WEBVTT

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 Hello and welcome to this video where
 we're going to do a refresh on dynamic

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 ARP inspection and talk about what it's
 useful for, how to configure it,

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 and how to monitor it.

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 All right, so what problem is solved
 with dynamic ARP inspection?

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 Well, at its basis, a lot of the same
 fundamental reasons why DHCP could

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 provide an attack surface for us is also
 why ARPs could provide an attack

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 surface. Let me explain.

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 We know that an ARP request
 goes out as a broadcast.

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 So once again, as a switch receives an
 ARP request, it will normally just

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 flood that to everybody, which means
 if someone's running a wire shark

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 stiffer capture or something like that,
 they now know who you're interested

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 in. You know, if you're ARPing for somebody,
 they know what your IP address

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 is, they know the IP address or the thing
 you're ARPing for that you have

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 interest for that, and they know your
 MAC address, and they can use that

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 against you. For example, here we have
 a situation where PCA is ARPing

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 for his default gateway.

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 The malicious evil person sees that
 and says, okay, now there's nothing

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 that the person can do to
 stop the ARP response.

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 That is a unicast packet, so right
 now PCA has the correct entry.

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 113 equals MAC address CC.

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 That is correct.

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 But that person there, that malicious
 evil person, is aware that PCA exists,

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 and PCA is interested in
 his default gateway.

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 So now that person can do, that malicious
 person can change their own

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 IP address to match the default gateway,
 leaving their own MAC address

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 alone as MAC address BB, and now that
 person can send an unsolicited ARP

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 response and say, hey, PCA, just want
 you to know I'm your router, but

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 my MAC address has changed.

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 I'm still 1113, just like your ARP
 for, but now my MAC address is BB,

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 which is clearly wrong.

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 So we have now poisoned
 the ARP cache of PCA.

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 So what's this going to mean?

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 Well, now when PCA needs to send any
 packets that are off network, which

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 let's face it, that's like 99% of what
 you do is off your own subnet,

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 those packets are going to be directed
 via ethernet to the MAC address

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 of the malicious rogue person.

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 They're going to get your packets because
 it's going to their MAC address

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 BB. Now, if they're smart, they will
 forward your traffic to the actual

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 router so it can get to the outside
 world, but now they have visibility

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 of everything you're doing, all outbound
 packets you're sending that you

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 think you're sending to your default
 gateway are going to this man in

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 the middle instead.

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 So dynamic ARP inspection is
 very simple how it works.

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 First of all, like it says here, it works
 hand in hand with the DHCP snooping

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 binding database.

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 So here's how it works.

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 When dynamic ARP inspection is enabled
 for a particular VLAN, then every

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 ARP packet, whether it be an ARP request
 or an ARP reply that comes into

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 that VLAN is going to be stopped, and
 we're going to inspect it against

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 the DHCP snooping
 binding database.

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 So for example, if PC 1111 on port 1
 sends an ARP request, that's going

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 to come into the switch.

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 The switch is going to
 say, hold on a second.

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 Before I transmit your ARP request,
 before I forward it, let me verify

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 that you are who you say you are.

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 So you say you're 1111 and you're on
 port 01 and you say this is your

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 MAC address. Let me
 see if that's true.

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 I'm going to go into the DHCP snooping
 binding database because after

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 all, you got that IP
 address via DHCP.

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 And oh, yep, there you are right
 in the DHCP snooping database.

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 It does say you're 1111, that does
 match with the MAC address that you

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 say you are, and apparently that
 was learned on port number one.

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 You're good to go.

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 I'll go ahead and forward
 your ARP request.

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 And the same thing happens when
 the ARP reply comes back.

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 It'll be stopped, paused, and inspected
 against the DHCP snooping binding

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 database. If there is no match,
 we will drop that ARP packet.

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 Now, here's a challenge with this.


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 This is all well and good if the ARP
 requests and the ARP responses are

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 coming from devices that obtain their
 IP address via DHCP because their

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 information, their binding, is in the
 DHCP snooping binding database.

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 But what if we have a device with a static
 IP address like a router, like

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 a server? Well, that's not going to
 be in your DHCP binding tail because

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 they don't do DHCP, which means that
 ARP requests going to them will make

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 it there. But then when they send their
 ARP reply, the switch will not

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 be able to validate their ARP reply
 because there will be no entry in

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 the binding database to validate that
 they are who they say they are,

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 or if they try to ARP something themselves,
 like they're trying to ARP

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 their default gateway.

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 Once again, those ARPs
 will be dropped.

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 So how do we deal with that?

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 Well, there's two ways.

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 Just like DHCP snooping has a concept
 of untrusted and trusted interfaces,

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 so does dynamic ARP inspection.

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 This validation of ARPs, whether they
 be requests or replies, only takes

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 place on untrusted interfaces.

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 If you make an interface trusted, well,
 like it sounds, then we trust

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 any ARP requests or replies that
 are received on that interface.

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 So if you have an interface that's directly
 connected to an end host like

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 a server or router, that has a static
 IP address, that's probably what

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 you want to do is make that interface
 on the switch a dynamic ARP inspection

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 trusted interface.

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 But what if you have
 something like this?

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 What if we had our
 switch right here?

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 And maybe it was connected to a server,
 but this isn't any old server.

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 This is a server running maybe
 VMware or something.

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 And inside this VMware server,
 we have a whole bunch of VMs.

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 So we have one physical link going
 there, but then we have a bunch of

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 VMs with static IP addresses.

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 All right, maybe this
 is 1111, 1112, 1113.

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 Now those are known VMs
 that we put in there.

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 Those are authorized.

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 So you say, okay, well, I'll just make
 this interface on the switch trusted

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 from the perspective of
 dynamic ARP inspection.

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 But here's the problem.

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 If somebody is able to gain access to
 that switch, what's to prevent them

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 from configuring a rogue virtual machine
 with some other IP address?

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 And now that rogue device has pure freedom
 to do some sort of ARP attack,

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 because it's coming in
 on a trusted interface.

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 What do we do then?

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 Because trusted interface is not
 going to work in the situation.

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 Well, in this case, what we would want
 to do is on that switch, we will

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 want to leave that interface as untrusted,
 and we're going to want to

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 configure an ARP access list.

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 So for the known VMs or for those known
 static things, we'll configure

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 an ARP access list saying this IP address
 and this MAC address, we know

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 about them. Those are permitted.

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 And then if something comes in that
 untrusted port that matches that ACL

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 that's permitted,
 we let it through.

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 If something comes in that does not
 match that ACL, then we drop it.

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 So dynamic ARP inspection, just like
 DHCP snooping has the concept of

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 untrusted and trusted interfaces, and
 it relies on the DHCP snooping binding

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 database to do the validation
 of ARP requests and replies.

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 Thank you so much for watching this
 video on a review of the theory and

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 operation of dynamic
 ARP inspection.

