 going to be the command that's

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 going to enable DHCP snooping on the VLAN
 of your choice, like IPDCP snooping

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 VLAN 2 or VLAN 2-7 to run it
 across a range of VLANs.

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 And because we already did the IPDCP
 snooping command, it's ready to go.

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 It's carved out the memory, it's ready
 to start building the binding database.

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 Now, with just those two commands, we're
 not done yet because every interface

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 in the VLAN that we selected here will
 be configured as an untrusted port

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 for DHCP snooping, which means whatever
 interface is connected to our

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 real legitimate DHCP server is not going
 to have any packets transmitted

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 out of that interface.

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 So we need to go to that interface and
 configure it right here as IPDCP

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 snooping trust. We need to make at
 least one interface, a trusted port

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 that leads to our legitimate
 DHCP server.

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 I skipped over a command there, the
 IPDCP snooping limit rate command.

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 So one form of a DHCP attack is called
 a DHCP denial of service attack,

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 where someone could say, hey, what I'm
 going to do is I'm just going to

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 start some packet generator in my laptop,
 which is going to create maybe

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 1,000 DHCP discover packets
 every single second.

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 Now, I'm just going to pound the DHCP
 server over and over and over again

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 with DHCP discover packets to where
 maybe just kills the server.

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 I just hit the server so often with
 DHCP discovers that it fries it and

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 just cause it to crash.

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 Well, this command here could prevent that
 by rate limiting incoming packets.

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 Now, just be aware, this packet, this
 command here only works on untrusted

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 interfaces, which is where a DHCP attack
 would normally initiate from

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 anyway. And this last command
 is very important.

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 So if you've done a studying of DHCP
 snooping or watched any of my other

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 videos, you will have learned that
 when you enable DHCP snooping on a

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 switch, by default, it will insert
 a special DHCP option called option

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 82 into the DHCP client messages.

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 This is a bad thing because most DHCP
 servers don't recognize option 82.

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 And if you have a router or another
 switch configured as a DHCP server,

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 it will drop those DHCP client messages
 when it sees option 82.

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 It doesn't like that.

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 So we need to tell DHCP
 snooping, don't do that.

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 So here we're going to want to configure
 no IPDHCP snooping information

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 option, which means don't
 put in option 82.

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 So when you configure this, this is
 how you monitor it, with the show

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 IPDHCP snooping command.

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 And you can see here it verifies that
 DHCP snooping has been configured

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 and is running on the VLAN of
 your choice, like VLAN 18.

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 It'll show you here whatever interfaces
 that you've configured as trusted

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 interfaces. And just as importantly,
 we can see here it verifies that

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 option 82 is disabled.

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 We do not want option
 82 turned on.

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 So this is good.

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 This confirms it has
 been disabled.

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 Now, how do I know that DHCP snooping
 is actually seeing anything and

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 building any tables?

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 Well, we can look at
 the binding database.

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 Show IP DHCP snooping binding shows us
 the various clients that have passed

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 through here. So we can see, for example,
 that on fast ethan at 0 slash

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 4, which is an untrusted interface,
 we have seen the client with this

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 particular MAC address, that client was
 offered and accepted that IP address.

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 We can see in seconds how long the lease
 is good for, and all that information

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 was gleaned via the DHCP snooping information
 or the DHCP snooping feature

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 on VLAN 18. So the show IP DHCP snooping
 binding command gives us all

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 of that good output.

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 So that concludes this video on DHCP snooping
 configuration and verification.

